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The aim of this study was to identify how top managers’ health and safety (H&S) 
management practices are affected by their motivations.  The research focused on the 
top organisational level because, under the European framework of enforced self-
regulation, it is those managers who are responsible for appropriate H&S conditions in 
workplaces.  The study’s results should help to better understand managers’ decision 
making, supporting H&S authorities and other stakeholders in promoting safety at work. 
 
Managerial systems and underlying H&S motivations were investigated based on 24 
semi-structured interviews with top-management representatives of medium-sized 
organisations.  The sample comprised four professional fire departments in each of the 
selected countries: Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.  Relying on a pragmatic 
research paradigm, the interview data and related organisational documents were used 
to develop cross-sectional case studies.  These were subject to inductive within-case and 
cross-case analyses, including the development of three country cases.  
 
The findings have been aggregated into a typology of managers’ H&S motivations in 
their managerial and regulatory context.  A distinction is made between two types of 
decision makers: Law Managers and Law & People Managers.  The first type reacts to 
the power of formal rules only, striving to implement legally required H&S procedures.  
The second type additionally exhibits moral and personal motivations.  These moral 
views result in more effective approaches to H&S management.  In contradiction with 
legal requirements, Law & People Managers often use focused change projects to 
improve H&S conditions, which was exemplified at organisations in all three countries. 
 
The study contributes to the scientific and practical discourse by adding a new 
managerial perspective on H&S.  This can improve communication between managers 
and authorities, allowing organisations to apply this study’s empirically tested model of 
effective project-based H&S management.  It is recommended that regulations and 
corporate training aim at sensitising top managers to the moral aspects of H&S. 
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„Man könnte wohl sagen, daß die lebendige Menschlichkeit eines Menschen 
in dem Maße abnimmt, in dem er auf das Denken verzichtet...“ 
 
[“To be sure, the very humanity of man 





Lessing-Preis, Hamburg, 1959 
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Glossary of Key Terms 
 
Approach to health and safety management 
A characteristic set of managerial practices that are applied to create workplaces with 
acceptable health and safety conditions (EU-OSHA, 2012a; Hale et al., 2012) 
 
Behaviour orientation of health and safety management systems 
All health and safety management practices aimed at informal behaviours, as well as the 
associated social control (Guldenmund, 2010; Krzywicki and Keesey, 2011) 
 
Co-determination 
An approach to health and safety management that, according to the findings of this 
study, is governance oriented and lacks top-management leadership (section 7.2.2) 
 
Co-operation 
An approach to health and safety management that, according to the findings of this 
study, is behaviour oriented and lacks employee innovation (section 7.2.3) 
 
Domination 
An approach to health and safety management that, according to the findings of this 
study, relies on the authority of top management and lacks employee innovation 
(section 7.2.4) 
 
Elements of an effective health and safety management system 
Four specific health and safety practices of top management and employees that 
together create an optimal safety climate (Vinodkumar and Bhasi, 2010), described in 
this study’s model as ‘deciding’, ‘innovating’, ‘leading’ and ‘taking care’ (Figure 2.7) 
 
Employees 
Organisational members who act within the defined health and safety management 
system, including supervisors who execute the practical elements of safety climate 





A regulatory approach that allows organisations to develop, within a prescribed 
framework, individual rules that are enforced by authorities mainly through dialogue 
rather than sanctions (Braithwaite, 2011; Johnstone, 2014) 
 
Enforcement pyramid 
A concept of responsive regulation according to which managers’ compliance is 
stimulated by a combination of support and deterrence; generally applied in enforced 
self-regulation (Braithwaite, 2011) 
 
Focusing 
An approach to health and safety management that, according to the findings of this 
study, typically covers all elements of an effective health and safety management 
system; often applied in the context of change projects (section 7.2.1) 
 
Formalistic organisation 
The context in which the health and safety behaviour of an organisation’s members is 
generally characterised by regular analyses and scheduled meetings as described as a 
finding of this study in section 7.1 
 
Good moral judgment 
A concept of ethical decision-making according to which managers’ compliance is 
stimulated by supporting and sensitising discussions (Heyler et al., 2016; Nielsen, 1984) 
 
Governance orientation of health and safety management systems 
All health and safety management practices aimed at formally documented structures 
and processes as well as associated rule compliance (Griffin and Hu, 2013; 
Guldenmund, 2010) 
 
Health and safety condition 
The state of the workplace with regard to the risk to employees of becoming ill or 





Health and safety management practices 
Management activities that are intended to create workplaces with acceptable health and 
safety conditions (EU-OSHA, 2012a; Hale et al., 2012) 
 
Health and safety management system 
All health and safety management practices in a specific context, defined by formally 
documented structures and processes, as well as informal behaviours related to health 
and safety goals and policies (Guldenmund, 2010; Hale et al., 2012; Yorio et al., 2015; 
Zohar and Luria, 2005) 
 
Health and safety management system model 
Description of a specific way of implementing a health and safety management system 
with reference to the four elements ‘deciding’, ‘innovating’, ‘leading’ and ‘taking care’ 
(Figure 2.7) that were derived from Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2010) 
 
Law Manager 
A type of managerial motivation that is related to top managers directly responding to 
regulatory promotion according to the enforcement pyramid (Braithwaite, 2011), 
reflecting a strong motivation from the ‘power of formal rules’ as identified in 
section 8.3 
 
Law & People Manager 
A type of managerial motivation that is related to top managers trying to combine legal 
compliance and feelings of moral responsibility (Hawkins, 2002), reflecting a co-
existence of ‘power of formal rules’ and ‘moral and personal’ motivations as identified 
in section 8.3 
 
Managerial context 
Characteristics of health and safety issues in their organisational environment, which 
top management addresses with specific ways of implementing a health and safety 





A factor that drives people’s activities (Bluff, 2011; EU-OSHA, 2010); the motivational 
drivers for H&S management are categorised in this study as ‘limited resources and 
savings’, ‘overall performance and safety’, ‘power of formal rules’, ‘moral and 
personal’, and ‘power of informal rules’ (section 9.1) 
 
Organisational context 
Characteristics of an organisation’s internal environment; they may be categorised as 
ongoing operations, change projects or high-level decisions (Capon, 2004) 
 
Pragmatic organisation 
The context in which the health and safety behaviour of an organisation’s members is 
generally characterised by pragmatic views and spontaneous meetings as described as a 
finding of this study in section 7.1 
 
Regulatory context / regulatory environment 
The characteristics of the regulator’s activities that top management responds to with 




Employees’ perceptions of formal and informal rules, as well as their preferences 
regarding the health and safety conditions; typically measured with quantitative 
employee surveys (Guldenmund, 2010; Zohar, 2010) 
 
Safety culture 
The values and beliefs of an organisation’s members regarding the health and safety 
conditions and related activities; typically revealed by long-term expert judgement 
(Guldenmund, 2010; Hale et al., 2010) 
 
Top management 
The highest-ranking managers and the H&S specialists who advise them; together they 




Typology of managers’ health and safety motivations 
A grouping and characterisation of managers based on their dominant motivations for 
engaging in health and safety management, reflecting managers’ views on the issue 
(Bazeley, 2013) 
 
Way of implementing a health and safety management system 
The manner in which top managers facilitate the execution of organisational health and 
safety goals, policies, procedures and measures (Zohar and Luria, 2005) 
  
 xviii 
List of Abbreviations 
 
DE Germany 
D-1 to D-5 Fire departments numbers one to five in Germany 
  (including D-1 as participant in the second pilot study) 
EU European Union 
EU-OSHA European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, Bilbao, Spain 
HSE Health and Safety Executive, a non-departmental public body 
  in the United Kingdom 
HSMS Health and safety management system 
H&S Health and safety 
IOSH Institution of Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH), 
  Wigston, United Kingdom 
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OHS Occupational health and safety 
OHSAS 18001 Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series 18001, 
  an internationally applied British standard for HSMS 
OSH Occupational safety and health 
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S-1 to S-5 Fire departments numbers one to five in Sweden 
  (including S-1 as participant excluded from the analysis) 





Introduction and Context of the Research 
 
1.1 Rationale for research 
 
Modern health and safety (H&S) management is a complex task for managers.  Not 
only does it require compliance with the relevant laws, regulations and guidelines, it 
also requires that managers develop their own organisational structures and practices to 
ensure good H&S conditions for their employees (EU-OSHA, 2012c).  This idea is 
reflected in the EU Framework Directive 89/391/EEC on Safety and Health at Work, 
which provides a framework of enforced self-regulation across Europe (Ales, 2013).  
Under enforced self-regulation, authorities define broad regulatory goals that managers 
are expected to meet by developing their own H&S measures (Fairman and Yapp, 
2005a).  Apart from basic rules for H&S management processes, only a few operational 
H&S measures are defined as mandatory minimum requirements (Hale et al., 2015).  
Authorities focus on providing compliance support rather than on enforcement through 
sanctions (Braithwaite, 2011). 
 
Hutter (2001) described the health and safety management system (HSMS) of British 
Railways as having been implemented under enforced self-regulation in the UK in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s.  Based on 135 qualitative interviews at the company, she 
investigated the organisational H&S conditions under this regulatory approach, which 
was adopted in the UK in 1974.  She found that the HSMS of British Railways was not 
effective despite the company’s high H&S motivation and its compliance with legal 
requirements.  Hutter (2001, p. 393) stated: 
 
“British Railways provided safety equipment and safety 
clothing but these were not always used. It had in place 
rules and systems for health and safety but these were not 
always enforced. It also provided health and safety 
education, but the risks were not always understood by its 
staff.”  
 
Hutter (2001) attributed the shortcomings of the HSMS at British Railways to complex 
corporate H&S rules, a fragmented company structure and a heterogeneous corporate 
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culture.  She concluded that the company was not able to create good H&S conditions.  
But why should an organisation not be able to overcome such problems?  In contrast to 
Hutter (2001), this study assumes that a company’s ability to implement an effective 
HSMS is determined by top management.  The initiative of top managers and the H&S 
specialists advising them has been described as essential to promote good H&S 
conditions in organisations (Hale et al., 2010).  
 
To reveal why top managers implement HSMSs of varying effectiveness, this study 
investigated the relationship between managerial motivations and management 
practices.  Top management comprised the decisions makers who defined the working 
environment of their employees by allocating resources, implementing organisational 
processes and assuming leadership roles (Hale et al., 2010).  There is broad literature on 
the ways in which they might create a good safety culture, a good safety climate and, 
ultimately, good working conditions for their employees (Yorio et al., 2015).  In 
Chapter 2 the literature on H&S management is reviewed and a model of an effective 
HSMS is developed, forming the basis for data collection and analysis. 
 
Few studies have been conducted on managers’ motivations for implementing HSMSs 
in certain ways (Frick and Johanson, 2013; MacEachen et al., 2016).  Previous research 
mostly took an inspectors’ perspective by evaluating formal compliance (Fairman and 
Yapp, 2005a) or investigating the application of H&S management tools that authorities 
provided (Beck, 2011).  For example, a strong motivation for legal compliance might 
explain why, according to Hutter (2001), British Railways complied with the legally 
required rules and procedures but paid little attention to the outcomes of their HSMS.  
The dominating perspective of inspectors might be considered the cause for the lack of 
research on managers’ activities and motivations.  This study addressed this literature 
gap by investigating the views and experiences of top managers and the H&S specialists 
advising them.  Surveys indicated that about three-quarters of managers considered 
H&S issues to be important (Beck, 2011; KPMG, 2001; Njå and Fjelltun, 2010).  Such 
individuals with a generally positive view on H&S management were expected to 
participate in the semi-structured interviews of this study.  The aim was to identify how 




1.2 Scientific background 
 
The general objective of an HSMS is to ensure that the members of an organisation act 
in a common and coordinated way to reduce their individual H&S risks.  EU-OSHA 
(2012a, p. 8) summarised: 
 
“Prevention is the cornerstone of the European approach 
to occupational safety and health.  In practice, this means 
analysing work processes to identify short- and long-term 
risks, and then taking action to either avoid them as far as 
possible or mitigate them.” 
 
EU-OSHA (2012a) emphasised that top managers are obligated to define decision-
making processes for determining the extent to which risks can be avoided or which 
risks will be accepted.  They hold the ultimate responsibility for the actual H&S 
conditions.  
 
The task of creating a healthy and safe workplace is difficult because risk determinants 
in employees’ physical and organisational working environment are often complex and 
ambiguous in nature (Reason, 2016).  Even comprehensive technical, organisational or 
psychological analyses do not provide definitive results.  Therefore, managers have to 
decide on the basis of incomplete information (Hale et al., 2012).  They may use 
empirical studies by external research institutions, or they may follow the advice of 
regulatory authorities.  However, according to European H&S laws, managers are 
ultimately responsible for the well-being of their employees (EU-OSHA, 2012a).  They 
act under considerable legal uncertainty because legal prosecution typically takes place 
only in the case of severe accidents (Gunningham, 1998; Gregor, 2006; Johnstone, 
2014).  This uncertainty and the incomplete information on H&S risks result in complex 
conditions for decision makers. 
 
An organisation’s HSMS comprises all strategic H&S practices designed to create 
appropriate H&S conditions (Yorio et al., 2015).  Both formal organisational rules, such 
as certified risk assessment procedures, and informally developed behaviours, such as 
common work practices, must be considered (Hale et al., 2012).  The literature review 
in Chapter 2 suggests that an effective HSMS has two prerequisites.  First, the 
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engagement of top management and employees should be balanced, because neither 
managers nor workers can create good H&S conditions alone (EU-OSHA, 2012a).  
Second, the HSMS should consider both rule-based governance and initiative-based 
behaviour.  The focus on rule compliance is necessary to ensure basic safety practices 
(Griffin and Hu, 2013).  Supporting employee initiatives through a positive safety 
climate promotes the development of good H&S measures (Denti, 2013).  
 
A modern, proactive approach to H&S management has evolved since the 1970s 
(Reason, 2016).  The central definition of H&S measures is replaced by the application 
of management systems that enable bottom-up H&S innovations (Drais et al., 2008; 
Hale et al., 2012).  H&S rules and measures are developed close to the workplace, using 
regular formal risk assessments based on the latest information from internal and 
external sources (Reason, 2000).  Management provides the leadership and 
organisational structures for the development and implementation of good H&S 
conditions.  In order to work, the HSMS must be driven by the “twin motors of top 
management and the safety professional” (Hale et al., 2010, p. 1034).  This approach 
corresponds to the European regulatory framework mentioned above (EU-OSHA, 
2012a).  Such systems provide a framework for all H&S-related activities within an 
organisation and should foster the creation of a safety culture, which, in turn, supports 
the optimisation of the H&S conditions (Guldenmund, 2010). 
 
H&S regulation in Europe has developed in parallel with the modernisation of 
management approaches (Reason, 2016).  In the past, H&S authorities used to define 
comprehensive and detailed rules for many different types of workplaces.  Today they 
focus on supporting organisations in implementing modern HSMSs.  Thus, the 
regulatory approach moved away from command and control toward enforced self-
regulation (Fairman and Yapp, 2005a).  This development began in Scandinavia and the 
United Kingdom in the 1970s (Walters and Wadsworth, 2014) and was then transferred 
to the other member states of the European Union in the 1990s (Ales, 2013).  Due to 
historical and socio-political influences, variations between these two main approaches 
still exist within the EU (Walters and Wadsworth, 2014).  Ales (2013, p. 449) explained 
that the “procedural part of health and safety law” was harmonised by EU Framework 
Directive 89/391/EEC on Safety and Health at Work while “the substantive part of it”, 
comprising quality targets, organisational procedures and legal penalties, remained 
national.  
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Baldock et al. (2006) and Beck (2011) stated the following prerequisites for good H&S 
conditions based on independent research in Germany and the United Kingdom: 
 
• Management commitment, including awareness, capability and a proactive 
approach 
• Cooperative work culture 
• Availability of information and propensity to utilise it 
• External factors, including inspections and stakeholder demands 
 
The first aspect reflects the responsible managers’ general knowledge and views on 
H&S risks and related measures.  The second aspect refers to the interaction between 
managers and their employees.  These two prerequisites determine the organisational 
framework for a modern approach to H&S management as described by EU-OSHA 
(2012a).  The availability and usage of information influences the contents of the 
discussion and thus the achievable quality of the H&S conditions (Reason, 1998).  
Finally, the external factors influence top managers’ decisions on H&S measures and 
budgets, balancing the competing forces of production and safety (Reason, 2016). 
 
Top managers’ decision-making is mainly based on legal, economic and social-context 
motivations (Bluff, 2011).  Authorities may address these motivations in order to 
change H&S management practices.  Previous studies on managers’ H&S motivations 
and practices took a rather general perspective (Bluff, 2011; Frick and Johanson, 2013).  
They investigated the preferences of managers but did not consider why or how 
managers implemented HSMSs in their organisations.  Fairman and Yapp (2005a), as 
well as Hale et al. (2015), stated that managers of small enterprises preferred clear rules 
from authorities to general management guidelines, because they did not have the 
resources to develop their own H&S measures.  In contrast, larger organisations 
preferred the freedom of the modern H&S management approach and often exceeded 
legal requirements because they wanted to mitigate reputational risks (Hale et al., 2015; 
Gunningham et al., 2005).  Research to date has not focused on management activities 
but on the relationship between regulation and rule compliance (Gunningham et al., 
2005; Hale et al., 2015; Scholz and Gray, 1990; Walters et al., 2011) or regulation and 
safety outcomes (Hale et al., 2010; Lindøe et al., 2006).  How top managers’ decisions 
on HSMS are affected by their H&S motivations has been investigated by only a limited 
number of case studies that are mostly confined to individual countries, such as Beck 
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1.3 Why fire departments in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden? 
 
Cases from professional fire departments were expected to provide good examples for 
H&S management because H&S awareness is generally high due to the relatively 
dangerous work environment (Alavaara, 2007; Reason, 1998).  In the selected countries, 
fire departments are municipal organisations that are free in decision making, especially 
in terms of H&S.  They report to the cities’ mayors but are independent from the rest of 
the public administrations due to their distinct area of work.  The commanders of the 
brigades and the H&S specialists advising them were therefore interviewed as 
representatives of top management.  Additionally, organisational H&S documents were 
reviewed to investigate the individual ways of implementing an HSMS.  These seemed 
to be relatively diverse in fire departments because, during emergency situations, 
firefighters are typically exposed to a combination of many different occupational risks, 
while in between emergencies, they face the general risks of office and maintenance 
work (EU-OSHA, 2011; Gerhold, 2012).  Medium-sized fire departments were chosen 
in order to investigate management decisions at the intersection of large organisations, 
which prefer the freedom of modern self-regulation, and small organisations, which like 
clear rules from H&S authorities (section 1.2).  In the three countries selected, fire 
departments are local organisations under the control of municipalities.   
 
Different countries were considered because varying regulatory environments were 
expected to have differing influences on managers.  Due to historical and socio-political 
influences, the regulatory environments and management practices differ between 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden (Walters and Wadsworth, 2014).  The Europe-
wide quantitative survey ‘Esener-2’ of the European Agency for Safety and Health at 
Work in Bilbao, Spain (EU-OSHA, 2015) confirms this.  The European approach to 
H&S management is based on the assumption that “those controlling the work are in 
the best position to control the risks” (EU-OSHA, 2015, p. 6).  Thus, an organisation 
that pursues the desired approach should conduct its workplace risk assessments with its 
own staff.  The national differences shown in Figure 1.1 suggest that the modern 
approach to H&S management is applied to varying extents.  Indeed, Sweden may be 
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considered a leading country, while Germany and the Netherlands are followers 
(Walters and Wadsworth, 2014).  Germany and the Netherlands differ in terms of top-
management attention to H&S (Walz and de Ruig, 2011). 
 
Figure 1.1 
Workplace risk assessments by internal staff (EU-OSHA, 2015) 
 
 
Before deciding to take fire departments as an example, the literature was investigated 
to determine whether there are fundamental differences between public and private 
organisations with regard to H&S management.  No direct answer to this question was 
found.  However, the study by Bysted and Hansen (2015) provided relevant information 
because the European approach to H&S management represents a kind of innovation 
management (Drais et al., 2008; Hale et al., 2012).  Bysted and Hansen (2015) 
concluded that innovative behaviour does not differ between public and private 
organisations, but rather between different subsectors in the public and private domain.  
Both public and private organisations were more or less innovative.  Accordingly, it 
could be assumed that both public and private organisations had a competent HSMS.  
Thus, fire departments were considered a suitable example for investigating H&S 
management in general. 
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1.4 Research question, aim and objectives 
 
To address the identified gap in the literature on H&S management, the relationship 
between managers’ H&S motivations and their ways of implementing an HSMS was 
investigated.  This managerial-behaviour perspective was considered important because 
top management decides on the characteristics of the organisational HSMS and thus the 
H&S conditions for employees.  Therefore, top managers and the H&S experts advising 
them were asked about their views and experiences.  The answers from the semi-
structured interviews were codified for analysis.  By comparing and contrasting the 
codes in different regulatory environments, relationships were identified and an 
empirically based typology of managers’ H&S motivations was developed.  This 
research approach is reflected in the following research question, aim and objectives.  
 
Research question: 
How are top managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS affected by their H&S 
motivations in different regulatory environments? 
 
Research aim: 
To identify how top managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS are affected by 
their H&S motivations in different regulatory environments. 
 
Research objectives: 
• To codify top managers’ ways of implementing an organisational HSMS. 
• To codify top managers’ perceptions of H&S authorities’ regulatory approaches. 
• To codify the H&S motivations of top managers. 
• To identify relationships between managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS 
and their H&S motivations in different regulatory environments. 
• To develop a typology of managers’ H&S motivations in their managerial and 
regulatory context.  
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1.5 Expected contributions 
 
The main result of this study was expected to be an empirically based typology of 
managers’ H&S motivations in their managerial and regulatory context.  This outcome 
should illustrate how top managers’ decisions regarding HSMSs are affected by their 
H&S motivations.  The study adds an otherwise absent managerial-behaviour 
perspective to the predominant inspectors’ view in the current literature.  The case 
studies provide examples of current managerial practices that may be applied across fire 
brigades and countries.  Additionally, the cross-case analysis of three countries 
illuminates the effects of different national regulatory environments.  Therefore, the 
envisaged results are relevant to managers and H&S authorities alike.  The typology of 
managers’ H&S motivations was expected to indicate which H&S motivations should 
be addressed to promote effective HSMSs in organisations.  It should enable H&S 
authorities and other stakeholders, such as trade union representatives and non-
executive directors, to improve their measures for promoting health and safety at work.  
Finally, an analytical tool for reviewing organisational HSMSs was to be tested and 
refined in order to provide a reference point for effective H&S management. 
 
 
1.6 Outline of the thesis 
 
This thesis comprises 12 chapters.  The first five chapters describe the scientific and 
practical foundations of the study.  Chapter 1 presents the context of the research and 
Chapter 2 comprises a comprehensive literature review.  The research question and aim 
as stated in section 1.4 address the identified gap in the literature on H&S management.  
The related objectives are explained in Chapter 2, where a model of the elements of an 
effective HSMS is derived, and enforced self-regulation is explained as the European 
approach towards H&S regulation.  The literature on managers’ H&S motivations and 
decision-making is reviewed.  Subsequently, the research methodology and design are 
developed in Chapters 3 and 4.  A qualitative methodology within a pragmatic paradigm 
is justified using case studies to investigate the complex social phenomenon of 
managers’ H&S motivations and their decisions regarding HSMS implementation.  
Qualitative semi-structured interviews are the primary data source, as is common in 
management research (Piekkari et al., 2009).  The interviews were designed based on 
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conversations with representatives of Dutch, German and Swedish fire services.  
Subsequently, two pilot case studies were conducted, as presented in Chapter 5.   
 
The last seven chapters of this thesis present the data collection and analyses, which 
were carried out according to the approach of Eisenhardt (1989).  Individual case 
studies are described in Chapter 6 with a view to the theoretical framework from the 
literature.  There are 30 examples of organisational HSMS implementations from 24 
interviews at 12 fire departments.  Categories of organisational and regulatory contexts 
are defined in Chapter 7 based on cross-case analyses, and the envisaged typology of 
managers’ H&S motivations is developed in Chapter 8.  Subsequently, conclusions are 
discussed in view of the literature (Chapter 9).  The identified relationships between 
managers’ H&S motivations and their ways of implementing HSMSs and their 
regulatory experiences are compared with findings of other studies.  The expected 
contributions to the knowledge base, stated in section 1.5, were achieved as outlined in 
Chapter 10.  Additionally, focused change projects are presented as a newly identified 
approach to H&S management that might amend or replace common ways of 
implementing an HSMS.  The thesis ends with reasons for and against generalisation 
and recommendations for future research in Chapter 11, and personal reflections on 






2.1 Conceptual framework of H&S management  
  
There is a diverse literature base on HSMSs and their effects on the organisational 
safety culture, the safety climate, the physical H&S environment and the resulting H&S 
conditions.  Based on a model presented by Yorio et al. (2015), Figure 2.1 was 
developed to provide a structural overview for this literature review.  The main 
additions to the original model relate to regulatory and industrial influences on top 
managers (Bluff, 2012), the effects of the physical environment (Makin & Winder, 
2008; Reason, 1998) and the overarching concept of safety culture (Guldenmund, 2010; 
Reason, 1998; Reason, 2016).  The resulting framework comprises all major aspects of 
organisational H&S and its determinants. 
 
Figure 2.1 
Conceptual framework of organisational H&S and its determinants 
 
 
The H&S characteristics of an organisation are shown on the right side of Figure 2.1.  
Top management, comprising senior managers that are typically supported by H&S 
experts, forms these H&S characteristics by deciding on the organisational HSMS.  As 
shown on the left side of Figure 2.1, management decisions are influenced by industry 
culture, market forces and the H&S regulator.  The resulting HSMS may be formally 
defined or informally practised within the organisation.  It affects the safety climate and, 
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with it, employees’ safety behaviour as well as accident and illness rates.  The HSMS 
also determines the safety culture and physical working environment.  These two 
aspects represent the long-term, comparatively stable background of the organisation, 
being formed by previous resource allocations (for example to machinery) and previous 
H&S conditions (including major accidents).  The safety climate at the workplace 
develops on the basis of the implemented HSMS and the organisational safety culture as 
well as physical working environment.  The ultimate objective of all such management 
activities is to create good H&S conditions.  
 
With reference to Figure 2.1, this literature review distinguishes between three distinct 
streams of literature on organisations’ H&S characteristics.  These streams offer 
managers guidance from different perspectives: 
 
• The first perspective is safety culture as a comprehensive concept that takes into 
account both the effects of human behaviour on organisational safety and the 
historic focus on technology and working rules.  This literature is predominantly 
qualitative in nature and gives managers rather general recommendations. 
 
• The second is safety climate as a concept for measuring an organisation’s 
current H&S conditions.  These authors use quantitative employee surveys to 
identify the main drivers of H&S conditions. 
 
• The third perspective is that of practical HSMS guidelines that build on the 
above topics and that, to some extent, reflect legal norms.  These texts describe 
how to implement an HSMS in an organisation. 
 
The literature review first considers these three streams of literature to identify how 
managers should act to create appropriate working conditions.  The subsequent part of 
Chapter 2 then covers the literature on regulation and its effects on H&S management in 
organisations.  Finally, the literature on the role and motivations of top managers in the 
field of H&S is reviewed.  As mentioned by Bluff (2011) and MacEachen et al. (2016), 
there has been comparatively little research on managers’ H&S motivations and related 
activities.  The research question, aim and objectives are justified with reference to the 
comprehensive literature review.   
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2.2 Safety culture as an organisational background  
 
Hale et al. (2010, p. 1026) defined safety culture as “beliefs, motivations and choices of 
workforce (and management)”.  Safety culture provided the “motivational resources” 
and the “energy and priority which goes into animating” the HSMS.  Just like general 
organisational culture, safety culture is an overarching characteristic of a group of 
people that influences all activities and, with it, the overall H&S conditions.  To some 
extent, it is explicitly communicated, but mostly it is tacit in nature and thus difficult to 
completely describe and understand.  It is the result of an organisation’s history, its 
environment and its top-management leadership (Reason, 1998).  The term ‘safety 
culture’ has been used since the early 1970s and reflects the idea that human factors 
should be considered in H&S management (Reason, 2016). 
 
Guldenmund (2010) distinguished between three views on safety culture: academic, 
pragmatic and analytical.  The academic approach is mainly used in the scientific 
context and refers to qualitative ethnographic studies.  The basic idea is that an 
organisation’s safety culture develops over time as a result of both internal and external 
influences.  Culture is viewed as something an organisation “is” rather than “has” 
(Guldenmund, 2010, p. 1467).  According to Guldenmund (2010), there is little 
literature in this field.  Such research might provide rich descriptions of different 
manifestations of safety culture.  These could then be used to further develop the more 
applied approaches to safety culture, namely, the pragmatic and the analytical view.  
Only these views are considered in this literature review because the academic view 
does not provide guidance on practical H&S management. 
 
The pragmatic approach to safety culture focuses on offering managers guidance.  
Reason (1998, p. 302) stated: “for all practical purposes, a safe culture could be 
equated to an informed culture”.  A reporting system is used to collect information 
about the technological and organisational H&S conditions in order to ensure that every 
manager and employee has the information required to run the business safely.  The 
reporting system is characterised by proactive reporting by the organisation’s members.  
In line with the academic view and the definition of Hale et al. (2010), culture is 
characterised by the values and opinions of managers and employees.  It is analysed in 
the context of organisational structures and processes in order to derive solutions for 
businesses (Guldenmund, 2010).  Accordingly, the term ‘safety culture’ comprises the 
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soft or human elements of HSMSs, for example communication processes.  This mainly 
qualitative approach may also be called the consulting approach to safety culture 
because it has been widely used by management consultants in recent decades.  It might 
be considered the initial H&S approach from the 1970s for dealing with human factors 
in the field of H&S management. 
 
As shown in Figure 2.1, safety culture is an overarching concept that is related to all 
organisational elements of H&S management (Reason, 1998; Guldenmund, 2010).  It 
influences both the HSMS and employee perceptions.  In contrast to Yorio et al. (2015), 
the basic assumption of this study is that a strategically implemented HSMS is not 
defined by top managers and their H&S experts alone, it is also influenced by the 
organisational values, that is, the safety culture as defined by Hale et al. (2010).  This 
assumption relates to the pragmatic approach of Guldenmund (2010), who included the 
soft elements of the HSMS in his pragmatic definition of safety culture. He emphasised 
that there was a dynamic interplay between an organisation’s safety culture and its 
formal processes and structures.   
 
If top managers decide to improve H&S conditions, their managerial measures may 
affect both the physical H&S environment (for example, by investing in safe 
technology) and the organisational safety culture.  The effectiveness of the measures 
depends on the cultural background of the organisation because human behaviour 
ultimately determines the degree of achievable safety (Reason, 2016).  According to 
Reason (1998), it is difficult to change employees’ opinions by persuasion, but 
modifying organisational structures and processes may lead to new beliefs.  For 
example, a powerful managerial position might be implemented within an organisation 
in order to counteract pressures that favour production over safety (Hopkins, 2006).  
Safety culture is also affected by how the H&S conditions have been experienced, 
which is characterised by historic accidents and incidents as well as current working 
conditions (Reason 2000).  Thus, changing an organisation’s safety culture is an 
iterative process that takes time (Reason, 1998).  
 
An organisation’s physical equipment and working conditions also affect its safety 
culture.  This is shown as an indirect relationship via the HSMS and the safety climate 
in Figure 2.1.  The processes and organisational elements of the HSMS are influenced 
by the actual jobs that have to be performed.  Additionally, workers’ physical 
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environment affects their risk perception.  Reason (1998) exemplified this effect by 
referring to nuclear power plants and building construction sites.  In the former, very 
few incidents occur, so employees may forget to be afraid.  At construction sites, in 
contrast, dangers tend to be evident because situations are obvious and accidents more 
frequent, resulting in more cautious employees.  Risk perceptions are also influenced by 
information that is widely available within the industry and by national media reports 
about incidents.  In this context, the size of a country matters, as well: because the 
media is nationally organised, there are more reports about accidents in larger countries 
(EU-OSHA, 2013).  National culture, in contrast, has only a minor influence on risk 
perceptions (Mearns and Yule, 2009; Sjöberg, 2000).  
 
A commonly known consulting concept of safety culture is the DuPont Bradley Curve, 
as shown in Figure 2.2.  It distinguishes between four phases of organisational culture 
and indicates the corresponding manifestations in the behaviour of managers and 
employees.  Krzywicki and Keesey (2011, p. 3) put it very succinctly: safety culture 
“defines what people do when no one is watching”.  This definition adds an element of 
social control to the information focus of Reason (1998). 
 
Figure 2.2 




According to the DuPont Bradley Curve, any organisational safety culture has four 
development phases.  The reactive phase represents a weak safety culture.  Top 
management is hardly interested in the issue and relies on the safety instincts of 
workers.  Compliance with H&S laws and regulations is ensured by delegating 
corresponding tasks to safety engineers, called safety managers in Figure 2.2.  These 
typically focus on documentation, which has little effect on the actual H&S conditions 
in the organisation (Frick, 2013b).  
 
The dependent phase of safety culture corresponds to the top-down management 
approach to H&S management.  In this environment, top management deals with H&S 
issues, but focuses extensively on centrally defined rules.  Reason (2000) stated that 
formal rules are problematic, especially when the working conditions are characterised 
by local variations, such as in firefighting.  In such contexts, rules often are not 
applicable due to the actual situation, or they may even be entirely absent.  In 
organisations with this type of work culture, top managers are committed to ensuring 
good H&S conditions for their employees, but they over-emphasise rules and top-down 
decision-making (Reason, 2000).  Hale et al. (2012, p. 33) stated, with reference to the 
top-down management approach: 
 
“We also approach here the limits of the use of rules, in 
the sense that proactively made rules can never cover all 
eventualities, even in relatively simple tasks.  At that point 
the only defence against the unpredictable (or 
unpredicted) is deep professional competence through 
experience, training and the sharing of expertise.” 
 
The independent and interdependent phases of the DuPont Bradley Curve refer to the 
modern approach of HSMSs.  In both phases, bottom-up decision-making is supported 
by good H&S knowledge on the part of employees and comprehensive information 
flows.  Employees’ personal commitment and knowledge and their individual 
recognition allows them to better deal with variations in their working environment.  
The main difference between the independent and interdependent phase is that, in the 
former, employees show “care for self”, while in the latter, they also show “care for 
others”, sharing information about H&S-related experiences among all employees and 
managers.  In terms of the dangers of its production business, the organisation “knows 
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continually where the ‘edge’ is without necessarily having to fall over it” (Reason, 
2000, p. 3).  This organisational knowledge is built by gathering and exchanging 
information about incidents such as near misses and accidents.  It is disseminated 
throughout the organisation to ensure that both managers and employees know about 
“human, technical, organizational and environmental factors that determine the safety 
of the system” (Reason, 1998, p. 294).  In the final, interdependent phase, the 
information exchange and proactive activities of managers and employees are at the 
highest level because H&S is among the organisation’s most important values.  
Conflicts between business and H&S matters tend to be resolved in favour of the latter.  
Reason (2000, p. 11) concluded: 
 
“No organisation is just in the business of being safe.  The 
continuing press of productive demands is far more likely 
to engage the forefront of people’s minds than the 
possibility of some unlikely combination of protective 
failures.  This is exactly why safety culture is so important.  
Culture transcends the psychology of any single person.  
Individuals can easily forget to be afraid.  A safe culture, 
however, can compensate for this by providing the 
reminders and ways of working that go to create and 
sustain intelligent wariness.”  
 
A safety culture can be socially engineered (Hudson, 2007; Guldenmund, 2010; Reason, 
1998).  It is influenced by management activities, both in terms of top managers’ visible 
actions and their decisions regarding organisational structures and processes.  
According to Reason (2000, p. 12) a safe culture consists of four elements: 
 
• “reporting culture” 
• “just culture” 
• “learning culture” 
• “flexible culture” 
 
The “reporting culture” is characterised by the willingness of all members of the 
organisation to report incidents that are relevant to H&S.  Such events are often 
dangerous situations that occur because of individuals’ mistakes.  In order to motivate 
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these persons to report their mistakes, a “just culture” is needed.  The members of the 
organisation must be able to trust that they can talk about events without getting 
punished.  This requires that it be clear to everybody what kinds of actions are 
acceptable and what kinds are unacceptable (Reason, 1998).  As a result, about 90% of 
all unsafe actions are more or less non-culpable and can be reported by the acting 
individual (Reason, 2000).  A “learning culture” is established by evaluating the 
collected information and disseminating the results of the analysis within the 
organisation.  Finally, a “flexible culture” is needed to allow for unpredicted variations 
in H&S conditions.  Reason (2000, p. 6) mentioned an example from firefighting in the 
United States where 13 firefighters died in the Mann Gulf forest fire disaster in 1949 
because they “obeyed the organisational instruction to keep their fire-fighting tools 
with them at all times.”  The survivors violated the rule by dropping their heavy tools in 
order to escape the fire.  However, such decentralised decision-making may also create 
new risks if the limits are not clearly defined.  Leveson et al. (2009) emphasised that 
optimal decision-making often requires knowledge of the work processes in the greater 
organisational context.  This is often not given on the work-floor level.  Therefore, he 
called for the alignment of employee education with their decision-making limits.  Such 
limits, however, may contradict the safety culture approach described by Reason (2000). 
 
 
2.2.1 Summary of safety culture as an organisational background  
 
A positive safety culture is an important objective of modern H&S management.  It 
implies open communication of H&S issues and organisational pride in good H&S 
conditions.  Managers should implement their HSMS in a way that supports the 
development of corresponding organisational values and beliefs because it has a strong 
influence on the day-to-day behaviour of their employees (Krzywicki and Keesey, 
2011).  Organisational processes and structures should promote information exchange in 
order to ensure that all relevant H&S measures can be taken (Reason, 2000).  
Empowering and training employees are additional measures.  However, it is difficult to 
measure the success of managers’ efforts because there is no clear definition of the 
concept of safety culture.  It is “grounded in expert judgment and primarily based on 
observables” (Guldenmund, 2010, p. 1470), resulting in ambiguous interpretations and 
unclear recommendations for HSMS implementation.  
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2.3 Safety climate as a quantitative indicator 
 
Safety climate has been called the analytical approach to safety culture (Guldenmund, 
2010).  It is defined as employees’ shared perception of H&S behaviour within an 
organisation and may be used to quantitatively measure the development of a safety 
culture (Zohar, 2010).  In line with the pragmatic concept of safety culture, employees 
are at the centre of the approach.  The difference is that, instead of observing workers’ 
behaviour, the safety climate is evaluated by asking employees about their 
understanding of organisational rules and procedures.  The resulting quantitative 
surveys reveal whether employees have the awareness and motivation to participate in 
creating safe working conditions.  Safety climate may be considered a snapshot of 
safety culture (Guldenmund, 2010), reflecting the current values and beliefs of an 
organisation’s members.  The concept of safety climate has been established as a 
quantitative indicator of an organisation’s H&S conditions since the late 1970s (DeJoy 
et al., 2004; Zohar, 2010).   
 
The approach of determining the organisational safety climate by investigating 
employees’ shared perceptions has been empirically tested in a large number of studies 
using many different variables and factors for describing safety climate (Griffin and 
Neal, 2000; Vinodkumar and Bhasi, 2010; Yule et al., 2007; Zohar, 2010).  Safety 
climate has been shown to be a good predictor of organisational accident rates, although 
there is no clear agreement regarding its determinants (Zohar, 2010).  Corresponding 
employee surveys investigated a variety of elements that might be relevant for the H&S 
conditions within an organisation.  
 
Based on the HSE Climate Survey Tool developed by the UK regulator (Health and 
Safety Executive, HSE), Yule et al. (2007) presented their safety climate model, shown 
in Figure 2.3.  In their study, 1,023 employees of a utility company in the United 
Kingdom answered questions about their perceptions of management’s 
commitment/involvement and management’s practices (that is, safety systems, 
employee training etc.).  Also employees’ views on individual accountability, 
responsibility and risk-taking behaviour were considered to be part of the safety climate.  
The study investigated the statistical relationships between the elements shown in 




Safety climate model of Yule et al. (2007, p. 146) 
 
 
Figure 2.3 indicates that top management and supervisors have different roles in 
promoting the safety climate.  Senior managers determine, in cooperation with their 
H&S experts, the HSMS of the organisation and assume corresponding leadership roles 
(Zohar, 2010).  Additionally, they provide the resources for knowledge and training.  
Supervisors create the practical elements of the safety climate, such as teamwork and 
personal responsibility.  Employees’ perceptions of risk-taking behaviours and 
accountability are determined by supervisors’ actions and decisions (Zohar and Luria, 
2005).  The analysis of Yule et al. (2007) revealed major relationships between 
management activities and employee perceptions.  They concluded that top 
management can reduce risk-taking behaviours (and thus accident rates) by investing in 
knowledge and training and by encouraging supervisors’ H&S involvement.  
Supervisors facilitated interactive communication between management and staff, as 
well as the inclusion of employees’ ideas for H&S improvements. 
 
Employees’ perceived responsibility, that is, their understanding of their work’s H&S 
risks, is a key element in the model of Yule et al. (2007) because it provides a feedback 
loop for the perception of management commitment.  According to their data, this 
element of safety climate was improved by investing in knowledge and training.  Due to 
the information provided, workers felt better equipped to deal with the risks of their job.  
At the same time, they developed the common perception that management was 
committed.  The positive perception of safety climate led to an improved perception of 
 21 
the safety system.  Interestingly, there was also a negative correlation between a low 
propensity to risk-taking behaviour and responsibility.  Yule et al. (2007) explained this 
with situations in which employees were dissatisfied with the practicalities of H&S 
rules.  In such cases, they followed the rules and showed a low propensity to risk taking 
despite not understanding or agreeing with the procedures defined by management.  
This reflects the importance of creating an understanding of H&S procedures among 
staff to creating a good safety climate.  
 
In the model of Yule et al. (2007) all perceptions of employees concerning the H&S 
conditions were considered elements of the organisational safety climate.  The overall 
score was used as a predictor of accidents and other safety-related incidents (for 
example near misses).  Other authors defined safety climate more narrowly (Braunger et 
al., 2015; DeJoy et al., 2004; Griffin and Neal, 2000; Vinodkumar and Bhasi, 2010) in 
order to distinguish between climate elements that managers influence and the resulting 
H&S outcomes.  Griffin and Neal (2000) presented the following model: 
 
Figure 2.4 




Griffin and Neal (2000) considered management values, such as commitment or 
concern for employee well-being, to be the central elements of the safety climate.  The 
importance of management in creating a positive safety perception among 
organisational members is generally confirmed in the literature (DeJoy et al., 2004; 
Vinodkumar and Bhasi, 2010; Zohar, 2010).  Sub-dimensions of Griffin and Neal 
(2000) were safety communication, safety practices, safety training and safety 
equipment.  Their quantitative employee survey with 326 participants statistically 
confirmed the relationships between safety climate, as an antecedent of safety 
performance, and the determinants and components of safety performance.  Griffin and 
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Neal (2000) defined knowledge and motivation as determinants of performance.  Their 
data showed that both elements are equally important, while Yule et al. (2007) 
emphasised the extraordinary importance of knowledge.  Braunger et al. (2015), in 
contrast, found that motivation is the essential determinant of safety performance, while 
knowledge aspects are less important.  The terms ‘task performance’ and ‘contextual 
performance’ in Figure 2.4 refer to workers’ safety compliance and their safety 
participation. 
 
General organisational support for employees may be considered a determinant of 
safety climate (DeJoy et al., 2004; Wallace et al., 2006) rather than part of 
management’s safety values, defined by Griffin and Neal (2000) as concern for 
employee well-being.  Communication, too, may be regarded as general organisational 
characteristic rather than being considered purely as safety communication.  Based on 
data from a quantitative questionnaire survey among 2,208 employees of a retail chain 
in the United States, DeJoy et al. (2004) found that these two factors, which reflect 
basic organisational values, had significant influence on safety climate.  Safety climate 
was defined as employees’ common perception of management support for safety and 
the importance of safety in day-to-day business.  Safety policies and programmes were 
investigated with regard to such elements as safety training, hazard communication and 
personal protective equipment.  Together, the terms ‘safety climate’ and ‘safety 
policies’ of DeJoy et al. (2004) correspond to the more comprehensive definition of 
‘safety climate’ by Griffin and Neal (2000).  
 
Employees’ perceptions of risk in their work environment is another important 
determinant of safety climate (DeJoy et al., 2004).  The riskiness of the work 
environment affects both the HSMS and the safety climate/culture.  According to Leiter 
et al. (2009, p. 1), risk perception is affected by employees’ “evaluation of the 
prevalence and harmfulness of hazards in their environment”.  They completed a 
quantitative survey with 350 workers from six departments in an Italian printing press 
company.  By comparing responses from different departments with high and low injury 
rates, respectively, Leiter et al. (2009) found that employees in the high-injury units 
perceived their work environment to be more dangerous.  Injuries from accidents that 
had happened within the organisation increased risk perception, especially the perceived 
prevalence of hazards.  This higher risk perception was significantly related to higher 
compliance with safety regulations, although there was no additional safety training. 
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Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2010) developed a comprehensive model that describes the 
relationships between six elements of safety climate and organisational H&S conditions.  
With reference to the model of Griffin and Neal (2000), they identified six antecedents 
of safety performance in the literature and investigated their relationship with safety 
knowledge and motivation, that is, the determinants of safety performance, as well as 
safety compliance and participation, that is, components of safety performance.  
Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2010) conducted an employee survey with 1,566 participants in 
the Indian process industry.  Figure 2.5 shows only the statistically relevant paths with 
p < 0.01, including standardised path coefficients. 
 
Figure 2.5 
Safety climate model of Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2010, p. 2090) 
 
 
As shown in Figure 2.5, the six elements that constitute safety climate affected not only 
the determinants of safety performance, but directly determined safety compliance and 
safety participation.  Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2010) expected safety promotion policies 
and workers’ involvement to increase safety motivation, but the data did not confirm 
these relationships.  The two factors did not predict safety knowledge, either.  Instead of 
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affecting the determinants of safety performance as defined by Griffin and Neal (2000), 
these behavioural aspects of H&S management were directly related to the components 
of safety performance.  Employees complied with rules and participated in activities 
without displaying increased motivation.  This observation might be explained by the 
way motivation was framed in the questionnaire of Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2010), 
which mainly referred to feelings about the importance of H&S rather than considering 
employees’ H&S opinions.  The data of Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2010) indicated that 
individuals were willing to engage in H&S activities without considering it to be 
generally important.  Alternatively, the direct effect on safety performance might be 
interpreted as manifestations of the social control of safety culture as described by 
Krzywicki and Keesey (2011). 
 
Both safety promotion policies and workers’ involvement are characteristics that 
describe the cooperation between the members of an organisation.  These categories of 
Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2010) reflect the engagement of managers and employees in 
terms of H&S behaviour, which seems to be an important aspect of good H&S culture.  
Bronkhorst et al. (2018) confirmed, with their quasi-experimental quantitative study of 
Dutch healthcare organisations (comprising 520 participants who completed pre- and 
post-intervention questionnaires), that safety participation could be increased by means 
of management safety rounds and team discussions.  The introduction of these H&S 
measures represented interventions that could be appropriately described as ways to 
promote safety and involve workers.  They were applied in one half of the sample, and 
the resulting changes in safety climate were compared with the findings in the other half 
of the sample not experiencing interventions.  Besides confirming the effectiveness of 
such H&S measures, Bronkhorst et al. (2018) found that H&S projects should also 
result in actual changes in day-to-day practices if safety climate was to be improved.   
 
With respect to rule-based governance, Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2010) indicated that 
H&S compliance was directly increased if employees perceived that management was 
committed, that is, that top managers decided in favour of good technical H&S 
solutions.  Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2010) also found that training is essential to 
maximise safety.  Additionally, communication and safety rules have a positive 
influence on employees’ knowledge.  This corresponds well to the so-called informed 
safety culture of Reason (1998), which was identified as an important prerequisite for 
good H&S performance in the previous section. 
 25 
2.3.1 Summary of safety climate as a quantitative indicator 
 
The research on safety climate in recent decades has revealed the influence of 
management on H&S conditions.  The development of employees’ H&S opinions and 
their effects have been investigated by quantitatively evaluating employees’ shared 
perception of H&S behaviour.  Griffin and Neal (2000) distinguished between climate 
elements that managers influenced and the resulting H&S outcomes.  In their view, 
management activities, particularly the H&S commitment managers demonstrate, affect 
employees’ knowledge and motivation, which in turn determine employees’ compliance 
with H&S rules and their engagement in H&S improvements.  Based on this model, 
Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2010) showed the importance of six elements of safety climate 
that should be considered when implementing an organisational HSMS. 
 
 
2.4 HSMSs as a top-management tool 
 
According to Reason (2016), today’s HSMSs are the result of authorities’ moves 
towards enforced self-regulation since the early 1970s.  This is true if one looks at the 
formal systems defined in norms such as OHSAS 18001.  Facing the regulatory 
environment, many managers, particularly in larger organisations, implement a formal 
HSMS to comply with laws.  However, due to the complexity of the managerial context, 
the implementation of an HSMS requires a broader focus.  Guldenmund (2010, p. 1477) 
stated: 
 
“Although compliance to [sic] current regulation might 
often be a first step, this is certainly not the final goal of 
most [management] interventions.  On the contrary, they 
are aimed at establishing an effective SMS [safety 
management system] as opposed to a paper tiger 
bureaucracy of rules and procedures.” 
 
The top management decisions that define an HSMS refer to documented processes and 
structures as well as behaviour-oriented activities.  As described in section 2.2, safety 
culture may be considered the extension of traditional governance-oriented H&S 
management to the behavioural determinants of H&S conditions. 
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Section 2.3 shows that there are certain essential elements that must be considered in 
order to create an effective HSMS.  Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2010) showed that, besides 
management commitment and workers’ involvement, both specific H&S measures (that 
is, safety rules and procedures as well as safety training) and general H&S measures 
(that is, safety communication and safety promotion policies) are important. 
 
In the literature, the term ‘HSMS’ is used with reference to both documented and non-
documented management systems.  Those authors who focus on the topic of safety 
culture, especially the consulting view, emphasise the importance of documentation 
(Reason, 1998; Frick, 2013b).  In their view, an HSMS should be comprehensively 
documented in order to work well.  These formal HSMSs then form the basis for top 
managers’ leadership, motivating their organisation’s members to comply with the rules 
and to participate in safety measures.  In the more general literature and in articles about 
safety climate, the definition of HSMSs is not limited to formally documented structures 
and processes but refers to the organisational H&S management approach as a whole 
(Guldenmund, 2010; Vinodkumar and Bhasi, 2010; Yorio et al., 2015).  The authors 
focus on employees’ perceptions and behaviours, assuming that these ultimately result 
in both good H&S conditions and the required HSMS documentation.  Guldenmund 
(2010, p. 1477) emphasised that an HSMS must provide “a framework for meaning and 
a reference for behaviour”.  This study follows the broad definition of HSMSs as 
presented by Yorio et al. (2015, p. 221): 
 
“a set of institutionalised, interrelated, and interacting 
strategic H&S management practices designed to 
establish and achieve occupational safety and health goals 
and objectives”. 
 
Hudson (2007) described how the organisational safety culture was engineered in the 
multinational oil and gas company Shell.  He stated that by the late 1990s it was clear to 
the company’s management that a further improvement of the H&S conditions was not 
possible through changes to the formal HSMS, but only by specifically motivating 
employees to change their behaviour.  Therefore, the HSMS was amended with a 
cultural toolkit that teams were to apply locally to develop an improved safety culture.  
In order to describe progress, Hudson (2007) developed five categories of cultural 
characteristics that were similar to the DuPont Bradley Curve (Figure 2.2), extended by 
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an initial stage of no care for H&S issues.  His model also included the idea of social 
control within the organisation, as he urged “that those within the culture raise 
themselves up” (Hudson, 2007, p. 708).  The corresponding project at Shell began in 
1998 as a research project and was then rolled out throughout the organisation in 2004.  
The tools were mostly not introduced top-down; instead, their application was promoted 
by a group-wide marketing campaign under the logo ‘Hearts and Minds’.  The approach 
corresponded well with the literature on safety culture, but Hudson (2007) presented no 
evidence that this form of H&S management was effective. 
 
Smaller companies often have little documentation of their general and H&S activities.  
Their management practices are far from creating a “paper tiger bureaucracy” 
(Guldenmund, 2010, p. 1477), preferring a pragmatic informal management approach – 
before the introduction of enforced self-regulation as well as today – because they lack 
the resources and the understanding to create comprehensive documentation (Fairman 
and Yapp, 2005a; Hale et al., 2015).  Nevertheless, they may have good H&S 
management because top managers are in closer contact with their employees and know 
much about actual working conditions (Meggeneder, 2007; Frick, 2013b).  Creating 
good H&S conditions and complying with regulatory rules may even represent 
conflicting targets.  Based on an HSMS audit in a Swedish fire department, Alavaara 
(2007) concluded that the relationship between an HSMS and regulatory compliance 
should be played down in order to avoid employees considering H&S measures to be 
bureaucratic efforts rather than useful improvements.  
 
The empirical studies of Nordlöf (2015), with 142 and 188 small and medium-sized 
enterprises from the Swedish manufacturing industry, indicated that the degree of 
formalisation of HSMSs was related to four organisational characteristics: 
 
• Size: The larger the organisation, the more developed the formal HSMS was. 
• Safety climate: There was a positive correlation between employees’ answers in 
a questionnaire survey on safety culture and the existence of a formal HSMS; 
however, safety climate did not depend on organisational size. 
• Creditworthiness: Companies with low creditworthiness had worse HSMSs. 
• Group companies: Enterprises that belonged to a corporate group tended to have 
a more formal HSMS. 
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The correlation between creditworthiness and HSMS development exemplifies the 
general conflict between production and safety.  Nordlöf (2015) explained the effect of 
size with the limited resources of smaller organisations. He therefore recommended that 
small organisations should try to consult with the authorities or larger organisations to 
develop their own formal HSMSs.  This recommendation was also based on his finding 
that small companies had more formalised HSMSs if they were part of a corporate 
group.  However, he did not consider the alternative perspective of Meggeneder (2007) 
and Frick (2013b), who referred to the positive effect of direct relationships between 
managers and employees in small organisations.  The latter may indeed explain why 
Nordlöf (2015) found that safety climate, in contrast to HSMS formalisation, did not 
depend on organisational size. 
 
There is an ongoing debate about how formal the procedures and objectives of HSMSs 
should be and whether such systems should be certified according to generally applied 
standards (Podgórski, 2015; van Guldener et al., 2013; Wachter and Yorio, 2014).  Such 
standards put administrative and technical controls at the centre of HSMSs.  They focus 
on continuous improvements through systematic risk assessments and engineering 
measures in unsafe working environments (Yang, 2012), while hardly taking 
behavioural aspects into account (Wachter and Yorio, 2014).  They are based on the 
principle of plan, do, check and act (PDCA) developed by William Edwards Deming in 
the 1950s with a view to quality management (IOSH, 2015). 
 
The PDCA approach illustrated in Figure 2.6 corresponds to a variety of management 
systems, such as OHSAS 18001 and ISO 45001 for H&S management, ISO 9000 for 
quality management and ISO 14000 for environmental management.  Figure 2.6 may 
also be presented as a cycle, because after a measure has been completely implemented 
(act), the next planning phase begins.  As indicated in the diagram, planning is generally 
considered central to a formalised HSMS, implying defining an H&S policy, planning 
corresponding measures in detail and analysing the H&S conditions by identifying 
hazards and assessing risk (IOSH, 2015).  Such management systems might be 
considered a tool for assisting organisations in complying with the legal requirements of 




PDCA diagram for HSMSs (IOSH, 2015, p. 3) 
 
 
Podgórski (2015) claimed that after more than 20 years of increasing usage of certified 
H&S management systems there still is no evidence that such systems improve H&S 
conditions.  IOSH (2015) mentioned advantages such as defined H&S priorities, clear 
lines of communication, comprehensive risk coverage and support of legal compliance.  
However, from an empirical study in the Netherlands, van Guldener et al. (2013) found 
that belonging to a certain industry is much more relevant for the character of an 
organisation’s HSMS than the existence of a certified management system such as 
OHSAS.  In terms of a modern H&S approach, ensuring good H&S conditions and 
complying with regulations tend to represent two separate, only partly related goals 
(Guldenmund, 2010; Saracino et al., 2015). 
 
The modern, proactive approach to H&S management implies that rules and measures 
(including target definitions) are developed close to the workplace with the involvement 
of employees and supervisors.  The basic assumption is that those at the site know best 
about the actual working situation.  This approach implies bottom-up innovation 
processes to improve workplaces (Drais et al., 2008; Hale et al., 2012) and top-down 
HSMS definitions and resource allocation (Reason, 1998; Guldenmund, 2010).  As in 
general innovation processes, top managers have to assume a dual leadership role 
(Denti, 2013). First, they create the necessary organisational climate for H&S 
innovations through open communication, employee involvement and corresponding 
incentives.  Second, they “embody the organization’s desire” (Denti, 2013, p. 22) by 
defining ambitious H&S policies and processes and providing the necessary resources 
for employee training and workplace equipment.  Both roles in innovation are generally 
best assumed by applying a transformational leadership style (Denti, 2013), that is, by 
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creating an H&S vision and by supporting employees’ H&S initiatives.  However, in 
H&S management, transactional leadership styles that focus on compliance with 
existing rules are also necessary to ensure basic compliance (Griffin and Hu, 2013).  
There must be clear lines of punishment to prevent incidents resulting from 
unequivocally dangerous actions by employees (Reason, 1998).  In the best case, 
information about H&S-related experiences is shared among all members of the 
organisation in order to ensure that both managers and employees know about all 
relevant “human, technical, organizational and environmental factors that determine 
the safety” (Reason, 1998, p. 294). 
 
The reviewed literature on HSMSs suggests that there are two main dimensions that 
determine the effectiveness of an HSMS: the engagement of top management and 
employees in running the HSMS, and the orientation towards either rule-based 
governance or initiative-based behaviour.  To ensure good H&S performance, top 
management must create an HSMS that is well positioned along these two dimensions.  
Figure 2.7 was developed by the author as a HSMS model that forms the theoretical 
basis for HSMS analysis in this study.  
 
Figure 2.7 
Elements of an effective HSMS (developed by the author) 
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The four categories shown in Figure 2.7 operationalise the two managerial dimensions 
that determine effectiveness according to the literature.  The author derived the 
categories from the six elements of the safety climate model of Vinodkumar and Bhasi 
(2010), taking his own H&S experience as head of power plant operations into account.  
The objective was to develop a tool for describing H&S management practices at the 
participating fire departments.  The explanatory subtitles refer to the questions 
Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2010) used in their employee survey.  Their category 
‘management commitment’ was changed to ‘deciding’ because the associated questions 
mainly referred to top-management decisions (based on management interest) in favour 
of time or capital for H&S measures.  The additional element of ‘safety rules & 
procedures’ was included in this category because it directly reflects the decisions.  The 
category ‘promotion policy’ was renamed ‘leading’, as the questions about H&S events, 
rewards and competition all refer to valuing H&S behaviour.  The category ‘workers’ 
involvement’ was translated into the more practical term ‘taking care’.  The additional 
topic of ‘safety communication’ was considered in both ‘leading’ and ‘taking care’.  
The term ‘innovating’ was taken from Drais et al. (2008) and comprised the questions 
about training, knowledge and hazard assessment of Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2010). 
 
The model depicted in Figure 2.7 also covers the four types of controls that Reason 
(2000, p. 8) derived from his studies on safety culture: 
 
• “administrative controls (prescriptive rules and 
procedures), 
• individual controls (selection, training and 
motivators), 
• group controls (supervision, norms and targets), and 
• technical controls (automation, engineered safety 
features, physical barriers)”. 
 
In the model described above, the administrative and technical controls are combined in 
‘deciding’, while the group controls are split into ‘leading’ and ‘taking care’.  The so-
called individual controls described by Reason (2000) correspond to the element of 
‘innovating’.  Thus, the elements of an effective HSMS as shown in Figure 2.7 
distinguish more clearly between the actions of top management and those of 
employees, while still reflecting the difference between governance and behaviour. 
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2.4.1 Summary of HSMSs as a top-management tool 
 
The objective of an HSMS is to create good H&S conditions on the basis of mutual 
information and organisational innovation processes.  At the same time, demands of 
H&S authorities should be considered, for example written risk assessments.  Also, 
legal practices may require certain minimum standards of documented H&S rules.  
Thus, H&S management is a complex task that must take into account the overall 
situation in the organisation as well as the regulatory and legal context.  A balanced 
management approach is needed that can be analysed with the help of the HSMS model 
described in this section. 
 
 
2.5 Enforced self-regulation as a modern regulatory approach 
 
Enforced self-regulation of H&S has been spreading around the world since the early 
1970s (Reason 2016).  The European Union adopted the approach with the Framework 
Directive 89/391/EEC on Safety and Health at Work on 12 June 1989 (Ales, 2013).  
The corresponding laws were introduced in the member states in the 1990s.  The 
directive provided a framework for the system of enforced self-regulation, while the 
content (the scope of obligations and regulatory sanctions) was nationally defined (Ales, 
2013).  In general, the degree of command and control in H&S regulation is declining 
because the regulatory definition and enforcement of detailed technical and procedural 
rules is becoming increasingly difficult in an ever more complex business world 
(Reason 2016).  However, there are considerable differences between countries.  For 
example, H&S regulation in the United States tends to be closer to command and 
control than the Australian approach (Yang, 2012).  In the EU, those countries that 
moved in the direction of enforced self-regulation in the 1970s, for example Sweden, 
are further developed than the followers, such as the Netherlands and Germany (Walters 
and Wadsworth, 2014). 
 
Enforced self-regulation provides companies with the freedom and the duty to define 
their HSMS independently (Reason, 2016).  Managers are allowed to develop their own 
technical and organisational solutions for H&S problems as long as the resulting risks 
for employees are acceptable according to generally applicable standards (Gregor, 
2006).  In contrast, under command and control, managers are responsible only for 
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implementing the measures that are defined by the regulator (Hale et al., 2012).  
Accordingly, regulators’ activities in a system of enforced self-regulation differ 
considerably from their actions under command and control.  Inspectors are more 
consultants than enforcers (Beck, 2011), and they respond to the H&S activities of 
companies and industries (Johnstone, 2014).  The enforcement pyramid (Figure 2.8) as 
presented by Braithwaite (2011) is central to this responsive regulation. 
 
Figure 2.8 
Enforcement pyramid (Braithwaite, 2011, p. 486) 
 
 
The assumption of the enforcement pyramid is that there are three major types of 
companies or managers, respectively.  The first is virtuous actors that understand and 
assume their H&S responsibilities and are willing to create good H&S conditions for 
their employees.  The second type is rational actors that invest in H&S measures only 
when there are obvious economic or business advantages to doing so.  The third is 
incompetent or irrational actors that are either unable or unwilling to follow the rules.  It 
is generally assumed that most managers are virtuous actors who are willing to create 
good H&S conditions for their employees (Bluff, 2011; Braithwaite, 2011; Fairman and 
Yapp, 2005a; Frick 2013b).  Accordingly, most regulators’ actions fall in the category 
of restorative justice, comprising informing and supporting companies with regard to 
H&S issues.  Braithwaite (2011, p. 1) emphasised that, 
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“by having a capability to escalate to tough enforcement, 
most regulation can be about collaborative capacity 
building.” 
 
If a manager is not willing to collaborate, the regulator will increase the pressure with 
sanctions, that is, by moving to deterrence.  In the worst case, prosecution may result 
and end in incapacitation of the manager.  A rational manager will be persuaded to take 
H&S measures only if the likelihood of the misconduct being detected is sufficiently 
high, that is, if there are frequent inspections (Johnstone, 2014; Tombs and Whyte, 
2010).  Additionally, regulators must be willing to move up the pyramid if they detect 
unacceptable H&S conditions.  However, strong court sanctions are typically imposed 
only in the rare cases of severe accidents (Gunningham, 1998; Gregor, 2006; Johnstone, 
2014), when managers may face legal prosecution for negligent injury or homicide.  
This split of the enforcement pyramid can result in severe problems, as Gunningham 
(1998, p. 224) emphasised: 
 
“The regulated enterprise, knowing that even if it is 
detected no serious enforcement action will be taken 
unless there is a serious injury (and in this case its general 
approach to safety will be a secondary consideration 
anyway), is unlikely to undertake expensive remedial 
action.” 
 
The frequency of H&S inspections has generally decreased since enforced self-
regulation was introduced in the countries of the European Union (Frick and Johansson, 
2013; Satzer, 2011; Tombs and Whyte, 2010).  Based on the new regulatory approach, 
and due to limited personnel resources, regulators have shifted their focus from 
enforcement to promoting awareness and educating employers (Tombs and Whyte, 
2010).  Inspections are also difficult in the system of enforced self-regulation because 
authorities have only limited information about organisations’ risk assessments and 
safety measures (Tombs and Whyte, 2010; Satzer, 2011).  As shown in Figure 1.1, only 
just over one-third of companies in the European Union have their own staff conduct 
regular risk assessments (EU-OSHA, 2015).  This is peculiar because the central idea of 
such risk assessments is that those who do the job are best qualified to evaluate risks.  
Indeed, employee engagement is a central element of modern H&S management.  As 
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most enterprises do not act accordingly, this might point to the weakness of today’s 
H&S self-regulation in the European Union. 
 
Managers’ decisions are affected not only by regulators but also by market forces and 
industry culture.  Market forces comprise both economic pressure from competition and 
workers’ demands pushed through with the support of trade unions (Makin and Winder, 
2008; Reason, 2016).  Industry culture refers to H&S practices that are considered 
appropriate among managerial peers, such as non-executive directors, or that are applied 
in response to the demands of key customers (Bluff, 2011).  The effect of customers 
includes the influence of supply chains that have become increasingly relevant in certain 
industries in recent years (EU-OSHA, 2012b; Jensen et al., 2010).  In those industries, 
larger players act as regulators in the lower part of the enforcement pyramid of enforced 
self-regulation.  Top managers have to balance the competing forces of production and 
safety (Reason, 2016).  If there is less pressure in the direction of safety, the balance 
seems to move towards production.  Baldwin and Black (2007) stated that there might 
be situations in which managers do not respond to regulators’ orders due to stronger 
pressure from the prevailing culture in an industry or from economic business forces.  
 
Hawkins (2002) asked H&S inspectors from the Health and Safety Executive authority 
in the United Kingdom about their assumptions regarding managers’ reasons for 
compliance or non-compliance.  He assumed that the national H&S authority developed 
its regulatory strategies on the basis of inspectors’ theories of managerial behaviour.  
With respect to economic motivations, a former deputy director of the authority stated 
in one of the qualitative interviews (Hawkins, 2002, p. 261): 
 
“A lot of safety, of course, doesn’t cost any money, it costs 
management effort and management time… So they don’t 
do it, because there are other things that they want to do 
with their time and effort.” 
 
Thus, in contrast to the assumption of Baldwin and Black (2007), the practical 
experience of the H&S authority suggested that economic reasons were not relevant.  
Instead, the inspectors confirmed the second main suggestion of Baldwin and Black 
(2007), which referred to the importance of industry culture.  According to Hawkins 
(2002, p. 263), there were some managers who did “not recognise the necessity or 
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legitimacy of compliance with regulation”.  Certain industries were observed to exhibit 
a common attitude of non-compliance which H&S authorities might tackle with the help 
of H&S opinion leaders and roles models (Bluff, 2011).  It would also need to be 
ensured that H&S responsibilities are clearly allocated to individual managers because, 
for example, subcontracting might create confusing situations.  Overall, the inspectors 
were convinced that most managers aimed at complying with H&S laws because they 
wanted to be good citizens and cared for their employees.  Besides such ethical and 
moral aspects, legal deterrence and regulatory advice were considered important. 
 
 
2.5.1 Summary of enforced self-regulation as a modern regulatory approach 
 
From a managers’ perspective, enforced self-regulation may be considered complex and 
ambiguous.  In contrast to command and control, sanctions by inspectors are not 
precisely specified, but depend on the circumstances.  Organisations have the freedom 
and the duty to define their HSMS independently (Reason, 2016).  Therefore, managers 
must implement an HSMS that ensures appropriate organisational H&S conditions 
(Beck, 2011).  MacEachen et al. (2016) stated that the regulatory environment of 
organisations is often inconsistent because several authorities are active in H&S 
regulation, resulting in rather confusing signals to managers.  At the same time, market 
forces and industry culture affect their H&S decisions (Makin and Winder, 2008; Bluff, 
2011).  The resulting complexity creates insecurity and additional business risks as 
managers have no clear guidelines on how to act.  Accordingly, managers’ H&S 
motivations for implementing an organisational HSMS may be expected to be diverse.  
According to Hawkins (2002), H&S inspectors experienced that moral considerations, 
industry culture and legal deterrence were important factors in determining H&S 
compliance on the part of top management. 
 
 
2.6 The role of managers and their motivations 
 
Comparatively few studies have been conducted on managers’ decision-making in 
organisational, regulatory, business and social environments (Bluff, 2011; Njå and 
Fjelltun, 2010; MacEachen et al., 2016).  Studies that investigated how regulation and 
other external forces affect the H&S activities of managers mainly looked at the 
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outcomes of H&S management, that is, the H&S conditions in individual companies or 
whole industries (MacEachen et al., 2016).  Such studies typically created quantitative 
data on rates of compliance, shares of companies with certain HSMS features, and 
injury rates in organisations or industry sectors (Frick and Johanson, 2013).  This 
perspective on H&S does not sufficiently consider the role of managers in creating an 
HSMS, and with it, the H&S conditions in an organisation (Frick, 2013b). 
 
Hale et al. (2010) concluded from their study on publicly subsidised H&S interventions 
in Dutch companies that the initiative of top managers and safety professionals is 
essential to promote H&S within organisations.  Together they ensure that the resources 
and knowledge needed to implement H&S measures are available.  Additionally, they 
ensure that information is shared within the organisation.  Hale et al. (2010, p. 1034) 
emphasised the importance of management commitment and stated: 
 
“The introduction of formal management systems and the 
negative influence of unfavourable markets and 
organizational change are shown to be less important or 
irrelevant.” 
 
Frick (2013a) presented a longitudinal case study in a large public organisation between 
2007 and 2009. He and his team observed the introduction of Leksand’s ‘Hälsosam’ 
project, which aimed at improving the H&S conditions.  Leksand is a rural municipality 
of about 15,000 inhabitants in Sweden.  The public organisation had 1,300 employees in 
190 types of jobs and was organised into six administrative departments.  The 
qualitative data of Frick (2013a) comprised 76 documents, 37 participant observations 
and 35 interviews with members of the organisation, both managers and staff.  He 
described the conditions in the organisation as very much in favour of cooperative 
working and negotiation.  The employer was open to dialogue and the employees had 
significant power because 85% of them were union members.  Accordingly, the 
implementation of ‘Hälsosam’ was agreed between the social partners.  It resulted in 
better compliance with formal demands of H&S legislation.  However, the resulting 
H&S system was not driven by content, but by form.  Top managers were measuring 
“input activities, such as number of safety rounds, meetings, and training” (Frick, 
2013a, p. 80) rather than monitoring workplace risks and employee health.  The 
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management of actual H&S working conditions was left to the lower ranks of 
management, as Frick (2013a, p. 81) described: 
 
“Like other municipalities, many of Leksand’s workplaces 
were inspected by the Swedish Work Environment 
Authority during 2003–2006, which resulted in many 
inspection notes.  However, Leksand left it to the lower 
management to answer and comply with the authority’s 
requirements.  Higher managers (and even less 
politicians) did not reflect on the shortcomings in their 
management that had caused the violations found in the 
inspections.” 
 
The lack of top-management engagement and commitment made it difficult or even 
impossible for lower management to improve H&S conditions.  This was the case 
despite the improved cooperation and communication between managers and 
union/safety representatives resulting from the introduction of ‘Hälsosam’.  Thus, this 
case illustrates that the HSMS must not omit the contents of organisational H&S 
processes.  
 
Knowing the key role of top management in promoting H&S, the question arises, why 
are managers willing to engage in H&S?  As described by (DeJoy et al., 2004), an 
organisational HSMS reflects the values and beliefs of top management.  The decisions 
of managers affect the safety conditions in workplaces and determine the likelihood of 
harm to employees.  This implies a typical moral and ethical question.  Individuals may 
feel that avoiding harm to others is a universal moral rule, or they may consider harming 
people to be sometimes necessary to create benefits (Tsahuridu, 2003).  Though 
managers do not directly harm employees with their H&S decisions, they accept or 
reject risks to employees’ health when deciding on work processes and equipment.  
Accordingly, H&S management implies ethical decision-making. 
 
There have been only a few studies in which managers were specifically asked about 
their motivations for engaging in H&S (Bluff, 2011).  According to Njå and Fjelltun 
(2010, p. 1076), H&S activities are  
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“part of priorities concerning time pressures, equipment, 
manning, salaries, communications, procedures, etc.  
Managers’ attitudes are assumed to play a major role in 
the prioritising work and, hence, in constructing the safety 
climate in the work place.” 
 
It is known that managers’ H&S engagement is based on legal, economic, and social-
context motivations (Bluff, 2011).  These are the drivers that determine the 
implementation of HSMSs in organisations.  However, many of the existing studies 
were limited to the relationship between regulatory inspections and formal compliance, 
which is less relevant for the system of enforced self-regulation (Fairman and Yapp, 
2005b) because the material H&S rules are, to a large extent, defined through 
negotiations between managers, employees and authorities.   
 
In Australia, the results of a quantitative telephone survey indicated that only about 20% 
of managers did not care about H&S in their organisations (KPMG, 2001).  This figure 
was similar across all firm sizes.  Njå and Fjelltun (2010) found a corresponding figure 
when investigating the views of managers of small and medium-sized enterprises in the 
Norwegian transport sector.  About 75% regarded H&S as important for their 
enterprise’s reputation, while only 25% thought that H&S measures compromised their 
competitiveness.  Also qualitative interviews in German craft businesses (Beck, 2011) 
found that just 30% of participating top managers of small businesses did not want to 
engage in H&S management.  Thus, studies have shown that the large majority of 
managers across various countries and industries are in favour of H&S management.  
 
KPMG (2001, p. 8) identified the following main motivations of managers: 
 
• “A sense of moral responsibility for the health and 
safety of their colleagues; 
• Regulation and its enforcement; 
• Commercial incentives such as greater productivity 
and lower workers’ compensation premiums; and 




The latter three motivations reflect those extensively described by Bluff (2011), where 
legal motivations referred to regulation and enforcement, economic motivations 
corresponded to commercial incentives and benchmarking was described as comparison 
with other managers.  The sense of morality, which KPMG identified as most important, 
was not mentioned as a major motivation in other studies (Beck, 2011; Fairman and 
Yapp, 2005a; and Baldock et al., 2006).  Indeed, Bluff (2011) claimed that moral issues 
were rarely mentioned in empirical studies on managers’ responses to H&S regulation.  
However, the difference may result from an unclear definition of morality.  Legal and 
social-context motivations may also be considered moral motivations, as the 
corresponding behaviours are generally considered socially positive. 
 
The additional motivators that KPMG (2001, p. 8) described as significant in only 
certain industries are all related to social-context issues: 
 
• “supply chain pressure; 
• corporate image; 
• performance linked pay; 
• mass media campaigns; and 
• safety information.” 
 
Similarly, van Guldener et al. (2013) found in their study that the introduction of a 
certified HSMS was often done for image reasons, that is, as a result of forces from the 
social environment.  The social context of management, that is, their belonging to a 
certain industry or organisation, seemed to be very important in general.  For example, 
van Guldener et al. (2013) also found that belonging to a certain industry is much more 
relevant for the performance of an organisation’s HSMS than the existence of a certified 
management system with well-defined HSMS processes, such as OHSAS 18001.  
Maslen and Hopkins (2014) presented qualitative cross-sectional case study research on 
safety incentives (called “performance linked pay” by KPMG, 2001, p. 8) for managers 
in large enterprises in the oil and gas, petrochemical, pipeline and mining industries.  
Interviews, observations and document analyses were conducted in 11 companies.  
They concluded that the main motivator for managers to engage in safety activities was 
not the incentive itself, but the evaluation process.  Thus, financial incentives did not 
work as motivators.  Instead, the related evaluation process provided social-context 
motivations because the managers wanted to meet their performance targets. 
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Fairman and Yapp (2005a) indicated that legal and economic motivations were most 
important for H&S activities.  The aim of their study was to examine how managers of 
small organisations could be encouraged to change their behaviour so that they 
complied with H&S laws and regulations.  Like Fairman and Yapp (2005b), they took 
an inspector’s perspective (including compliance inspections as part of their interviews) 
and concluded that training and face-to-face information was necessary.  Asking 
managers about their motivations was an additional part of their study, but they 
concluded that managers’ motivations were practically irrelevant because managers did 
not decide whether to comply or not.  In contrast, once a manager was aware of H&S 
requirements, he/she tried to improve the conditions in order to ensure compliance.  
Thus, it might not be necessary to motivate managers, but to create H&S awareness 
through information and training. 
 
The reviewed studies on managers’ H&S motivations indicated that, besides economic 
and legal issues, the social context of management decisions is important.  These social-
context motivations were described in different forms, such as moral duty, bench-
marking, performance evaluation, reputation, supply chain pressure etc.  The variety of 
manifestations indicates that social-context motivations tend to be more complex in 
nature than economic and legal motivations.  The latter, which are often analysed in 
terms of deterrence, tend to be weaker under enforced self-regulation because the laws 
and regulations are rather unspecific (Fairman and Yapp, 2005a).  Economic 
motivations are often cited in connection with small enterprises because regulatory costs 
of small organisations are decidedly higher than those of larger ones (Hale et al., 2015).  
Larger organisations are typically more open to discussions with authorities, and their 
H&S measures often exceed legal standards, because they consider reputational risks 
more important than regulatory demands (Gunningham et al., 2005; Hale et al., 2015).  
The importance of economic motivations seems to decline with organisational size, 
while the importance of social-context motivations increases.  Only medium-sized and 
large enterprises tend to follow the idea of continuous H&S improvements (Fairman and 
Yapp, 2005b).  This core of modern H&S management is based on information 
exchange between an organisation’s managers and stakeholders, including employees 
and H&S authorities.  Such internal and external communication requires a positive 
social context (Makin and Winder, 2008; Reason, 2016).  Therefore, social-context 
motivations are considered an important factor in modern H&S management.  
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2.6.1 Summary of the role of managers and their motivations 
 
Although the initiative of top managers and safety professionals is essential to promote 
H&S within organisations (Hale et al., 2010), there have been only a few studies on 
their decision-making in the field of H&S (MacEachen et al., 2016).  Managers’ H&S 
engagement is based on legal, economic and social-context motivations (Bluff, 2011).  
Especially, social-context motivations have been described in different forms, such as 
moral duty, benchmarking, performance evaluation, reputation, supply chain pressure 
etc.  These kinds of motivational factors mainly determine the information exchange 
between managers and organisational stakeholders, which forms the basis for a balanced 
HSMS under enforced self-regulation (Makin and Winder, 2008; Reason, 2016).  
Therefore, social-context motivations were expected to be of special importance. 
 
 
2.7 Literature synthesis 
 
There is considerable literature on safety culture, safety climate and HSMS 
implementation, but little has been written about the motivations of top managers in 
H&S decision-making.  Management, however, determines the implementation of an 
HSMS with the allocation of resources as well as the definition of organisational 
structures and processes (Yorio et al., 2015).  Decision-making is an especially complex 
task in modern H&S management because it must be done with incomplete information 
and is expected to include negotiations with both authorities and employees (Fairman 
and Yapp, 2005a).  In contrast to the regulatory system of command and control, 
enforced self-regulation provides few specific rules (Yang, 2012), being built instead 
upon open communication between H&S stakeholders (Frick, 2013a).  This approach is 
pursued by authorities across the European Union on the basis of the EU Framework 
Directive 89/391/EEC on Safety and Health at Work (Ales, 2013).  The idea is that top 
managers develop the HSMS in cooperation with their employees (EU-OSHA, 2012a).  
An HSMS may be considered the “surface manifestations of the basic values and 
beliefs” of top management (DeJoy et al., 2004, p. 82). 
 
Research on managers’ H&S approaches indicated that they generally take their H&S 
responsibility seriously and are willing to invest in H&S measures (Beck, 2011; KPMG, 
2001; Njå and Fjelltun, 2010).  Most managers will engage with H&S consultation 
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processes with employees and H&S authorities if they become aware of non-
compliance (Fairman and Yapp, 2005a) and if they perceive authorities to be willing to 
advise (Beck, 2011).  Managers make decisions based on legal, economic, and social-
context motivations (Bluff, 2011).  Regulatory activities affect these motivations, as do 
influences from peers, competitors, trade unions, the public and others (Makin and 
Winder, 2008).  Management decision-making regarding HSMS implementation is 
complex because the modern approach to H&S implies both bottom-up innovation 
processes to improve workplaces (Drais et al., 2008; Hale et al., 2012) and top-down 
rule definitions and resource allocation (Reason, 1998; Guldenmund, 2010).  Ensuring 
good H&S performance requires a balanced management approach along two main 
dimensions.  The first dimension is the engagement of top management and employees 
in running the HSMS.  The second is the orientation of activities towards organisational 
governance or individual behaviour. 
 
In their research, MacEachen et al. (2016, pp. 12-13) concluded that “greater attention 
is needed to understand implementation realities.”  They identified “studies of 
employers as policy recipients” as a gap in the literature.  This is in line with the 
literature reviews of Bluff (2012) and Frick and Johanson (2013), who also stated that 
past studies on managers’ H&S motivations and H&S activities took rather general 
perspectives.  Researchers and authorities such as the European Agency for Safety and 
Health at Work typically used quantitative surveys to identify preferences and activities 
of managers (for example Baldock et al., 2006; EU-OSHA, 2010; EU-OSHA 2015; 
KPMG, 2001; Njå and Fjelltun, 2010; Wachter and Yorio, 2014).  Only a few 
qualitative studies considered why and how managers implemented an HSMS in their 
organisations (for example Beck, 2011; Fairman and Yapp, 2005a; Frick, 2013a).  This 




2.8 Research question, aim and objectives 
 
To reveal why managers implement HSMSs of varying effectiveness, this study 
investigated the relationship between managerial motivations and management 
practices.  This perspective on decision-making was considered important because top 
management determines the characteristics of the organisational HSMS and thus the 
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H&S conditions for employees.  Managers’ behaviour was expected to be based on 
legal, economic and social-context motivations.  Therefore, top managers and the H&S 
experts advising them were asked about their ways of implementing an HSMS and their 
underlying H&S motivations.  The codified answers were then compared in different 
regulatory environments.  Relationships were identified and an empirically based 
typology of managers’ H&S motivations was developed.  The literature review provided 




How are top managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS affected by their H&S 
motivations in different regulatory environments? 
 
Research aim: 
To identify how top managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS are affected by 
their H&S motivations in different regulatory environments. 
 
Research objectives: 
• To codify top managers’ ways of implementing an organisational HSMS. 
• To codify top managers’ perceptions of H&S authorities’ regulatory approaches. 
• To codify the H&S motivations of top managers. 
• To identify relationships between managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS 
and their H&S motivations in different regulatory environments. 




2.9 Expected contributions to the scientific discourse 
 
As recommended by Frick and Johanson (2013) and Zanko and Dawson (2012, p. 12), a 
qualitative “holistic approach” was used to investigate the complex context of 
decision-making in H&S management.  Views and experiences of managers in the 
defined business of firefighting were evaluated across three countries.  MacEachen et al. 
(2016) described a literature gap with regard to managers’ receptivity to authorities’ 
H&S policies.  The views of the interviewed fire department managers in the different 
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regulatory environments of Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden provided insights 
addressing this gap.  The resulting case studies of organisational HSMSs under varying 
regulatory regimes also exemplified different managerial approaches.  Focusing on the 
business of firefighting rather than taking the cross-industry view of previous studies 
(Frick and Johanson, 2013; Walz and de Ruig, 2011) was expected to provide clearer 
indications of the relationships between top managers’ H&S motivations and their ways 
of implementing an HSMS.  The envisaged result was a typology of managers’ H&S 
motivations in their managerial and regulatory context.  The research was expected to 
contribute to the scientific discourse by adding a management perspective to the 
prevailing inspectors’ view on formal compliance.  The new perspective should help to 
better understand managers’ motivations for their approaches to H&S management.  
The resulting knowledge should enable H&S authorities and other stakeholders, such as 
trade union representatives and non-executive directors, to improve their measures for 
promoting health and safety at work. 
 
 
2.10 Expected contributions to applied business practices  
 
Top managers’ decisions on organisational HSMSs and specific H&S measures are the 
main determinants of employees’ working conditions.  Therefore, information exchange 
on ways of implementing an HSMS is relevant for both managers and employees.  The 
case studies of organisational HSMSs at fire departments in Germany, the Netherlands 
and Sweden fostered such information exchange between the participating organisations 
and their national industry associations, as the researcher presented preliminary findings 
in anonymous form.  The cases provided examples of current practices that could be 
applied across fire brigades and countries.  Thus, this study could help both managers 
and authorities to improve their applied practices in the field of H&S management.  
Finally, an analytical tool for reviewing organisational HSMSs was tested and refined in 






3.1 Qualitative methodology with a pragmatic paradigm 
 
An organisational HSMS comprises comprehensive structures, processes and 
behaviours that require a holistic view in order to describe the HSMS appropriately 
(Frick and Johanson, 2013; Zanko and Dawson, 2012).  Such systems are implemented 
in economic, legal and social contexts that influence the H&S motivations and activities 
of managers.  The overall complexity of HSMSs and their environment reduces the 
meaningfulness of quantitative studies (Frick and Johanson, 2013).  Surveys that 
identified the prevalence of certain elements of HSMSs (for example workplace risk 
assessments by internal staff as shown in Figure 1.1) cannot reveal how these elements 
work.  Therefore, Frick and Johanson (2013) recommended using qualitative case 
studies to explain these complex social phenomena.  Accordingly, this study relied on 
case studies that were built mainly upon qualitative data from interviews. 
 
Despite its mainly qualitative methodology, this research drew on positivistic 
assumptions.  The focus was on developing an explanation that was not limited to the 
context of the investigated cases, but was generalisable to other industries (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  The ontological idea was that there is an independent reality with determinant 
social laws that can be used to create desired social outcomes (Brinkmann and Kvale, 
2015).  At the same time, it was acknowledged that qualitative explanation building 
could not be precise because the researcher’s mind always affects theory building (Yin, 
2014).  With reference to pragmatism, it was assumed that knowledge is constructed in 
order to improve general practices and foster change (Goldkuhl, 2012).  
Correspondingly, this study combined a qualitative data collection with positivistic 
assumptions, relying on variable-oriented constructs (Piekkari et al., 2009) and data 
triangulation with multiple sources (Yin, 2014).  In particular, the analysis of the 
interview transcripts took not only scientific and practical literature into account, but 
also organisational H&S documentation.  The underlying pragmatic research paradigm 
is described by Creswell (2003, p. 12) as follows: 
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“Truth is what works at the time; it is not based in a strict 
dualism between the mind and a reality completely 
independent of the mind.” 
 
Piekkari et al. (2009) found that it was typical for management studies to use qualitative 
interviews as the dominant data source and to apply a multiple-case design.  In this 
study, fire department managers from selected fire departments in Germany, the 
Netherlands and Sweden were interviewed about their H&S experiences and 
motivations.  The cross-sectional cases were analytically combined in order to develop 
categories of managerial practices and motivations and to describe national conditions 
as country cases.  The motivation statements from the interviews were counted and 
quantitatively evaluated with respect to their managerial and regulatory contexts.  
 
The aim of this study was to identify how top managers’ ways of implementing an 
HSMS were affected by their H&S motivations.  There were few research reports on 
this relationship in the literature.  Accordingly, this study pursued an exploratory 
approach in the broad sense of Piekkari et al. (2009).  According to Yin (2014), it was 
an explanatory study because the aim was to induct a concept that explained the 
phenomenon, not to develop a grand theory that was based on incremental extension of 
existing knowledge (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
 
 
3.2 Case studies as a strategy of enquiry 
 
Following Eisenhardt (1989), case studies were an appropriate research strategy for 
developing theory in the field of this study because there was little previous research.  
Typically, such cases are “bounded by time and activity” (Creswell, 2003, p. 15) and 
are most suitable when the “boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be 
clearly evident” (Yin, 2014, p. 16).  They are typically based on qualitative data, 
although quantitative methods may contribute additional information (Yin, 2014).  Case 
studies represent a social science research method that enables the researcher to keep a 
real-world perspective.  Piekkari et al. (2009, p. 567) found that “exploratory, 
interview-based multiple case studies, drawing on positivistic assumptions and cross-
sectional designs” are most common in qualitative management research.  This study 
pursued a corresponding strategy of enquiry.   
 48 
Creswell (2003) described the main strategies of enquiry that provide direction for 
research design in general.  He distinguished between quantitative, mixed methods and 
qualitative.  Quantitative strategies comprise experiments and surveys.  Experiments are 
used to investigate causal relationships by manipulating defined variables and 
monitoring the effects on dependent variables, requiring a sufficient number of 
experiments in order to develop generalisable theories based on random sampling.  
Surveys are based on the same statistical principles as experiments but are done without 
manipulating variables, while sample characteristics are investigated by means of 
questionnaires.  Creswell (2003) divided the mixed-methods approaches into three 
groups: sequential, concurrent and transformative procedures.  A sequential procedure 
reflects a hierarchical view of research strategies, that is, qualitative exploration is 
followed by quantitative statistical analysis.  Concurrent approaches are characterised 
by the simultaneous combination of qualitative and quantitative data for an overall 
interpretation of results.  In transformative procedures, researchers use specific 
theoretical lenses when applying sequential and/or concurrent qualitative and 
quantitative data analysis. 
 
Case studies are one of five qualitative strategies described by Creswell (2003).  He 
stated that case studies are used to explore a new field of research in order to develop 
hypotheses that are subsequently tested with quantitative methods.  In contrast, 
Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2014) emphasised that case studies can also be used to build 
explanatory theories, although they are predominantly based on qualitative data.  
Grounded theory, which Creswell (2003) describes as a second qualitative research 
strategy, is often done by combining cross-sectional case studies.  It is based on 
continuous comparison of data with emerging constructs.  Longitudinal case studies are 
not applicable for this purpose because multiple cases are needed.  Eisenhardt (1989) 
extended the original concept of grounded theory.  She presented a comprehensive 
process for theory building that was adopted as the research design of this study, as 
described in Chapter 4.   
 
The remaining three qualitative research strategies according to (Creswell, 2003) are 
ethnographies, narrative research and phenomenological research.  They may be used as 
methods within case studies or as stand-alone approaches.  Ethnographies are primarily 
based on the observation of individuals’ behaviour within their social context.  
Narrative and phenomenological studies are usually based on interviews with 
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individuals, but they differ in their approaches.  In the former, participants’ experiences 
are combined with the researchers’ thoughts, while in the latter, the researchers intend 
to exclude their own experiences (Creswell, 2003).  In this study, the qualitative 
interviews in the case studies were analysed with a phenomenological approach, as 
described by Brinkmann and Kvale (2015).  The social phenomenon of HSMS 
implementation under enforced self-regulation was investigated based on the actors’ 
experiences.  The interviews with fire department managers were semi-structured in the 
sense that they were neither open conversations nor closed questionnaires (Brinkmann 
and Kvale, 2015).  The answers were analysed in order to identify patterns and derive 
causal relationships.  The combination of these answers with additional information 
from organisational H&S documents and literature analysis resulted in case studies 
describing the experiences of managers within their organisational and social contexts. 
 
Pragmatism focuses on the consequences of actions, as the emphasis is on the practical 
value of the developed theories (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015).  Thus, the qualitative 
approach of this study was expected to yield outcomes that were relevant for 
practitioners.  However, theoretical lenses may become problematic if they interfere 
with objectivity or promote biases (Sweetman et al., 2010).  Eisenhardt (1989) 
emphasised that theory building should begin with an open mind with no predefined 
perspective.  At the same time, theoretical frameworks from the literature are 
recommended for explanatory case study research because they improve both the 
reliability and validity of results (Creswell, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014). 
 
 
3.3 Reliability, validity and generalisability 
 
The term ‘reliability’ refers to the consistency and trustworthiness of findings 
(Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015).  The underlying question is whether another researcher 
would identify the same causal relationships based on the investigated cases.  Especially 
with interview data, there is a risk of low reliability because the interviewer’s questions 
can influence the interviewee’s answers (Yin, 2014).  Additionally, the transcription and 
analysis of interview data may be affected by the researcher’s attitudes (Brinkmann and 
Kvale, 2015).  Both the wording of questions and the exact understanding of answers 
are important.  It is necessary to describe and analyse the data as realistically as possible 
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in order to prevent bias.  Eisenhardt (1989, p. 536) therefore recommended with respect 
to researchers: 
 
“They should avoid thinking about specific relationships 
between variables and theories as much as possible, 
especially at the outset of the process.” 
 
Semi-structured interviews were the main data source in this study.  The researcher 
introduced the topic to the participants and then asked open questions – amended with 
clarifying enquiries – to investigate the participants’ experiences.  The interviews 
referred to theoretical frameworks that were derived from the literature.  The HSMS 
model (section 2.4) and the literature-based motivational constructs (section 2.6), 
provided the theoretical background.  Such frameworks enhance reliability because they 
determine which aspects of a topic are the focus of the qualitative investigation 
(Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
There are three kinds of validity: construct validity, internal validity and external 
validity (Yin, 2014).  Construct validity refers to the correct description of a theory’s 
variables.  In this study, managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS and their H&S 
motivations were the two variables to be analysed.  Yin (2014) suggested that the key 
informants (which were the commanding officers and their H&S experts as top 
management of the organisations) should be allowed to review draft case study reports.  
This was ensured in this study.  
 
Internal validity is often easier to ensure in qualitative case study research than in 
quantitative statistical evaluations (Yin, 2014).  It is the nature of qualitative research 
that not only relationships between predefined variables, but also corresponding reasons 
and emerging details are investigated.  This is important for building theories and 
explanations based on case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989).  A broad range of literature 
should be considered when drawing conclusions from qualitative case study data.  The 
theoretical background enables the researcher to ask the questions that are necessary for 
answering why emerging relationships may exist (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014).  The 
comparison of case study data with the literature contributes to the analysis either by 
identifying similar relationships or by yielding conflicting results.  The latter represents 
opportunities for refining and extending conclusions (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 51 
External validity is also called generalisability.  It refers to the idea that developed 
explanations should be applicable to different contexts.  Multiple case studies follow the 
same replication logic as multiple experiments (Yin, 2014).  Accordingly, the approach 
may also be referred to as quasi-experimental research (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015).  
Cases contribute to theory building either by revealing similar relationships between 
variables or predicting contrasting results.  The former is called “literal replication”, 
the latter, “theoretical replication” (Yin, 2014, p. 57).  This replication logic improves 
both internal and external validity.  According to Eisenhardt (1989), a main risk of 
theory building from case studies is that the explanations are too specific for 
generalisation.  To mitigate this risk, she recommended the application of theoretical 
frameworks as general reference points during data analysis.  By referring to a 
theoretically derived HSMS model (section 2.4) and taking typical motivational 
constructs into account (section 2.6), the findings of this research were related to the 
existing knowledge base.  The generalisability was analytically evaluated, describing 
underlying reasons in detail.  Brinkmann and Kvale (2015, p. 297) clarified this when 
they stated: 
 
“By specifying the supportive evidence and making the 
arguments explicit, the researcher can allow readers to 
judge the soundness of the generalization claim.”   
 
 
3.4 Ethical considerations 
 
According to Yin (2014, p. 167), the analysis of case study evidence implies the 
following challenge: 
 
“A challenge you must be prepared to meet in doing a 
case study is therefore to know how to develop strong, 
plausible, and fair arguments that are supported by the 
data.” 
 
The development of such arguments requires not only an open-minded enquiry 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014), but also ethical conduct.  Findings that are contrary to 
the expected or desired theory must not be ignored during data analysis.  During the 
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interviews, manipulation of participants must be prevented, as must co-optation 
(Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015).  In general, interview questions should not lead in a 
predefined direction.  An ethical researcher will strive for as much validity as possible 
without being distracted by practical constraints such as time and project resources.  
Taking responsibility for one’s own work and abstaining from plagiarism and 
falsification are essential characteristics of an ethical researcher (Yin, 2014).  
 
The project participants must be treated in a fair manner.  This is a fundamentally moral 
obligation, though the terms ethics and morality are often used interchangeably 
(Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015; Tsahuridu, 2003).  With respect to top managers, it means 
they should be convinced to participate based on a true and fair view of the benefits for 
their organisation and the efforts required of them (Darke et al., 1998).  With respect to 
interviewees in general, it must be ensured that individuals’ identities will not become 
public.  In this study, participants were informed about how confidentiality would be 
ensured, and the promised procedures were followed.  All organisations and individuals 
were anonymised, both in the analytical memos (such as the case study report in 
Appendix C) and during further analyses.  The list of participants was kept strictly 
separate from all other data.  Additionally, each interview began with a general 
introduction of the purpose and procedures of the research project.  This formed the 
basis for obtaining the informed and voluntary consent of all individuals with respect to 
participation, interview recording and data usage.  During the interviews, the 
interviewer also did not exploit the superior position of the researcher in the 
conversational situation (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015).  For example, no pressure was 
put on participants to answer questions, allowing them to withdraw at any time. 
 
Protecting participants from negative effects is an ethical dimension of special 
importance in social science (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015; Yin, 2014).  The researcher 
must be aware that certain answers may have negative consequences for participants.  In 
the case of this research project, admitting non-compliance with H&S laws could 
possibly be used in either civil or criminal court cases against individual interview 
participants or their organisations.  To prevent such ethical problems and ensure truthful 
answers from interviewees, this research was not aimed at investigating non-
compliance.  Instead, the interviews focused on the decisions of top managers regarding 
how (not whether) they created appropriate H&S conditions in their organisations.  
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According to Brinkmann and Kvale (2015), ethical behaviour in research projects must 
be learned.  It implies not only compliance with predefined rules but also consideration 
of contexts, experiences and good practices in the research community.  In their view, 
ethical behaviour requires the “skill of thick ethical description”, that is, “the ability to 
see and describe events in their value-laden contexts and judge accordingly” 
(Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015, p. 90).  This broad definition of ethical conduct was taken 
into account.  The researcher’s background enabled a good understanding of contexts 
and examples, as he used to be a firefighter as well as a managing director with H&S 
responsibility.  In terms of good practices in the community, the researcher was able to 
draw upon the interview training courses taken during his management education 








4.1 Theory building from case studies 
 
Piekkari et al. (2009) stated that multiple cross-sectional case studies predominate in 
management research.  They are used to build theories that are grounded in holistic 
empirical evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014).  These may deliver explanations that 
are less abstract than theories in “normal science” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 547), and bring 
new perspectives to specific research topics.  The mainly qualitative case studies 
presented in this thesis were explanatory rather than exploratory in the sense that no 
subsequent quantitative hypothesis testing was envisaged (Yin, 2014).  The little-
researched relationship between managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS and their 
H&S motivations was investigated.  The intended outcome was a typology of managers’ 
H&S motivations in their managerial and regulatory context.  Individual case studies 
from fire departments in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden formed the foundation 
of the analyses.  Eisenhardt (1989) described eight steps for building theory from case 
studies, which Rowlands (2005) combined into three phases as shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1 




Similar to this study, Rowlands (2005) used the approach depicted in Figure 4.1 to 
investigate managers’ views on an activity (in his case, the application of information 
systems) and their related motivations.  The first phase comprised generally defining the 
research area and identifying participants and data collection methods.  The research 
design should be informed by “a priori specifications” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 536) that 
were derived from the literature as theoretical references and means for accurate 
description of constructs.  The corresponding codes for data evaluation in this study are 
presented in section 4.3.  Regarding the second phase, Rowlands (2005) emphasised the 
importance of combining data collection and within-case analysis by depicting his 
“Step 4”, the fieldwork, twice in the diagram.  During investigations at the case 
organisations, emergent themes and findings should be used to adjust the initially 
defined specifications (that is, codes) and possibly also the data collection focus 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  The result of the second phase would be case reports comprising 
within-case analyses, revealing preliminary theories/concepts in the context of the 
individual case organisation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Rowlands, 2005). 
 
The cross-case analyses in the third phase should provide explanations from a general 
perspective.  Eisenhardt (1989) suggested developing hypotheses by searching for 
cross-case patterns.  The hypothesised theories/concepts were to be compared with the 
data.  This would result in adjustments to constructs, which in turn would change the 
theories again.  This iterative process was applied to the case data of this study in order 
to develop constructs and identify relationships between them.  Finally, the literature 
base was considered in order to compare the researcher’s own constructs and 
explanations with rival views of other studies.  
 
In this study, the individual cases of fire departments were integrated into three country 
cases that reflected national regulatory environments.  The number of cases 
corresponded to the recommendations of Eisenhardt (1989).  To reflect national 
situations, four organisational cases were used per country, resulting in 12 case studies 
in total.  The data could not provide statistical relevance with respect to the manager 
populations in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden because the number of 
participants was too small.  Instead, the data were used to qualitatively investigate the 
relationships among content codes and between codes and the social context 
(Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015).  Within the group of participants, the frequency of 
motivation statements permitted statistical analysis because several hundred quotes 
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were identified.  Thus, the qualitatively derived motivation codes were quantitatively 
evaluated to reveal differences within the sample.  Overall, the thematic analysis 
involved reviewing interview transcripts and documents, identifying themes that can be 
supported by examples and deriving explanations.  Burnard et al. (2008, pp. 429-430) 
emphasised:  
 
“Interview transcripts, field notes and observations 
provide a descriptive account of the study, but they do not 
provide explanations.  It is the researcher who has to 
make sense of the data that have been collected by 
exploring and interpreting them.” 
 
 
4.2 Data collection for individual case studies  
 
To develop the individual case studies, multiple data sources were used.  The interviews 
focused on the experiences and views of fire department managers.  Additionally, 
organisational H&S documents and the general context of the fire departments (for 
example number of full-time firefighters, number of fire stations etc.) were investigated.  
In creating the country cases, national publications relating to the regulatory 
environment and H&S practices were also considered. 
 
It was important for data-collection design to consider the criteria for interpreting 
findings.  The criteria were derived from a substantiated literature review because they 
determined what kind of data would be collected (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014).  The 
HSMS model for this study (Figure 2.7) was developed accordingly, providing a 
reference point for the analysis of organisational HSMSs during fieldwork.  The 
motivations of managers were initially investigated with respect to five codes: legal, 
economic, information provision/usage, peer pressure and manager 
performance/reputation (section 4.3).  By establishing the HSMS model and the initial 
codes of H&S motivations, the literature review provided criteria for interpreting the 
variables of the research question of this study.  These criteria for data evaluation were 




“If the analysis will involve coding the answers, then 
during the interview the researcher should continually 
clarify the meanings of the answers with respect to the 
categories to be used later.” 
 
Two interviews of about one hour in duration took place at each of the 12 fire 
departments that participated: 
 
a. Interview with the commander or vice-commander of the fire department  
b. Interview with the H&S expert 
 
Interviews were conducted with both the commander (or vice-commander) and an H&S 
expert of each fire department because the organisational HSMS implementation is 
likely to be the result of the experiences and motivations that prompted their decisions 
as managers.  Together, these individuals were considered the top management in the 
field of H&S.  The participants were informed before the interviews about the contents 
and aims of the research project.  This also included an introduction to the HSMS model 
(Figure 2.7).  The interviews focused on specific examples of existing risk assessments 
and/or documented H&S measures from the organisations in order to ensure a practical 
level of discussion.  Due to the phenomenological perspective applied, the interviews 
centred around real-world topics (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015).  Specific topics (for 
example documented risk assessments) were selected and agreed upon with the 
participating fire departments in advance.  Interviewees were asked how those H&S 
topics had been developed, why they acted in that way, and how their decisions were 
related to their experiences with H&S authorities.  
 
Brinkmann and Kvale (2015) described semi-structured qualitative interviews as a 
method for identifying a person’s experience of a given topic.  The interviewer should 
begin with an open question that requests interviewees to describe a certain experience 
in their own words.  Subsequent questions should then be asked to clarify issues and to 
maintain the thematic focus.  In this study, four leading questions were asked during the 
interviews with both the commanders and the H&S experts: 
 
1. How is your organisational H&S management system shaped? 
2. What are your reasons for choosing such an approach to H&S management? 
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3. What are your experiences with H&S authorities (insurances, unions, etc.) and 
their publications? 
4. What H&S approaches and motivations do H&S authorities emphasise in your 
view? 
 
After the framework for the interview had been defined during the introduction (see also 
section 3.4), the chosen risk assessments or H&S measures, respectively, were 
discussed with reference to the HSMS model of this study.  On this thematic basis, the 
motivations of the commander and the H&S expert were investigated.  Finally, 
experiences with H&S authorities were considered.  During debriefing, the participants 
were asked if they would like to add anything.  The researcher explained that there 
would be another opportunity for conversation (either in person or by telephone) 
regarding the draft case study report, which was written by analysing the two completed 
interviews with respect to the predefined data codes (section 4.3) and by reviewing the 
general context of the respective fire department.  The latter was investigated during a 
complementary visit to the main local fire station.  The review of the draft case study 
reports by the participants ensured that the researcher’s understanding of the reported 




4.3 Within-case analysis 
 
The views and experiences of the participating fire department managers were the main 
data source.  The interviews were transcribed and then analysed in detail.  The QDA 
software NVivo 11 was used to structure the contents of the comprehensive text data for 
subsequent cross-case analyses.  This helped to systematically derive the outcomes and 
conclusions of the study.  Brinkmann and Kvale (2015) emphasised that transcribing 
interviews implied considerable interpretation because oral language is translated into 
written text.  In this study, the analysis was based on transcriptions that focused on 
content rather than verbatim presentation.  Thus, following the recommendation of 
Brinkmann and Kvale (2015), a more fluent written style was applied. 
 
The interviewees’ statements were analysed with respect to codes describing the ways 
of implementing an HSMS (referring to the elements of an effective HSMS according to 
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Figure 2.7) and the associated motivations of top management.  According to Bazeley 
(2013, p. 128), each code “provides a label that represents what passages of data are 
about”.  The interview data were scanned for such codes.  When a new issue emerged 
during an interview, it was discussed in detail to ensure a comprehensive description of 
this potentially new code.  At the same time, it was acknowledged that codes should 
typically be modified during the process of data analysis (Bazeley, 2013; Brinkmann 
and Kvale, 2015).  In the following, the initial codes from the literature are described. 
 
Motivation codes for managers’ reasons for implementing an HSMS: 
• Legal: aiming at complying with regulatory demands 
• Economic: aiming at creating benefits for the organisation 
• Information provision/usage: using information provided by authorities 
• Peer pressure: viewing activities of others as challenge 
• Manager performance/reputation: viewing H&S as important for one’s own 
performance evaluation or reputation within the organisation or industry 
• Other motivations that emerged during interviews, including those social-
context items from the literature that were initially considered less important for 




HSMS codes for managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS: 
• Governance oriented (‘Deciding’ + ‘Innovating’) 
• Behaviour oriented (‘Leading’ + ‘Taking care’) 
• ‘Deciding’ + ‘Taking care’ 
• ‘Leading’ + ‘Innovating’ 
• Holistic system (all four elements of an effective HSMS) 
• Other HSMS approaches that did not correspond with the literature review, 
including isolated HSMS elements or combinations of three HSMS elements 
according to Figure 2.7. 
 
The above codes were not described abstractly, but rather in a very practical way.  This 
approach mitigated potential problems resulting from language interpretation or 
intercultural understanding (Bazeley, 2013).  The interviews with Dutch and Swedish 
participants were conducted in English, occasionally supported by the author’s 
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knowledge of the local languages.  The use of English was possible because the 
participating interviewees spoke the language at a satisfactory level.  Among German 
participants, knowledge of the English language was insufficient.  Therefore, the 
interviews at German fire departments were conducted and transcribed in German.  The 
relevant parts of the transcripts were subsequently translated into English.  The effects 
of divergent language interpretations between the researcher and Dutch or Swedish 
interviewees was expected to be minor because of the practical interview focus.  The 
researcher aspired to further reduce potential language effects by asking clarifying 
questions during the interviews, as recommended by Brinkmann and Kvale (2015). 
 
The within-case analysis focused on identifying thematic statements from the 
interviews.  These represented the interviewees’ viewpoints as understood by the 
researcher (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015).  Such statements made participants’ 
experiences and management approaches as well as their motivations visible.  They 
comprised the ideas and concepts of H&S management that formed the basis for the 
analyses and outcomes of the cross-case analyses. 
 
 
4.4 Cross-case analyses 
 
The ideas and concepts that resulted from the within-case analyses were compared in 
order to identify cross-case patterns (Eisenhardt, 1989) and explore interrelationships 
and effects of context (Bazeley, 2013).  In terms of managers’ H&S motivations, open 
coding was used to develop categories that “capture the fullness of the experiences” 
(Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015, p. 227).  This enabled the creation of a typology that 
reflected managers’ views on the issue (Bazeley, 2013).  The identified motivation 
statements were related to the ways of implementing an HSMS.  Additionally, 
managers’ experiences with H&S authorities were reviewed.  The relevance of specific 
motivation categories was analysed by counting and statistically evaluating the number 
of respective statements.  It was investigated whether different H&S motivations led to 
different management practices in different regulatory environments.  Emerging 
patterns were scrutinised with a view to the literature on HSMS implementation. 
 
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 536) stated that the analysis should start “as close as possible to 
the ideal of no theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test”.  She conceded, 
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however, that this ideal could not fully be achieved.  Therefore, she recommended that 
only the main variables, and not comprehensive theoretical propositions, should be 
derived from the literature.  In this study, the initial codes for managers’ motivations 
and ways of implementing an HSMS were based on the literature.  The patterns that 
emerged during the data analyses were used to move from the initial motivation codes 
to the elaborated typology of managers’ H&S motivations, taking relationships with 
regulatory experiences and managerial practices into account.  Regarding these 
relationships, no substantiated propositions were derived from the literature; only basic 
ideas were developed.  For example, economic pressure might promote informal rather 
than formal HSMSs (Nordlöf, 2015; Yang, 2012). 
 
To investigate the effects of regulatory approaches in Germany, the Netherlands and 
Sweden, the individual case studies were combined to form country cases.  The 
literature review and the expert consultations (section 5.1) indicated that the regulatory 
environments within these countries could be assumed to be similar.  These country 
cases were supported by national documentation and literature on the activities of H&S 
authorities, such as government agencies, insurances, trade unions etc.  Emerging 
patterns were scrutinised with a view to the literature on H&S regulation. 
With reference to the typology of managers’ H&S motivations in their managerial and 
regulatory context, it was investigated whether the data provided answers as to why 
certain motivations led to certain H&S management practices and why these 
motivations were differently affected by authorities.  By considering the literature on 
these questions, reasons for and against generalisation were identified (Yin, 2014).  At 
the same time, the internal validity of the results was supported (Brinkmann and Kvale, 
2015).  There was no expectation of finding a complete answer to the question of why 
those relationships existed.  Indeed, it was important to avoid creating a “narrow and 
idiosyncratic theory” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 547) that would have been applicable to 
only the very specific context of fire departments in the selected countries.  
Accordingly, the theoretical considerations were not used to develop a complex 
proposition about why relationships between motivations, regulations and management 
practices existed.  Instead, the analyses were aimed at verifying and supporting the 




4.5 Sampling of fire departments in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden 
 
The selection process for participants was a combination of theoretical and convenience 
sampling.  The theoretical reasoning for choosing fire departments is described in 
section 1.3.  In the selected countries, there is a suitable number of medium-sized 
professional brigades (with 50 to 300 full-time firefighters).  These municipal 
organisations are free in decision making, which distinguishes them from their 
counterparts in countries with regional or national fire services, such as France or 
Poland.  The fire departments were approached by letter and email to ask if they would 
participate.  The term ‘convenience sampling’ refers to the limited willingness of fire 
departments to take part.  In each country, at least five organisations were interested in 
participating.  Geographic selection resulted in a regional diversity covering three 
federal states in Germany, four provinces in the Netherlands and three provinces in 
Sweden.  In total, 15 fire departments were examined, of which two served as pilot 
studies, one was excluded because of its unusual context and 12 provided the data of the 
main study.  Obviously, the sample of case organisations was biased towards fire 
department managers that cared about H&S management.  However, with respect to the 
given research question, this was not considered to be problematic because the study 
investigated how (not whether) an organisational HSMS was implemented. 
 
During the sampling process, Figure 4.2 was used for promotion purposes.  The figure 
was developed as an indicative visualisation of the different ways of implementing an 
HSMS in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.  It was based on selected literature 
from the respective countries.  National publications about H&S practices in fire 
departments indicated that Germans focused on formal, governance-oriented HSMSs 
(Gerhold, 2012), while the Dutch fire service association promoted a safety-culture 
approach (van Guldener, 2013).  In Sweden, a holistic approach that integrates both 
governance and behaviour orientation was described by Alavaara (2007).  Figure 4.2 
illustrates these findings with dark colours for the focus areas of national HSMS 
approaches and light colours for the non-focus areas.  Based on the literature review, it 
was not possible to determine whether the depicted differences existed in practice or 
whether they merely reflected the selected publications.  This investigation was part of 





Assumed national ways of implementing an HSMS at fire departments 
(developed by the author) 
 
 
Other European countries were considered not suitable for this study because either the 
organisational structure of fire services was not comparable or the number of 
organisations was very small.  In the United Kingdom and France, fire departments are 
organised at regional level.  Romania and Poland have national firefighting 
organisations.  In Austria and Belgium, fire brigades are run by municipalities, but there 
are less than ten professional organisations in each of these countries due to their 
relatively small size.  In Denmark, a single private enterprise is responsible for the 
majority of fire services. 
 
 
4.6 Consideration of potential problems and risks during data collection 
 
Darke et al. (1998, p. 281) described the accessibility of sample companies as a major 
issue in case study research and emphasised: 
 
“Organizations need to be very clear about the research 
outcomes and how their organization will benefit from 
involvement.  The researcher needs to work with the 
organization to identify ‘what’s in it for them’.” 
 
The research design of this study took into account that there should be some kind of 
immediate benefit to the fire departments.  Therefore, the drafted case study reports 
were discussed with participants not only to ensure validity, but also to provide the 
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organisations with initial analytical results.  In addition to the individual case analyses, 
which focused on the local ways of implementing an HSMS, the researcher provided 
general background information from his fieldwork.  Thus, participating organisations 
received an early benefit in the form of new H&S ideas.  Finally, the main findings of 
the study were summarised and provided in generalised form to protect confidentiality. 
 
The multiple-case design was expected to further reduce the data collection risks of this 
study.  If individual organisations had decided to end their cooperation, there would 
have been alternative fire departments to contact as alternative participants.  More than 
20 suitable organisations were identified in both the Netherlands and Sweden, and more 
than 50 in Germany.  Therefore, it was considered likely that the planned number of 





Pilot Studies and Resulting Approach to Data Analysis 
 
The process of qualitative data collection allows the interview design to be continually 
adjusted to account for new insights obtained from completed cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
van Teijlingen and Hundley, 2001).  The data are collected “socially in the interaction 
of interviewer and interviewee” (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015, p. 71).  For example, 
Beck (2011) reported that, in his qualitative study on H&S management, a leading 
interview question was edited after experiencing problems in early interviews.  Unlike 
in quantitative surveys, such adjustments are considered suitable in qualitative, 
interview-oriented research because of the overlap of data collection and analysis 
(Brinkmann and Kvale, 2015; Eisenhardt, 1989).  Nevertheless, the design of the semi-
structured interviews was well tested by means of expert reviews and two pilot studies, 
providing the basis for developing the applied approach to data analysis.  
 
 
5.1 Development of interview design 
 
According to Elo et al. (2014), interview questions should initially be developed in 
association with a relevant reference group in order to ensure the questions are 
understandable and relevant to the participants.  Such expert reviews were also used by 
other authors in developing questions on managers’ experiences and perceptions 
(Lampinen et al., 2015).  During the development of this study’s interview design, 
conversations took place with representatives of Dutch, German and Swedish fire 
services.  The conversations had two objectives.  First, fire departments were to be 
persuaded to participate in the project; this would require support from opinion leaders 
in the respective countries.  Second, the HSMS model and the interview questions were 
discussed and adapted to align with the needs and perceptions of fire departments.  The 
initial interview guidance (Appendix A) was developed after meetings with one 
particularly interested H&S expert from each of the three countries.  The refined 
interview guidance (Appendix B) emerged from two subsequent group discussions, one 
with commanding officers of German fire departments (representing one very small fire 
department and one very big one, neither of which was subsequently used as a case 
study), and one with H&S specialists from a Dutch firefighting research institute. 
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The expert reviews led to the following design adjustments: 
 
• The context of the interviews was re-focused by relating them to existing 
examples of risk assessments and/or H&S measures in the participating 
organisations.  In this way, a practical level of discussion could be ensured. 
• The content of the HSMS model (Figure 2.7) was clarified by changing the 
explanations of the categories ‘deciding’ and ‘taking care’.  In the former 
category, the words ‘in details’ were added to confirm that the focus was not just 
on management interest in general but on detailed H&S decisions.  In the latter 
category, ‘informing management’ was added in order to distinguish the action 
from communication among employees. 
• The term ‘H&S authorities’ was clarified for interview question three, stating 
that not only government agencies were included but also insurances and unions.  
This was necessary because the different roles of these authorities became 
obvious during the expert consultations. 
• It was stressed that managers’ experiences with H&S authorities were not 
confined solely to personal meetings or inspections, but also included 
publications and information from the authorities.  This was necessary because 
certain managers in Germany had never experienced a visit from authorities. 
 
In line with the recommendations of Elo et al. (2014), the research instrument was 
considered to have been pretested for appropriateness, comprehension and relevance.  
Thus, the interviews were expected to produce meaningful data for the subsequent 
thematic analysis.  Both the leading questions and the related HSMS model (Figure 2.7) 
were tested before the pilot studies, as the interviews were the main source of data.  It 
was investigated how interviewees understood the questions in the given interview 
context.  Collins (2003, p. 231) emphasised: 
 
“Whilst pilots may detect overt problems that disrupt the 
response elicitation process they often do not provide 
evidence of causes, nor do they provide evidence of covert 
problems.” 
 
Therefore, it was necessary to look at the relationship between questions and answers 
first.  The wording of the questions and the interview context were reviewed without 
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considering the specific H&S issues in individual organisations.  The focus was on the 
details of the research instrument, not the data collection method as a whole.  The pilot 
studies subsequently demonstrated that the two interviews with representatives of top 
management yielded the data required for further analysis.  
 
 
5.2 First pilot study 
 
The first pilot study was completed in order to demonstrate that the chosen research 
design would yield the data needed to answer the research question (section 2.8).  As a 
result of the expert reviews described in section 5.1, the main objectives of piloting in 
case study research, as stated by Yin (2014), had already been achieved.  The data 
collection method had been adapted with respect to both content and field procedures.  
However, it had yet to be shown that the individual case studies would provide 
meaningful results and sufficient data for subsequent cross-case analysis.  According to 
the research objectives (section 2.8), managers’ ways of implementing an organisational 
HSMS, their H&S motivations and their perceptions of H&S authorities’ regulatory 
approaches had to be codified.  The within-case analysis was expected to reveal 
indicative relationships between management practices and underlying motivations. 
 
 
5.2.1 Research design 
 
The first pilot study was conducted at a Dutch fire department.  The organisation 
comprised about 200 professional firefighters at five stations.  It was one of the bigger 
fire departments in the Netherlands.  Interviews were conducted with the vice-
commander and the H&S expert.  The interview guidance as presented in Appendix B 
was applied.  In order to ensure confidentiality, the organisation was referred to as NL-
1, and names of individuals and locations were omitted in the case study report 
(Appendix C). 
 
Two examples of H&S management activities were discussed at NL-1: 
 
a) Draft of guidelines for ‘Schoon werken bij brand’ [‘clean working at fire’] 
b) Draft of ‘RI&E proces’ [‘process for risk assessments’] 
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Two related documents were provided to the researcher in advance, allowing for 
preparation of the interviews.  Additionally, a TV report about the issue of ‘Schoon 
werken bij brand’ [‘clean working at fire’] was found on the internet.  This was well 
known by pilot study participants and it became part of the interview with the H&S 
expert.  The documents were discussed with respect to the leading interview questions 
in the interview guidance (Appendix B).  Based on the interviews and related 
documents, the researcher drafted a case study report that was provided to both 
interviewees for review.  The text was then edited based on the feedback received, 
resulting in the final report as presented in Appendix C. 
 
 
5.2.2 Case analysis 
 
With respect to the considered examples of H&S management at the Dutch fire 
department NL-1, two different ways of implementing an HSMS were identified.  As 
shown in Figure 5.1, a ‘holistic system’ was in place for the issue of ‘Schoon werken bij 
brand’ [‘clean working at fire’], while the regular ‘RI&E proces’ [‘process for risk 
assessments’] comprised only two of the four elements of an effective HSMS, namely 
‘deciding’ and ‘taking care’.  The underlying analysis is described in detail in the case 
study report (Appendix C). 
 
Figure 5.1 
Way of implementing an HSMS at fire department NL-1 (developed by the author) 
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The case study of NL-1 indicated that different ways of implementing an HSMS may 
coexist in an organisation.  A ‘holistic system’ was identified for the ‘clean working at 
fire’ guideline, which referred to reducing the risk of cancer among firefighters.  This 
issue was brought up by firefighters in 2015 and received considerable media attention.  
Firefighters had been developing their own H&S measures in the workplace even before 
top management considered the issue in detail.  As a result, there was an innovation 
process with no formal organisational rules or governance.  However, top management 
enabled this development by supporting and rewarding communication about the issue.  
As the whole organisation was dealing with the topic to some extent, the interviewees 
mentioned risk awareness at all levels of their fire department. 
 
In contrast, the ‘process for risk assessments’ was rather theoretical in nature.  Its 
practical relevance was less clear, making it more difficult to create awareness through 
leadership.  The resulting H&S measures were hardly considered in day-to-day business 
or training, which prevented innovation.  The process at NL-1 reflected legal demands.  
Nevertheless, NL-1 was trying to improve this way of implementing an HSMS.  Top 
management reported that they had discussed H&S innovation processes and related 
problems with the authorities.  The interviewees stated that the ‘Inspectie SZW’ 
[‘Inspectorate SZW’, an agency of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment] took 
a somewhat holistic view of H&S management, but that inspectors focused too much on 
detailed rules.  
 
Top management stated different motivations with regard to the two ways of 
implementing an HSMS.  In terms of ‘clean working at fire’, they had to respond to the 
activities of their employees and wanted to give direction to the discussion.  Their main 
motivations were ensuring credibility and controlling emotions.  Other motivations 
mentioned included avoiding overreactions and panic.  The vice-commander of NL-1 
(interview, #00:16:20) stated: 
 
“Of course, there are limits, sure, but on the other hand 
when you say we are an organisation that goes for safety 
and for health – that’s what we do outside – then we also 
have to do that for our own employees… 
To give direction to the emotions [and] to the awareness, 
that’s what we do by leading.” 
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The H&S expert added that the related TV report of September 2015 created another 
motivation for the top management of NL-1.  In that programme, the commander, who 
was responsible for H&S at the national association ‘Brandweer Nederland’, answered 
the journalist’s questions very openly and convincingly.  He was a member of the 
association’s standing committee of commanders in which also NL-1 was represented.  
The H&S expert from NL-1 stated (interview, #00:41:45):  
 
“The one commander you saw on TV; he felt a lot of 
responsibility; he felt a lot of ownership… and he 
convinced his colleagues in top management [at 
‘Brandweer Nederland’].” 
 
Regarding management motivations for the ‘holistic system’, two codes of section 4.3 
might therefore be applied, and avoiding panic might provide an additional code: 
 
• ‘Manager performance/reputation’ (based on statements by the vice-
commander) 
• ‘Peer pressure’ (based on statements by the H&S expert) 
• ‘Avoid panic’ (new people-focused code, based on statement by vice-
commander) 
 
The ‘RI&E proces’ [‘process for risk assessments’] was described as a less effective 
way of implementing an HSMS, covering only ‘deciding’ and ‘taking care’.  Both 
interviewees stated that the contents of the risk assessments were often not very relevant 
to the work of firefighters.  The vice-commander emphasised that, in reality, “you have 
to make priorities” (interview, #00:25:40), although inspectors might identify items of 
non-compliance when checking their lists of predefined risks and recommended 
measures.  The within-case analysis indicated that differences between work practices 
and written risk assessments were caused by the following motivation for the ‘RI&E 
proces’: 
 
• ‘Legal’ (based on statements by both the vice-commander and the H&S expert) 
 
The analysis of the ways of implementing an HSMS and the associated motivation 
statements in the interview transcripts provided a first indication of corresponding 
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relationships.  The motivation of legal compliance resulted in a less effective way of 
implementing an HSMS than other motivational factors, such as management reputation 
and peer pressure.  As described by Guldenmund (2010, p. 1477), legal compliance 
“was not the final goal”, but other motivations led to the ‘holistic system’ of H&S 
management at NL-1.  This was a first hint for the development of the envisaged 





The two interviews, the site visit and the H&S documents considered proved to be 
suitable sources for developing the case study.  The corresponding report (Appendix C) 
was reviewed by the participants.  Their feedback revealed that the presentation of the 
different ways of implementing an HSMS was meaningful, and that the description of 
main managerial motivations and regulatory experiences was valid.  The approach 
applied to ensure confidentiality worked well.  Neither the case study report nor the 
quotes from the interview transcripts contained any names or identifying characteristics.  
The list of associated names was treated as a strictly confidential document.  The 
research approach was well received by the participants.  
 
The researcher’s knowledge of the local language was important for data collection.  
During interview transcription, many Dutch words had to be captured and translated.  
Additionally, the interviews were partially influenced by a Dutch interpretation of 
English.  For example, the English term ‘governance’ was initially associated with the 
government officials of the municipalities.  As anticipated in the research design, it was 
necessary to clarify such terms during the interviews.  The considered H&S documents 
from the fire department and the H&S authority were also written in Dutch. 
 
During case analysis, the difference between fixed and open codes became evident.  The 
four elements of an effective HSMS (Figure 2.7) represented fixed codes that had been 
well defined in advance, referring to both the literature and experts.  They were used to 
describe the ways of implementing an organisational HSMS.  Following Brinkmann and 
Kvale (2015), this fixed coding was done during the interviews, allowing for clarifying 
discussions between the interviewees and the researcher.  In contrast, the researcher 
completed a self-contained transcript analysis of managers’ H&S motivations.  A 
 72 
variety of motivation statements were identified during the process of open coding.  
Obvious views were included as main motivations in the case report.  All motivation 
statements were marked in the transcript for subsequent cross-case analysis (examples 
in Appendix D).  Overall, the answers of the interviewees contained promising 
statements that could be expected to provide new insights when compared with data 
from other cases. 
 
This pilot case study revealed that authorities tended to expect uniform national 
approaches to H&S management.  A major inspection of fire departments in the 
Netherlands in 2015 by the H&S authority ‘Inspectie SZW’ [‘Inspectorate SZW’, an 
agency of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment] was discussed.  The 
authority investigated 19 of the 25 fire departments in the country.  The results indicated 
that all 19 of the organisations failed to have valid risk assessments for operations.  
Among other things, the authority recommended harmonising H&S approaches across 
the Netherlands in order to improve H&S conditions.  Accordingly, it might be expected 
that all Dutch fire departments would report similar experiences with H&S authorities in 
the main study.  This supports the idea, and value, of developing country-specific cases. 
 
In summary, the experiences from the first pilot case study demonstrated that the 
developed research design worked well.  The within-case analysis resulted in a case 
study report (Appendix C) that was well received by the participating organisation.  As 
anticipated during research design, it was possible to derive first ideas about the 
relationship between managers’ H&S motivations and their ways of implementing an 
HSMS.  The resulting case study report and the interview transcripts were considered a 
suitable data source for the subsequent cross-case analysis. 
 
 
5.3 Second pilot study 
 
The aim of the second pilot study was to demonstrate the reliability of data collection.  
The first pilot study had revealed a substantial difference in the coding process for the 
two main variables under investigation: fixed codes for the ways of implementing an 
HSMS versus open codes for H&S motivations.  With the second pilot study, it was 
examined whether this differential coding process was appropriate.  In contrast to the 
first pilot study, the fixed model of an effective HSMS (Figure 2.7) was not explained to 
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participants during the interviews of the second pilot study.  Only the questions in the 
interview guidance according to Appendix B were presented in oral and written form.  
This change to the interview design was expected to affect the course of the interview 
conversation, potentially resulting in different data collection outcomes.  
 
The first pilot study had provided the following experiences with respect to the two 
main variables of the research question: 
 
• First variable: Managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS 
The four elements of an effective HSMS (Figure 2.7) served as a fixed-coding 
framework.  The codes were deductively developed from the literature and 
sufficiently pre-tested for relevance during expert reviews (section 5.1).  In the 
beginning of the interviews in the first pilot study, the codes were explained to 
the participants and Figure 2.7 was on the table for reference during the 
interviews.  Following Brinkmann and Kvale (2015), this approach allowed for 
clarifying discussions regarding the elements of an effective HSMS.  As a result, 
the interview design of the first pilot study was expected to clearly reveal 
different ways of implementing an HSMS (Figure 5.1).  
 
• Second variable: Managers’ H&S motivations 
Managers’ motivations for engaging in H&S management were identified with 
an open coding process.  Not only statements that fit into the motivation codes 
derived from the literature (section 4.3) were considered: also new items, such as 
“avoid panic” (interview with the vice-commander of NL-1, #00:11:15), were 
coded as motivation statements.  Following Rowlands (2005), emergent themes 
and findings from within-case analysis should be used to amend the initially 
defined codes for subsequent data collection and analysis.  Correspondingly, the 
first pilot study provided indications of H&S motivations, but no definite 
motivation categories or themes. 
 
Based on the literature review, it was assumed that top managers’ H&S motivations 
(second variable) determined their ways of implementing an HSMS (first variable).  The 
open coding of H&S motivations corresponded with the little existing knowledge in the 
field.  The fixed codes for the ways of implementing an HSMS reflected the 
comprehensive literature on safety climate. 
 74 
5.3.1 Research design 
 
The second pilot study was conducted at a German fire department.  The organisation 
comprised about 100 professional firefighters at one station.  It was one of the smaller 
professional fire departments in Germany.  Interviews were conducted with the vice-
commander and the H&S expert.  In order to ensure confidentiality, the organisation is 
referred to as D-1.  The interviews were conducted and transcribed in German.  
Subsequently, relevant parts of the transcript were translated into English (Appendix D). 
 
The interview guidance as presented in Appendix B was applied, but without showing 
the elements of an effective HSMS (Figure 2.7).  In contrast to the first pilot study, the 
interviews did not start with describing the model to the participants.  Only the four 
leading questions were introduced.  Then it was explained that, in this study, the term 
‘HSMS’ refers to both informal behaviours and formally documented structures and 
processes.  During the interviews, reference to the ‘basic model of health and safety 
management systems’ (Appendix B), that is, the elements of an effective HSMS 
according to Figure 2.7, was avoided.  The sub-codes of the four elements were not used 
in clarifying or probing questions in order to prevent a hidden, implicit application of 
the pre-defined fixed codes.  There was thus no common theoretical framework for the 
interview conversations on the ways of implementing an HSMS, leaving the 
interviewees to present their views freely.  Regarding managers’ H&S motivations, as in 
the first pilot study, there was an open conversation with subsequent application of open 
codes. 
 
Four examples of H&S management activities were discussed at D-1: 
 
a) Risk assessment and risk mitigation at driving to emergency responses 
b) Employee information at introduction of new vehicles 
c) Formal instruction for refilling AdBlue on diesel vehicles 
d) Introduction of ‘Remove-before-smoke-diving badge’ for team registration 
 
The examples were considered with respect to the leading questions in the interview 
guidance (Appendix B).  The last example d) was considered in the greatest detail 
because it was directly related to the day-to-day work of firefighters, and its relevance 
for H&S was obvious.  At the same time, its operational nature was similar to that of the 
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‘Schoon werken bij brand’ [‘clean working at fire’] example from the first pilot study 
because both practices were applied during indoor firefighting.  Thus, a basis was 




5.3.2 Case analysis 
 
The case analysis of the second pilot study focused on the comparison of the data 
collection outcomes with those of the first pilot study.  Therefore, the two practices 
from indoor firefighting were taken as examples of H&S management at the 
organisations NL-1 and D-1, that is, ‘clean working at fires’ and the introduction of a 
‘Remove-before-smoke-diving badge’.  For both H&S management cases, a ‘holistic 
system’ of HSMS implementation was identified.  The corresponding interview answers 
from the vice-commanders of the two fire departments are presented in the following.  
The first interviewee knew the elements of an effective HSMS according to Figure 2.7 
when he gave his answers.  The second participant described the ‘holistic system’ 
without this knowledge.  The comparison of interview answers was expected to reveal 
potential differences in data collection outcomes and thus provide an indication of 
reliability.  At the same time, the occurrence of motivational statements during the 
course of the interviews was considered.  
 
The vice-commanders of both NL-1 and D-1 described a ‘holistic system’ of HSMS 
implementation.  The following is a list of the interview statements that were coded 
according to Figure 2.7:  
 
Statements of vice-commander NL-1 on the ‘holistic system’ for clean working at fire 
• Deciding: “we decided to start up a task force [sic]” (interview, #00:08:00). 
• Innovating: “[name of H&S expert] has told you probably all about it.  We are 
innovating” (interview, #00:14:20), supported by a separate statement by the 
H&S expert: “during the process, they [the firefighters] worked together with 
me and with higher management to get some extra funding.  After the first steps, 
we tried to get some innovation in the way” (interview with H&S expert, 
#00:28:10). 
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• Leading: “we have to bring back reason in what we have to do” (interview, 
#00:11:35) and “To give direction to the emotions, to the awareness, that’s what 
we do by leading” (interview, #00:17:25). 
• Taking care: “firemen, the basis of our organisation, start worrying about their 
health according to cancer, according to smoke, according to all the stuff that 
comes out of a fire [sic]” (interview, #00:07:15). 
 
Statements of vice-commander D-1 on the ‘holistic system’ for smoke-diving 
registration 
• Deciding: “And then we said that we could, actually…, we make a Remove-
before-smoke-diving badge, which is fitted with Velcro to the jacket” (interview, 
#00:44:00). 
• Innovating: “And then we also asked the team what other problems does smoke-
diving monitoring create for us.  If it rains, then, sorry, the pen doesn't write.  
How do we get the pen to write?  Then we looked for paper which is not 
destructible… and got a pen, the famous NASA pen” (interview, #00:45:30). 
• Leading: “We said, listen people, there were two serious smoke diving 
accidents.  We’ve examined them.  We’ll describe the accidents to you.  And at 
the same time, we’ll describe the lessons we learned from them to you.  And then 
we offered a training session” (interview, #00:46:45), and “encouraging the 
people very clearly in their responsibility.  Taking responsibility.  Making 
decisions themselves” (interview, #00:49:30). 
• Taking care: “he [the firefighter] must evaluate, can I take the responsibility for 
taking a measure now, which maybe isn’t the standard measure but can remedy 
things here.  If I [fireman] can’t, I [fireman] must pull back and provide 
feedback…  And the employees must be sensitized to realise:  So, now I’m at my 
wits’ end and I need support in making a decision” (interview, #00:53:40). 
 
When comparing the interview statements about the ways of implementing an HSMS, it 
became obvious that in the first pilot study, the vice-commander of NL-1 used the terms 
applied in Figure 2.7, while the answers in the second pilot study were more general.  
Nevertheless, also the latter statements permitted coding according to the pre-defined 
and tested codes.  Thus, both pilot studies revealed that the fixed codes for top 
managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS worked well.  However, during the first 
pilot study, suggestions emerged for amending the sub-codes in Figure 2.7.  For 
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example, the vice-commander added the term “emotions” to clarify his understanding 
of leadership, supplementing the given sub-code of awareness.  Similarly, the H&S 
expert suggested amending the ‘innovating’ by replacing ‘assessment of hazards’ with 
‘assessment of measures’ (Appendix C).  Thus, the comparison of answers indicated 
that richer data were gathered in the first pilot study because participants were 
introduced to the HSMS model according to Figure 2.7. 
 
All interviews indicated that the course of the conversation was supported by staying 
focused on specific examples.  During both the first and the second pilot study, 
interviewees tended to move to other fields of their H&S activities when they wanted to 
show good performance.  For example, the vice-commander of NL-1 mentioned 
“general annual presentations” when he wanted to emphasise his leadership (interview, 
#00:17:50).  Similarly, the vice-commander of D-1 mentioned “ambulance services” 
when he wanted to explain that employees had to decide independently (interview, 
#00:50:40).  In both cases, the pre-agreed examples were used to bring the interview 
conversation back to the original topic in order ensure that the ways of implementing an 
HSMS were correctly described.   
 
Interviewees stated their H&S motivations when describing their ways of implementing 
an HSMS.  There were no separate conversations about the first two questions in the 
interview guidance but the shaping of the HSMS and the underlying motivations were 
considered together.  The two pilot studies indicated that rather diverse statements could 
be expected in the main study.  These were used for an inductive development of 
themes for managers’ H&S motivations in the different regulatory environments.  In 
contrast to the HSMS codes in Figure 2.7, the motivation codes that were derived from 
the literature in section 4.3 did not cover all answers.  New themes emerged in both 
pilot studies in relation to the implementation of a ‘holistic system’.  For example, the 
vice-commander of NL-1 mentioned “avoid panic” (interview with vice-commander of 
NL-1, #00:11:20) and the vice-commander of D-1 stated “we also wrote an article… 
that was then publicised” (interview with vice-commander of D-1, #00:47:00).  Thus, 
both pilot studies demonstrated that an open coding approach was necessary for 






The comparison of the data collection outcomes in the first and second pilot studies 
indicated that the differences were rather small.  The analysis of the interviews with the 
vice-commanders of the NL-1 and D-1 fire departments also revealed that the courses of 
the conversations were similar.  With respect to the ways of implementing an HSMS, it 
was observed that the first pilot study resulted in richer data.  After introducing the 
fixed-coding scheme according to Figure 2.7, interviewees’ answers were more focused 
and provided indications for improved sub-codes for the elements of an effective 
HSMS. 
 
Brinkmann and Kvale (2015) stated that discussing fixed codes during an interview 
could increase the accuracy of coding because the interviewees could be asked about 
their understanding in detail.  McCafferty (2013) also applied deductively developed 
fixed codes to describe organisational behaviour with respect to a pre-defined model.  
For her qualitative interviews, she developed probing questions that were related to the 
factors of that model.  According to McCafferty (2013, p. 90), such an approach “makes 
explicit the reality that researchers are contaminated with theory”.  However, it might 
also be considered an inappropriate way of leading interviewees’ answers in a specific 
direction.  To take both of these views into account, the fixed codes in this study were 
explained to participants in the beginning of the interviews.  The interviewees, who 
were generally educated in the field of H&S management, were thus able to understand 
and judge the interview questions in the context of Figure 2.7.  By openly discussing the 
fixed codes in the first pilot study, the researcher’s influence on the outcome of the 
coding process was therefore expected to be smaller than in the second pilot study.  
During the interviews in the first pilot study, Figure 2.7 was continuously on the table in 
order to ensure that all elements of an HSMS were considered.  
 
The open coding of top managers’ H&S motivations and the investigation of the 
relationship with their ways of implementing an HSMS followed the recommendation 
of Eisenhardt (1989, p. 536), who stated that the analysis should start “as close as 
possible to the ideal of no theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test”.  With 
respect to the relationship between managers’ H&S motivations (second variable) and 
their ways of implementing an HSMS (first variable), some indications and ideas could 
be derived from the literature, requiring an inductive approach to data analysis.  The 
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corresponding open coding process started during within-case analyses and was 
envisaged to be completed during cross-case analyses.  
 
The review of the interview design during the two pilot studies showed that the setup 
represented a form of critical incident analysis as described by Stysko-Kunkowska 
(2014, p. 99): 
 
“Participant reconstructs an incident or set of incidents 
(events, processes, issues) of particular meaning for him 
and delivers information about the personal meaning, 
beliefs, emotions, behaviours, context and outcomes.” 
 
In this context, the term ‘critical’ did not refer to notions of crises or problems, but 
meant management situations that were “prominent in the memories” of participants 
(Cope and Watts, 2000, p. 112).  The pilot studies indicated that top management 
representatives of fire departments had many stories to tell about their ways of 
implementing an HSMS.  To ensure that participants had a common understanding of 
the HSMS characteristics, the elements of an effective HSMS (Figure 2.7) were 
presented in the first pilot study.  Cottrell (2013) used a similar approach when 
mentioning a list of stakeholders that interviewees should consider when reporting 
critical incidents.  Thus, a deductively developed framework was provided that resulted 
in comparable stories about organisational examples of H&S management.  Related 
H&S motivations of managers were then revealed inductively, pursuing a 
phenomenological approach as described by Brinkmann and Kvale (2015). 
 
 
5.4 Resulting approach to thematic data analysis 
 
Qualitative coding formed the basis of the thematic data analysis in the first and second 
pilot studies.  The validity and reliability of the applied codes was essential to ensure the 
correct conclusions were drawn (Campbell et al., 2013).  The relationship between the 
two variables of this study’s research question could only be investigated correctly if the 
codes described what they were supposed to describe (validity), and if the coding was 
done so consistently that other researchers would have done it in a similar way 
(reliability).  The coding of the semi-structured qualitative interviews was relatively 
 80 
complex because the transcripts were, as is typical for this research instrument, 
“conversational and choppy” (Campbell et al., 2013, p. 302).  The open-ended 
questions tended to produce broad answers that were developed as the interviewer and 
the interviewee “negotiate[d] an understanding” (McPhee, 1990, p. 399) of the topics.  
The researcher influenced what kinds of incidents were discussed and to what extent, as 
described in the second pilot study.  Due to the complexity of the transcripts, varying 
coding approaches had to be applied in order to ensure validity and reliability. 
 
There is little literature on how to code semi-structured interviews (Campbell et al., 
2013).  In line with the pragmatic research paradigm of this study, the researcher varied 
between deductive and inductive coding.  The pilot studies indicated that the first 
variable of the research question, that is, top managers’ ways of implementing an 
HSMS, could be coded well with the deductively derived framework according to 
Figure 2.7.  The fixed-coding scheme structured the interviews and produced data based 
on consistent codes.  The validity was tested during the interviews by discussing the 
coding with the interviewees, that is, pursuing a process of “member checking” 
(Saldaña, 2009, p. 28) as demonstrated in the first pilot study.  The emergent themes of 
HSMS implementation were reflected in analytical memos that were written after the 
interviews at each case organisation. 
 
The second variable of the research question had to be investigated using open codes 
because there was little literature on top managers’ H&S motivations.  Thus, the coding 
had an exploratory character.  In-vivo coding was applied because the study aimed to 
investigate the motivations of managers from the individuals’ perspectives.  Statements 
of interviewees on their H&S motivations were identified in the transcripts, not coding 
line-by-line, but applying codes with less frequency, as suggested by Saldaña (2009). 
Motivational codes and associated categories were inductively developed by quoting 
notable interviewee statements.  The analysis of motivations started with participants’ 
original expressions (that is, with in-vivo codes) to ensure reliability and validity. 
 
Descriptive coding was used to identify organisational and regulatory explanations in 
the transcripts.  The organisational codes were interrelated with the individual ways of 
implementing an HSMS, making the coding process similar to that for motivation 
statements.  Regulatory contexts, in contrast, were typically described separately, as 
answers to the third and fourth interview questions (Appendix B), yielding 
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corresponding passages in the transcripts that could be marked as ‘regulatory’.  The 
contents of the codes were then reviewed and compared with statements in related 
interviews.  The resulting organisational and regulatory views were triangulated with 
the literature, organisational reports and publications of the H&S authorities in 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.  
 
The pilot studies delivered on the envisaged structure of the data analysis according to 
the research objectives described in Chapter 2.  In the main study, top managers’ ways 
of implementing an HSMS were initially identified based on within-case analyses, 
taking organisational contexts into account.  The subsequent cross-case analyses 
comprised both the identified managerial practices and regulatory contexts.  Country 
cases were developed with respect to interviewees’ perceptions of authorities’ 
regulatory approaches.  Subsequently, managers’ H&S motivations were codified and 
related to the previously identified ways of implementing an HSMS and national 
regulatory contexts.  Finally, the envisaged typology of managers’ H&S motivations in 
their managerial and regulatory context was developed.  Accordingly, the presentation 
of the data analysis is separated into three chapters: 
 
• Chapter 6: Individual Ways of Implementing an HSMS in Varying Contexts 
(Within-Case Analysis) 
• Chapter 7: Integrated Ways of Implementing an HSMS under National 
Regulations 
(First Cross-Case Analysis) 
• Chapter 8: Typology of Managers’ H&S Motivations  
(Second Cross-Case Analysis) 
 
The chapters’ titles represent the different approaches to case analysis and comparison 
as pursued in this study.  The within-case analysis was the starting point, as is typical 
for theory building from cases (Rowlands, 2005).  The pilot studies indicated that there 
were several examples of different ways of implementing an HSMS in each 
organisation.  In total, six examples of H&S management were discussed in the pilot 
studies.  Thus, about 36 examples were expected for the main study with 12 
participating organisations.  The organisational background was expected to be similar 
in the case studies, as the sample was limited to municipal fire departments with 50 to 
300 full-time professional firefighters (section 4.5).  It was reviewed for each case 
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whether there were unusual organisational characteristics.  The within-case analysis 
resulted in a list of examples of H&S management practices.   
 
A cross-case view was taken in order to group the ways of implementing an HSMS, to 
describe national regulatory environments and, finally, to develop the envisaged 
typology of managers’ H&S motivations.  According to McPhee (1990, pp. 396-397), 
there are three different approaches that can be used to compare cases, depending on the 
experienced relationships between them: 
 
“Cases which can be integrated as different data-points 
all fall under the same conceptual and explanatory 
model... 
Where cases correspond to different explanations, they 
deal with the same kinds of phenomena or processes, but 
demand quite different explanatory models… 
A much more radical difference is present when the 
different cases correspond to different images. The cases 
are seen to differ, not just in degree or in explanatory 
account required, but in kind.” 
 
To assign the individual ways of implementing an HSMS to appropriate groups, it was 
necessary to consider the organisational and regulatory contexts of the HSMSs.  The 
organisational contexts were compared across all participating fire departments.  The 
review of regulatory contexts required a country perspective because both the literature 
and the initial findings from the pilot studies indicated that the legal determinants of 
HSMS implementation stemmed mainly from national activities of H&S authorities.  
Thus, the case organisations were considered “different data-points” McPhee (1990, p. 
396) of H&S management at fire departments.  For example, the formal approaches to 
employee involvement were expected to differ between Germany and Sweden because 
national laws stipulate different roles for employee representatives.  While the Swedish 
‘skyddsombud’ has the power to stop dangerous work duties and to inform H&S 
authorities, the German ‘Sicherheitsbeauftragte’ is expected to promote H&S awareness 
and support top management.  Such power differences are likely to affect the ways of 
implementing an HSMS (Hopkins, 2006). 
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The relationship between top managers’ H&S motivations and their ways of 
implementing an HSMS was expected to require different explanations in different 
circumstances.  Therefore, a typology, rather than a single explanatory model, was 
developed from cross-case analysis, describing the main relationships between H&S 
motivations and ways of implementing an HSMS (McPhee, 1990).  The motivation 
codes from the interview transcripts were combined to form motivation themes, taking 
the managerial and regulatory contexts into account.  For different motivational settings, 
top managers were expected to have varying views on the determinants of a good 
HSMS.  For example, a legal motivation should result in more formal documentation 
than a focus on H&S performance, that is, actual H&S conditions.  The resulting ways 
of implementing an HSMS were still deemed to represent similar kinds of practices that 
could be described with respect to Figure 2.7.  Varying managerial priorities were not 
expected to create “different images” McPhee (1990, p. 397), but rather different 
manifestations of H&S management.  The envisaged typology of managers’ H&S 
motivations answered the research question of this study: How are top managers’ ways 






Individual Ways of Implementing an HSMS in Varying Contexts 
(Within-Case Analysis) 
 
Overall, 30 examples of implementing an HSMS were identified during the interviews 
at 12 case organisations.  Following the conclusions of Chapter 5, the analysis was done 
using the fixed-coding framework derived from the literature as the HSMS model 
presented in section 2.4.  The individual ways of implementing an HSMS are presented 
in the following, sorted into three groups based on generic organisational context.  
Findings were triangulated with organisational documents and the researcher’s 
impressions from his visits to the main fire stations of the fire departments. 
 
The main study’s 12 fire departments were referred to as D-2 to D-5 in Germany (D-1 
was part of the second pilot study), NL-2 to NL-5 in the Netherlands (NL-1 was part of 
the first pilot study) and S-2 to S-5 in Sweden (S-1 was excluded as described below).  
 
 
6.1 Organisational contexts and interview settings  
 
The identified 30 ways of implementing an HSMS comprised 10 examples from each 
country.  Either two or three examples of HSMS implementation were reviewed 
together with the interview participants at each of the four fire departments in Germany, 
the Netherlands and Sweden.  The outcomes were grouped based on the organisational 
model of Capon (2004), distinguishing between three generic contexts for H&S 
management: 
 
• Ongoing operations and behaviour 
• Change projects 
• High-level decisions 
 
Capon (2004) described four central factors that shape an organisation’s internal 
environment.  First, there is a structure that defines the roles of individuals (for example 
in hierarchies) and groups (for example departments).  Second, there are dependencies 
between the organisational parts in terms of tasks and interests.  Third, resource 
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allocation varies within the organisation, and fourth, the behaviour of organisational 
members shapes actual practices.  Obviously the latter was most important for 
commanding fire officers when dealing with ongoing day-to-day operations.  They had 
to control the H&S behaviours and procedures on the work floor.  In change projects, 
they would additionally allocate dedicated resources and create minor (temporary) 
structural changes in the organisation.  Finally, their high-level decisions were affected 
by inter-dependencies with other parts of the overall organisation, especially the 
municipal administrations.  Such decisions might result in major changes in resource 
allocation and structures, as well as in the behaviours of organisational members.  In 
line with these categories, three generic contexts were used to group the identified ways 
of implementing an HSMS. 
 
Regarding the external environment for H&S management, there are national variations 
in H&S regulations due to historical and socio-political influences in Germany, the 
Netherlands and Sweden (Walters and Wadsworth, 2014).  The characteristics and 
effects of these contextual differences are considered in Chapters 7 to 9, where 
managers’ perceptions of organisational contexts and authorities’ regulatory approaches 
are analysed.  The other main factors of the external organisational context, such as the 
technological, economic and competitive environment and the associated 
interdependencies (Capon, 2004), were considered similar for all but one organisation. 
 
The Swedish fire department S-1 was excluded from the analysis due to a local 
‘competitive’ situation with neighbouring fire brigades.  Although S-1 was formally 
independent, it was supposed to cooperate with neighbouring organisations in a very 
integrated way.  Emergency responses were even handled by mixed teams of 
firefighters and commanding officers from different brigades.  This resulted in 
comprehensive documentation of operational procedures and very little top-
management leadership at S-1.  After excluding this unusual context, only the fire 
departments S-2 to S-5 were considered. 
 
The general characteristics of the main study’s 12 participating fire departments and the 
settings of the corresponding 24 interviews, which were conducted in 2017, are 
described in Table 6.1 below.  
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Table 6.1 
Participating fire departments and interviewees 
Code Characteristics of organisations and interviews  
D-2 120 full-time firefighters at one station.  Interviewees: commander (74 
min), one H&S expert (68 min, head of operations). 
D-3 100 full-time firefighters at one station.  Interviewees: commander (67 
min), two H&S experts (64 min, city’s H&S advisor, specialised officer). 
D-4 170 full-time firefighters at two stations.  Interviewees: vice-commander 
(57 min, head of technology), one H&S expert (45 min, head of team). 
D-5 60 full-time firefighters at one station.  Interviewees: vice-commander (63 
min), one H&S expert (62 min, safety representative / works council). 
NL-2 200 full-time firefighters at three stations.  Interviewees: commander (40 
min), two H&S experts (50 min, commanding and specialised officer). 
NL-3 100 full-time firefighters at one station.  Interviewees: commander (68 
min), one H&S expert (71 min, working full-time on H&S, no firefighter). 
NL-4 150 full-time firefighters at two stations.  Interviewees: commander (62 
min), one H&S expert (66 min, head of procurement). 
NL-5 100 full-time firefighters at two stations.  Interviewees: vice-commander 
(49 min, head of HR), H&S Expert (67 min, former station commander). 
S-2 290 full-time firefighters at six stations.  Interviewees: commander (57 
min), one H&S expert (75 min, commanding officer / internal trainer). 
S-3 90 full-time firefighters at two stations.  Interviewees: vice-commander 
(63 min, head of admin), one H&S expert (60 min, safety representative). 
S-4 170 full-time firefighters at four stations.  Interviewees: vice-commander 
(77 min, head of strategy), one H&S expert (57 min, HR professional). 
S-5 60 full-time firefighters at one station.  Interviewees: commander (42 
min), one H&S expert (54 min, commanding officer / planning function). 
 
 
6.2 Application of the fixed-coding scheme during within-case analysis 
 
The fixed-coding scheme for top managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS was 
consistently applied.  The deductively derived four elements of an effective HSMS 
depicted in Figure 2.7 were discussed with all interviewees.  As is typical for qualitative 
research (Bazeley, 2013), it was not always clear whether a certain element could 
indeed be identified in an incident description.  At S-2 for example, it was initially 
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assumed that there was a kind of hidden top-management leadership during the analysis 
of an accident involving indoor firefighting.  Later, however, this view was changed due 
to the lack of any descriptions of active leadership.  At D-5 it was finally concluded that 
the originally assumed ‘deciding’ of top management did not concern the actual H&S 
measures at emergency responses, but rather referred to equipment procurement.  
Similarly, the introduction of the new overall HSMS at NL-5 was characterised by 
independent ‘deciding’ on the part of top management rather than ‘innovating’ in 
collaboration with employees.  The review of questionnaire-based risk assessments at 
NL-4 and NL-5 indicated that this approach created awareness, which in the final 
coding was considered ‘leading’.  The relevance of dedicated employees to ‘taking care’ 
became clear at S-4 when comparing the issue with practices at D-2 and NL-3.  Overall, 
the adjustments of the initial analyses ensured that the fixed-coding scheme was 
consistently applied. 
 
The identified 30 examples of implementing an HSMS covered a wide variety of issues, 
such as improved work practices, new equipment, changed organisations or renewed 
buildings.  Psychosocial risks, however, were not discussed in detail.  EU-OSHA (2011) 
emphasised that emergency workers often cannot avoid disturbing situations in which 
they have to deal with fatalities or severely injured people.  The authors recommended 
organisational measures and employee training to prevent individual overstrain.  
However, EU-OSHA (2011) also indicated that negative psychological effects on 
firefighters, such as depression or work-related stress, are much less frequent than 
physical injuries.  Correspondingly, top managers seem to focus on physical H&S 
issues when implementing their organisational HSMSs.  
 
 
6.3 Top managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS 
 
The ways in which top managers implemented an HSMS were elaborated based on this 
study’s fixed-coding scheme.  The identified ways of implementing an HSMS are 
presented in sections 6.3.1 to 6.3.3, following the generic organisational contexts 




6.3.1 Ways of implementing an HSMS for ongoing operations and behaviour 
 
The context of ongoing operations and behaviour was assumed to be central to H&S 
management.  The literature review had revealed that the best way of implementing an 
HSMS is to follow the so-called PDCA circle, which describes a continuous operational 
process of risk assessment, measurement planning and activity completion (section 2.4).  
The within-case analysis indicated that there were only few examples of complete 
HSMSs in this context.  At D-5, NL-2 and S-5, such holistic HSMSs were found for 
ongoing operations.  At D-5 and NL-2, however, the identified ways of implementing 
an HSMS did not cover all operations at the respective fire departments.  At D-5, a 
distinction was drawn between work at the fire station and emergency responses.  The 
top management of D-5 limited the holistic HSMS to the yearly review of regular work 
at the station, while H&S during emergency responses were based on a behavioural 
approach, comprising only ‘leading’ and ‘taking care’.  Similarly, the HSMS at NL-2 
covered only near-miss reporting and did not include the development and 
implementation of H&S measures.  That is, ‘innovating’ referred only to the process of 
reporting but not to the contents.  Only the holistic HSMS of S-5 seemed to cover the 
overall operational H&S conditions.  This was underlined by the broad perspective of 
the commander of S-5 (interview, #00:12:00): 
 
“Much of H&S management is about making staff feel 
safe.” 
[„Mycket med Arbetsmiljöarbetet handlar om att få 
personal att känna sig trygg.“] 
 
The commander of S-5 considered the perceptions of employees to be important for 
organisational H&S activities, just as the general concept of safety climate suggests 
(Guldenmund, 2010; Zohar, 2010).  Table 6.2 describes the corresponding ways of 






Identified ways of implementing an HSMS for 
ongoing operations and behaviour – complete models 
HSMS Description of implementation 
D +  I 
L + T 
 
D-5 – Risk assessments and H&S measures for regular work at the 
station:  Yearly risk assessments were used to improve work conditions 
and H&S practices.  Top managers decided on all H&S procedures that 
were ‘innovated’ with the help of consultants.  Employee representatives 
were involved, and the commander actively promoted safe behaviour. 
L + T D-5 – H&S during emergency responses: Behaviour orientation prevailed.  
During severe emergency responses (including saving human life), every 
firefighter, regardless of rank, could decide individually whether or not to 
comply with H&S rules.  Detailed H&S rules were considered unsuitable 
in this context because they could endanger performance. 
D +  I 
L + T 
 
NL-2 – Reporting of near misses: There was an established reporting 
system for learning from incidents.  Six part-time H&S experts ran the 
procedure.  Together with operational supervisors, they dealt with reports 
and H&S measures.  Top managers led by supporting a culture that 
promoted communication, but they decided only on major H&S issues.  
D +  I 
L + T 
 
S-5 – Ongoing H&S task delegation: Top management collaborated with 
union leaders and the safety representative (‘skyddsombud’) who brought 
staff views into the co-determination committee ‘samverkansgrupp’.  The 
commander communicated outcomes according to the lines of command.  
He continuously reminded staff of rules, and rewarded communication. 
HSMS abbreviations: ‘D – deciding’, ‘I – innovating’, ‘L – leading’, ‘T – taking care’ 
 
Overall, the examples in Table 6.2 demonstrated that an effective HSMS could indeed 
be implemented for day-to-day operations.  The four elements that were derived from 
Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2010) were identified in interviewees’ descriptions of 
operational H&S management.  
 
In contrast to the holistic HSMS models at D-5, NL-2 and S-5, only incomplete HSMSs 
were found for ongoing operations and behaviour at other fire departments.  As shown 





Identified ways of implementing an HSMS for 
ongoing operations and behaviour – incomplete models 
HSMS Description of implementation 
D 
L + T 
D-2 – Smoke-diving training: H&S practices had developed historically.  
Medical conditions of participants were checked despite there being no 
H&S rules or legal provisions requiring this.  The commander supported 
this with a positive H&S attitude.  There were no discussions regarding 
innovations, but issues were solved with ad hoc management decisions.  
D 
L + T 
NL-4 – Risk assessment for emergency responses: Staff H&S views were 
surveyed through an employee questionnaire developed by a consultancy.  
Management used the data as background information and as a basis for 
discussions.  Rule innovations were not directly possible, as views 
represented individual feelings rather than assessments or analyses. 
D + I 
T 
S-2 – Accident analysis regarding indoor firefighting: Internal H&S 
experts asked affected staff about accidents.  Findings were developed in 
working groups.  If major rule changes were necessary, top management 
would decide in consultation with the safety representative.  Small rule 
changes were introduced by experts in training courses, without leading. 
D + I 
T 
S-4 – Documentation of emergency-response practices: Firefighters were 
expected to document their H&S experiences.  However, fewer than 5% 
of emergency responses were documented.  Better information was 
obtained by asking dedicated firefighters to write H&S reports, although 
support from colleagues was limited.  Top management did not lead. 
L + T 
 
 
D-4 – Behavioural safety when smoke diving: There were no detailed 
H&S rules.  Practices had been developed over time.  Leadership was 
considered the duty of commanding officers, who decided individually.  
Informal discussions of incidents took place, but outcomes were neither 
documented as lessons learned nor formally approved by management. 
L + T NL-3 – Safety during indoor firefighting: Behaviour orientation 
dominated.  The new tactical model was used to promote a mindset shift.  
This new rule was not applied strictly, but it was intended to provide a 
new perspective on decision-making, especially for commanding officers.  
Actual practices varied because not all firefighters were convinced (yet). 
HSMS abbreviations: ‘D – deciding’, ‘I – innovating’, ‘L – leading’, ‘T – taking care’ 
 
The incomplete HSMS models were less likely to improve H&S conditions at 
workplaces because either ‘leading’ or ‘innovating’ was missing.  As described in 
section 2.4, H&S innovations require that managers create an organisational climate of 
open H&S communication and employee involvement by ‘leading’.  This behavioural 
environment must be supplemented with sufficient resources for employee training, 
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H&S prioritisation and rule development, that is, ‘innovating’.  The resulting way of 
implementing an HSMS may be considered the core of modern proactive H&S 
management (Drais et al.; 2008; Hale et al., 2012).  The prerequisite for systematic 
H&S improvements is the existence of organisational H&S rules (Hale, 2015). 
 
The behaviour-oriented ways of implementing an HSMS at D-5 (Table 6.2) as well as at 
D-4 and NL-3 (Table 6.3), indicated that top managers did not define organisational 
H&S rules for emergency responses.  Top management did not decide, but asked 
employees to ‘take care’.  This might be considered an “unsafe worker attitude” as 
described by Bluff (2011, p. 13).  Such thinking would imply that managers blamed 
victims for having suffered accidents.  They would say that the accident would not have 
happened if the individual in question had followed the rules.  According to Bluff 
(2012), this thinking neglects the technical, organisational and personal circumstances 
that make human mistakes more or less likely.  However, the identified ways of 
implementing an HSMS indicated that top managers understood their influence on 
accident rates.  They considered H&S leadership a duty of superiors, as stated by the 
H&S expert at D-4, who was also head of the team for rescuing from heights.  He 
wanted to act as a role model because (interview, #00:20:50): 
 
“You suddenly have people next to you for whom you are 
also responsible, and you are responsible for their actions 
even if you are not with them,  so of course you need to 
have taught them something.” 
[„Man eben auf einmal neben sich Leute hat, für die man 
mit verantwortlich ist und wo man auch verantwortlich ist 
für deren Handeln, wenn man nicht dabei ist, das heißt 
man muss denen natürlich was mitgegeben haben“.] 
 
This individual leadership is a behaviour-oriented approach to H&S management.  As 
suggested by the safety climate study of Yule et al. (2007), suitable H&S conditions 
were created by encouraging supervisors’ H&S involvement.  However, such an 
informal approach should result in varying H&S practices in different teams, which was 
seen at both NL-3 and D-5.  At D-2 and NL-4, the behavioural approach was 
supplemented with top management decisions on H&S rules.  At D-2, such decisions 
were limited to major problems during training activities at the station.  At NL-4, top 
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management emphasised that they did not develop (or even innovate) organisational 
H&S rules for emergency responses but used formal risk assessment decisions to create 
H&S awareness.  Thus, at both organisations, ‘deciding’ on H&S issues was a weak 
element in the HSMSs. Top managers seemed to abstain from rule definitions for the 
rather unpredictable circumstances of emergency responses. 
 
At the Swedish fire departments S-2 and S-4, in contrast, there were management 
decisions on H&S rules and processes, but few leadership activities.  The Swedish 
organisations tried to formally analyse firefighters’ operational experiences.  The vice-
commander of S-4 emphasised (interview, #00:20:40): 
 
“And we want, we need it to be put in paper, so we could 
do it systematically, so we have tried so many times to get 
all the experience in and look at it as a whole and find 
systems to improve but it’s really difficult.” 
 
At the fire department S-4, they had tried to document operational experiences for 
several years.  The main objective was to create written reports and analyses that could 
be used to develop H&S rules.  These were then to be used for training.  As few 
firefighters wanted to write reports about their experiences, they concluded at S-4 that 
dedicated firefighters should write about defined topics, becoming H&S specialists in 
specific fields.  They found that this approach improved the quality of written reporting.  
At S-2, in contrast, top management developed H&S rules through working groups.  
Firefighters and H&S experts discussed H&S issues that were experienced either at S-2 
or at other fire departments.  Both Swedish organisations aimed at developing detailed 
operational H&S rules for emergency responses.  
 
Overall, the identified ways of implementing an HSMS in the context of ongoing 
operations and behaviour revealed a considerable variety of management practices.  
Even the complete HSMS models in Table 6.2 differed greatly, with their contents 
ranging from basic near-miss reporting at NL-2 to an overall approach at S-5.  The 
incomplete HSMS models in Table 6.3 indicated two main approaches, especially with 
respect to the unpredictable working environment for emergency responses.  Some top 
managers thought that detailed H&S rules were not necessary, while others tried to 
write down operational experiences in order to create a basis for rule development.  
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6.3.2 Ways of implementing an HSMS for change projects 
 
With respect to change projects, the identified examples, with the exception of one 
HSMS at D-2, covered either all or at least three elements of an effective HSMS.  Table 
6.4 describes the identified ways of implementing an HSMS.  
 
Table 6.4 
Identified ways of implementing an HSMS for change projects 
HSMS Description of implementation 
D +  I 
L + T 
 
NL-2 – Development of guidelines for clean working: The NL-2 
document ‘Arbeidshygiëne’ [‘clean working’] described briefly and 
practically how clean working should be realised to prevent cancer.  Top 
management decided on a leading framework document, which was then 
innovated based on employees’ knowledge and experience.    
D +  I 
L + T 
 
NL-4 – Implementation of clean working procedures: The focus was on 
behaviour.  A theatre play created awareness and generated discussions on 
possible improvements.  The resulting decisions on new equipment and 
procedures were documented, but without formal risk assessments.  The 
commander emphasised the issue’s relevance on stage. 
D +  I 
L + T 
 
NL-5 – Risk assessment for clean working: A consultancy prepared a risk 
assessment, including an employee questionnaire survey on experiences. 
The response rate was improved with giveaways.  A ‘goodie box’ 
(containing a laundry bag, a mask, a pair of gloves etc.) was given to 
firefighters to promote adherence to rules for clean working. 
D +  I 
L + T 
 
S-2 – New ways of working at motorway accidents: After having received 
a TMA (‘truck-mounted attenuator’) truck, a working group developed an 
improved procedure for H&S at sites.  The commander’s positive H&S 
reputation and the visible symbol of the new TMA truck, which was 
provided by the industry at no cost, created an element of leadership.  
I 
L + T 
 
D-4 – Equipment innovations in the team for rescuing from heights: Team 
leaders were expected to lead by good example.  Staff tended to focus on 
equipment innovations of manufacturers.  New technology put pressure 
on top managers to provide good equipment.  They did not base their 
decisions on analyses but agreed with team proposals in order to lead. 
I 
L + T 
 
S-3 – New equipment introduction with explicit risk assessment: Top 
management was not very involved, but the operations working groups 
were responsible for risk assessments for new equipment.  The resulting 
H&S documentation was then used for training purposes.  Top 
management was ‘leading’ by promoting group discussions on H&S. 
HSMS abbreviations: ‘D – deciding’, ‘I – innovating’, ‘L – leading’, ‘T – taking care’ 
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Table 6.4 (continued) 
Identified ways of implementing an HSMS for change projects 
HSMS Description of implementation 
D + I 
T 
 
D-3 – Risk assessment and risk mitigation when diving: A formal risk 
assessment and risk mitigation measures had been developed for the fire 
department’s diving team.  The team leader promoted the topic and 
considered employees’ views.  He discussed all issues in detail with the 
commander, who made the final decision.  Top management did not lead. 
D + I 
T 
 
NL-3 – Procurement of personal safety equipment: Documented risk 
assessments were continually updated using formal ‘management of 
change protocols’.  When preparing the acquisition of new equipment, 
dedicated test users entered their feedback on these forms.  Outcomes 
were discussed in working groups who prepared the final decisions.  
D + I 
T 
 
S-4 – Introduction of an ‘FIP’ process: The Swedish term ‘FIP’ means 
that the first (commanding) firefighter does not go with the first fire 
engine, but rather alone.  Top management, the safety representative 
(‘skyddsombud’) and union leaders discussed the new process.  Local 
commanders reported on employees’ views.  There was no leading. 
D + I 
T 
 
S-5 – Risk assessment for young interns: This was about the city’s social 
initiative to offer young people from the edge of society an internship.  
Because many firefighters opposed the idea, the risk assessment was used 
as a communication/political tool, involving the ‘skyddsombud’.  There 




D-2 – H&S checks for machinery and equipment: The commander 
decided that a dedicated employee should monitor regular technical H&S 
checks.  He created a new position after informal discussions with staff.  
The internal job advertisement aimed at improving reliability and creating 
knowledge, making D-2 independent of manufacturers’ guidelines.  
HSMS abbreviations: ‘D – deciding’, ‘I – innovating’, ‘L – leading’, ‘T – taking care’ 
 
With respect to the HSMS models in Table 6.4, management approaches seemed to 
reflect the importance of envisaged changes.  Three types of change projects were 
identified: 
 
• Symbolic changes implemented with holistic models (NL-2, NL-4, NL-5, S-2) 
• Major changes driven top-down with little staff input (D-2, D-3, NL-3, S-4, S-5) 
• Minor changes based on leadership and employee innovations (D-4, S-3) 
 
The symbolic changes related to important topics that had been widely discussed in the 
organisations.  Most employees were aware of those H&S issues, and top management 
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supported improving the H&S conditions.  In the Netherlands, the topic of clean 
working during emergency responses was a nationwide H&S topic in 2017, when the 
interviews for this study were conducted.  Therefore, related H&S projects were 
identified at three fire departments (NL-2, NL-4, NL-5).  The managers of all three 
organisations took a holistic approach to implementing changes in this area.  They 
promoted improvements by leading with symbols and providing opportunities for 
employee discussions.  The symbols were presented in the form of shirts bearing the 
logo “Arbeidshygiëne” at NL-2, a theatre play on clean working at NL-4 and a ‘goodie 
box’ with masks and gloves at NL-5.  In all organisations, workshops and team 
discussions were held in order to develop practical solutions for cleaner working in day-
to-day operations.  Similarly, at S-2, top management and employees discussed safer 
ways of working at traffic accidents.  Here, a new TMA (truck-mounted attenuator) 
truck, which the industry provided at no cost to S-2, was the visible starting point for 
developing new procedures.  The TMA was expected to increase the safety of 
firefighters by absorbing the impact of vehicles that subsequently crash into the 
emergency site.  Employees considered this issue to be highly relevant, as three 
Swedish firefighters had died at traffic accident sites in the previous year.  Finally, the 
holistic way of implementing an HSMS resulted from top management’s decisions on 
H&S rules and investments in equipment. 
 
Regarding major changes that were not related to symbols, and that were probably less 
widely discussed within the organisations, another way of implementing an HSMS was 
identified.  As became clear at D-2, D-3, NL-3, S-4 and S-5, decisions were based on 
employee involvement but managers did not act as leaders.  From the case descriptions 
in Table 6.4 it might be concluded that the characteristics of these examples were less 
suitable for leadership, either because the H&S issues were not clear or relevant enough 
(NL-3, S-4) or because commanders wanted to decide on their own authority (D-2, D-3, 
S-5).  
 
Minor changes were managed without any top-management decisions at D-4 and S-3.  
In these examples, top managers left it to their employees to find solutions for H&S 
issues.  At D-4, the team for rescuing from heights was allowed to decide independently 
which equipment should be bought.  The background to this freedom was that the 
equipment required few financial resources.  The working groups at S-3 elaborated 
H&S rules (based on risk assessments) for new equipment, such as recently bought fire 
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trucks.  Those rules were of rather minor relevance because the resulting H&S measures 
were mainly determined by earlier investment choices.  In both cases, top managers did 
not decide because the H&S issues did not appear to them to be relevant enough.  
Nevertheless, they acted as leaders in order to encourage employees to develop their 
own H&S solutions. 
 
From the reports in Table 6.4, it was concluded that HSMSs implemented for change 
projects tended to cover more elements of an effective HSMS than those implemented 
for ongoing operations and behaviour.  If the HSMS approach was not holistic, it still 
seemed to be suitable for the specific context.  If ‘deciding’ on the part of top managers 
was lacking, the expected H&S measures were not important enough.  If managers did 
not lead, the H&S issues were either not important or top managers wanted to decide on 
their own authority.  Overall, three different kinds of change projects were identified. 
 
 
6.3.3 Ways of implementing an HSMS for high-level decisions 
 
As in the two previous contexts of day-to-day operations and specific projects, 
exemplified in the descriptions of HSMS implementation in Table 6.3 and Table 6.4, a 
variety of managerial ways of implementing an HSMS were identified for high-level 
decisions in organisations, as described in Table 6.5. 
 
Table 6.5 
Identified ways of implementing an HSMS for high-level decisions 
HSMS Description of implementation 
D +  I 
L + T 
 
D-2 – Building measure for clean working at the fire station: Planning 
was initiated by the commander after employees informed him of 
contamination in the workshop.  The building plan was not based on a 
formal risk assessment; instead, a pragmatic solution was developed in 
collaboration with the city.  H&S communication was rewarded. 
D  
L + T 
 
NL-5 – Introduction of a new HSMS with ambitious objectives:  A 
dedicated H&S task force was led by former local commander, who acted 
as the H&S expert and leader to engage employees.  Top management 
decided on structures, including an H&S steering group and an H&S 
working group.  Staff wad expected to do 75% of future H&S work.  
HSMS abbreviations: ‘D – deciding’, ‘I – innovating’, ‘L – leading’, ‘T – taking care’ 
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Table 6.5 (continued) 
Identified ways of implementing an HSMS for high-level decisions 
HSMS Description of implementation 
D  
L + T 
 
S-3 – Equipment purchasing with implicit risk assessment: A working 
group for purchasing took a holistic view of new equipment (e.g. new fire 
extinguisher on truck).  No formal risk assessment was conducted, and 
staff was generally not involved.  Decisions were based on economics and 
the manufacturer’s H&S knowledge, supported by managers’ leading. 
D + I 
 
D-3 – Decision on formal instruction for using chainsaws: Guidelines for 
additional chainsaw training at D-3 were developed in collaboration with 
the city’s H&S expert.  They resulted in better employee training. The 
commander was not focused on behavioural change.  Therefore, he did 
not lead, but created the training with his staff’s views in mind. 
D + I 
 
NL-3 – Formal H&S procedure as means of organisational politics: An 
H&S item on meeting agendas could be misused for organisational 
politics.  Managers observed that issues were put in the H&S context to 
get budgets.  They preferred not to have separate H&S items, as decisions 
were always related to other issues, too.  This prevented H&S dominance.  
D + I S-4 – Organisational change for a new management structure: A 
consultancy recommended organisational change.  To take related H&S 
topics into account, a working group was created with three top managers 
and two union representatives.  Meetings included brainstorming sessions 
on H&S issues.  There was no direct employee involvement. 
D + I S-5 – Risk assessment for removal of small fire engines:  Small vehicles 
were no longer used in order to save money to meet the city’s budget. 
Employees’ work was the smaller part of the assessment, which focused 
on overall effects on the organisation and the municipality.  Management 
discussed the assessment with the ‘skyddsombud’ (safety representative).  
D D-4 – Decision to rebuild the smoke-diving workshop:  This H&S 
measure for clean working was adopted when a neighbouring room in the 
building became available due to general restructuring.  Top managers’ 
independent decision took both the economic performance and the H&S 
conditions into consideration.  No formal risk assessment was conducted. 
D NL-4 – Risk assessment for fire station buildings:  The risk assessment 
was based on visits to the fire stations.  It was carried out in cooperation 
with an external consultant who identified relevant H&S problems.  
According to the commander, it was then up to management to improve 
the situation.  The analyses focused on technical and engineering matters. 




The background to the holistic or near-holistic management approaches for high-level 
decisions at D-2, NL-5 and S-3 seemed to differ from that for operational change 
projects.  Interviewees did not report on specific employee ideas, but referred to 
employees’ agreement with top-management decisions.  The H&S expert at NL-5 
emphasised that it was necessary to convince the staff that H&S measures were 
beneficial (interview, #00:15:10): 
 
“So we have to get the staff on board to make this 
happen.” 
[„Wir müssen also die Mannschaft mitnehmen, um das zu 
organisieren.“] 
 
Thus, the ways of implementing an HSMS were similar to those frequently observed in 
change projects, but the contents of communication between top management and 
employees differed.  The decisions on an ambitious organisational HSMS at NL-5 and 
new equipment at S-3 took employees’ views into account, but without discussing H&S 
issues in detail.  Employees were ‘taking care’, but there was no ‘innovating’.  The 
commander of D-5 formalised the involvement of his firefighters because he tried to use 
their agreement to strengthen his position in budget negotiations with the city.  
Management tried to ensure employees’ support in all three cases.   
 
The core of the remaining six examples of HSMS implementation was top-management 
decision-making.  At D-3, NL-3, S-4 and S-5, managers followed formal procedures to 
involve employees or their representatives.  Accordingly, the element of ‘deciding’ was 
accompanied by ‘innovating’.  There was hardly any practical H&S communication, but 
instructions or organisational changes were implemented according to formal 
procedures.  H&S might be considered an element of organisational politics, as 
discussed at NL-3 and S-5.  Besides formal employee involvement, there were examples 
of independent decisions by top managers who simply relied on their superior positions 
(D-4, NL-4).  In all cases, H&S rules and measures were defined in a top-down manner, 
defining the general framework for operations at the fire departments.  The different 
ways of implementing an HSMS might be interpreted as outcomes of organisational 




To summarise, the identified ways of implementing an HSMS in Table 6.5 suggested 
that there were two main ways of making decisions on H&S issues that required high-
level decisions.  On the one hand, top management took employees’ views into account 




6.4 Conclusions on the individual ways of implementing an HSMS 
 
The 30 ways of implementing an HSMS that were identified at the 12 participating fire 
departments were grouped according to their organisational contexts.  This showed that 
top management applied different HSMS models in varying contexts.  For ongoing 
operations and behaviour, the four elements of an effective HSMS were usually not 
covered.  The HSMSs were either governance oriented, focusing on the development of 
organisational H&S rules, or behaviour oriented, emphasising informal communication 
between managers and employees.  High-level decisions were mainly governance 
based, as was to be expected.  Only management practices for change projects were 
often characterised by holistic ways of implementing an HSMS.  As H&S change 
projects had been implemented in many fire departments in all three countries, these 
seemed to be an organisational context in which managers followed the 
recommendations of the literature on safety climate.  Besides identifying the variety of 
ways to implement an HSMS, the within-case analysis confirmed that the fixed-coding 
scheme of this study was a suitable tool for describing managerial practices, providing 




Integrated Ways of Implementing an HSMS 
under National Regulations 
(First Cross-Case Analysis) 
 
The first cross-case analysis was aimed at grouping the identified ways of implementing 
an HSMS into relevant categories of approaches to H&S management.  Based on the 
resulting framework, country cases of managerial and regulatory practices were 
developed.  The varying organisational contexts were expected to determine the 
manifestations of the management approaches.  Therefore, interviewees’ context 
descriptions were analysed in depth to further elaborate the generic grouping presented 
in Chapter 6. 
 
 
7.1 Organisational context analysis 
 
The contextual factors according to Capon (2004) formed the theoretical basis for the 
descriptive coding of interview statements on organisational contexts.  Codes of 
behaviour, structure, resources and internal dependencies were considered.  This 
resulted in the following categories within each of the three general contexts that were 
initially used for sorting the individual ways of implementing an HSMS (Chapter 6). 
 
Categories of context codes relating to ongoing operations and behaviour: 
• spontaneous meetings and pragmatic views 
• scheduled meetings and regular analyses 
 
Categories of context codes relating to change projects: 
• defined project structures 
• backgrounds of introducing completely new or revised procedures 
 
Categories of context codes relating to high-level decisions: 
• inter-dependencies with other parts of the organisation and the municipality 
• backgrounds of major decisions on equipment or re-organisations 
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The analysis of context codes yielded two clearly opposing categories for ongoing 
operations and behaviour.  The behaviour of organisational members was either 
characterised by spontaneous meetings and pragmatic views (as mentioned at fire 
departments D-2, D-4, D-5, NL-4, NL-5 and S-3) or dominated by scheduled meetings 
and regular analyses (as described at D-3, NL-2, NL-3, S-2, S-4 and S-5).  Thus, the 12 
fire departments in this study could be divided into two groups of six based on the 
behavioural context codes in ongoing operations.  The two coding categories were 
considered overall behavioural characteristics of the organisations, referring not only to 
ongoing operations but also to change projects and high-level decisions.  The two 
categories were based on six descriptive codes each, as shown in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1 
Overall behavioural coding and number of references in the data 
Pragmatic organisations 
spontaneous meetings / pragmatic views 
at D-2, D-4, D-5, NL-4, NL-5 and S-3 
Formalistic organisations 
scheduled meetings / regular analyses 
D-3, NL-2, NL-3, S-2, S-4 and S-5 
historically developed H&S practices 
(five references) 
regular H&S meetings 
(six references) 
practically trying what is best at the 
moment (four references) 
continual documentation 
(three references) 














mindset shift based on new rules 
(one reference) 
 
The two identified organisational contexts were assumed to be relevant to all kinds of 
HSMS implementation.  Although the behaviour of organisational members was most 
obvious in ongoing operations, it also affected change projects in operations.  Regular 
meetings and continual documentation tended to result in formal project structures, 
while trial-and-error approaches and informal team meetings corresponded to little 
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planning of work structures and resources.  It was expected that this basic tendency 
towards either comprehensive or limited planning was also reflected in high-level 
decisions.  Thus, for the subsequent analysis it was assumed that there were two kinds 
of organisations.  Those that relied on spontaneous meetings and pragmatic views were 
called ‘pragmatic organisations’, and those that preferred scheduled meetings and 
regular analyses were referred to as ‘formalistic organisations’. 
 
The top managers of all Dutch fire departments and all but one Swedish fire department 
defined clear project structures when introducing completely new or revised H&S 
procedures.  Similar project set-ups were also found in Germany, although they were 
described as either very new (first H&S project at D-3, second working group meeting 
at D-4) or as being related to engineering issues, such as the equipment checks at D-2 
and the risk assessments at D-5.  Indeed, the latter example from D-5 might be 
considered a recurring project rather than a complete model for ongoing operations and 
behaviour (Table 6.2), because a temporarily defined team conducted the risk 
assessment with the help of a dedicated consulting budget.  Even the complete HSMS 
model for operations at S-5 had the character of a project, although the management of 
S-5 did not report having implemented a project structure.  The H&S expert at S-5 
emphasised that the risk assessment of young interns was conducted by the standing co-
determination committee (‘samverkansgrupp’, prescribed by Swedish law), which was 
considered central to the general H&S management in the organisation.  All ongoing 
H&S task delegation was done by that committee.  Nevertheless, when describing his 
holistic HSMS implementation for ongoing operations, the commander of S-5 narrowed 
down his H&S activities to a project-like context (interview, #00:40:40): 
 
“I think you must focus on specific things.  You cannot do 
everything at the same time, but when it is clear that it 
[the measure] develops very good, then we take the next.” 
[“Jag tror man måste fokusera på vissa saker. Man kan 
inte allt göra samtidigt, utan när det är klart det 
[åtgärdet] blir jättebra, då tar vi det nästa.”] 
 
The descriptions of the commander and the H&S expert at S-5 suggested that formal 
procedures and actual practices deviated.  By focusing on selected topics, top 
management personally promoted corresponding H&S measures while putting less 
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effort into other H&S issues.  Obviously, this approach could be interpreted as a 
deviation from the decisions of the co-determination committee.  Additionally, the focus 
on selected topics might be considered illegal because Swedish law prescribes an 
integrative managerial view on H&S issues rather than separate, project-like activities 
(Sanne, 2018).  Such a deviation between the formal HSMS implementation and 
operational H&S practices was also reported by the commander of the fire department 
S-2, where the human resources department managed the formal relationship between 
the employer and the employees, while technical experts were responsible for day-to-
day H&S issues.  Overall, interviewees’ descriptions of organisational structures and 
resource allocation indicated that project structures were widespread and, apparently, 
important for implementing an HSMS. 
 
Regarding high-level decisions, the analysis of participants’ context descriptions did not 
reveal any remarkable characteristics or substantial differences between fire 
departments.  The identified inter-dependencies mainly concerned the fire departments’ 
relationship with the administration of their municipalities.  They related to budgets, 
performance targets and technical guidelines.  They affected decisions on investments in 
buildings and equipment as well as re-organisations.  Thus, the municipalities 
determined the physical and operational environment in which HSMSs were 
implemented.  Although the interviews revealed no major differences between fire 
departments, the researcher’s site visits suggested that Dutch and Swedish fire 
departments were well equipped compared with German ones.  The fire stations in the 
Netherlands were very modern, and the fire departments in Sweden were so well staffed 
that many non-core activities were mentioned (for example, working groups on tactical 
or operational innovations and incident analyses).  The budgets of German fire 
departments, in contrast, seemed to be very constrained.  The station buildings of D-4 
and D-5 were very old, and it was obvious that modern H&S standards could not be 
met.  The commander of D-2 emphasised (interview, #00:35:20) that “there are way too 
few people and employees in the fire department” for tactical analyses.  And the 
commander of D-3 praised his regional H&S authority for inviting mayors to site 
inspections and asking them (interview, #00:26:35): “What are you doing for 
occupational health and safety at your fire department?” 
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In summary, the analysis of the organisational contexts revealed two main groups of 
organisations: those with formalistic practices and those with pragmatic behaviours.  In 
terms of project structures, the cross-case comparison of interviewees’ context 
descriptions suggested that the complete HSMS model for operations at D-5 and S-5 
should be considered change projects due to their corresponding characteristics and the 
general importance of project structures.  Additionally, the site visits made it clear that 




7.2 Basic approaches to H&S management  
 
After the context analysis described in section 7.1, the 30 identified ways of 
implementing an HSMS were grouped into four basic approaches to H&S management.  
The contrasting behavioural environments and the contextualised HSMS models formed 
the basis for the grouping.  The characteristic project structures revealed in section 7.1 
were reflected by reallocating the two complete HSMS models for operations at D-5 
and S-5 to the group of change projects.  The limited H&S resources in Germany served 
as background information.  The cross-case analysis was conducted according to Table 
7.2, which is shown on the next page. 
 
In the first column of Table 7.2, a distinction is drawn between ‘pragmatic 
organisations’ and ‘formalistic organisations’.  In the second column, the ways of 
implementing an HSMS are listed by the associated contexts.  The contextualised 
categories reflect the analyses of Chapter 6 and section 7.1.  In the third column, the 
basic approaches to H&S management are presented as outcomes of the thematic 
analysis.  These consistently described the relationships between organisational contexts 
and H&S management for all the identified examples of HSMS implementation, with 
the exception of safety management for indoor firefighting at NL-3.  This exception was 
therefore excluded from the explanatory concepts in this section, but it is taken into 
account in the country cases in section 7.3.  
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Table 7.2 
Cross-case analysis to develop basic approaches to H&S management  
Overall 
behavioural coding 
Specific contexts of 
HSMS implementation 
Basic approaches to 
H&S management 
Formalistic at 
NL-2, S-2, S-4 
Ongoing operations & behav. 
at S-2, S-4: 
HSMS with D+I+T 
Co-determination at 
S-2, S-4: 
HSMS with D+I+T, no ‘L’ 
Ongoing operations & behav. 
at NL-2: 
HSMS with D+I+L+T 
Focusing at 
NL-2: 
HSMS with D+I+L+T 
Pragmatic at 
D-2, D-4, D-5, NL-4 
 
Ongoing operations & behav. 
at D-2, NL-4: 
HSMS with D+L+T 
Co-operation at 
D-2, NL-4: 
HSMS with D+L+T, no ‘I’ 
Ongoing operations & behav. 
at D-4, D-5, NL-3*: 
HSMS with L+T 
Domination at 
D-2, D-4, D-5, NL-3: 





HSMS with D+T 
Formalistic at 
NL-2, S-2, S-5 
and 
pragmatic at 




at D-5, NL-2, NL-4, NL-5, 
S-2, S-5: 
HSMS with D+I+L+T 
Focusing at 
D-4, D-5, NL-2, NL-4, 
NL-5, S-2, S-3, S-5: 
HSMS with (D)+I+L+T Change projects 
at D-4, S-3: 
HSMS with I+L+T 
Formalistic at 
D-3, NL-3, S-4, S-5 
 
Change projects 
at D-3, NL-3, S-4, S-5: 
HSMS with D+I+T 
Co-determination at 
D-3, NL-3, S-4, S-5: 




at D-3, NL-3, S-4, S-5: 
HSMS with D+I 
Pragmatic at 





HSMS with D+I+L+T 
Focusing at 
D-2: 
HSMS with D+I+L+T 
High-level decisions 
at NL-5, S-3: 
HSMS with D+L+T 
Co-operation at 
NL-5, S-3: 
HSMS with D+L+T, no ‘I’ 
High-level decisions 
at D-4, NL-4: 
HSMS with D 
Domination at 
D-4, NL-4: 
HSMS with D, no ‘I’ 
* Although NL-3 was formalistic, the HSMS for ongoing op. was not overly formal:  
well-defined H&S rules were not enforced but promoted with dedicated leadership.  
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Table 7.2 describes the basic approaches to H&S management with reference to the 
HSMS model that was developed through the literature review.  The four elements of an 
effective HSMS, shown in Figure 2.7, were covered to differing degrees.  These 
differences and the related contexts were used for case grouping.  It became clear that 
the fire departments applied H&S management approaches that fitted with their general 
behavioural characteristics.  Governance-oriented ways of implementing an HSMS were 
found at the ‘formalistic organisations’, and behaviour-oriented ways were identified at 
the ‘pragmatic organisations’.  In both cases, one specific element of an effective HSMS 
was typically missing.  As shown in Table 7.2, the formalistic approach of co-
determination was characterised by no ‘L’.  Top management did not show leadership to 
convince employees of H&S measures.  This diminished the impact of the HSMSs on 
actual H&S conditions due to reduced staff participation.  The pragmatic approaches of 
co-operation and domination, in contrast, were characterised by no ‘I’.  Employees did 
not innovate H&S procedures because there were no innovation frameworks (for 
example, processes or budgets for H&S improvements) and they could not discuss H&S 
issues with top management.  Only the focusing approach comprised both leading on the 
part of top management and innovating on the part of employees.  Especially in the 
context of change projects, all kinds of organisations applied holistic ways of 
implementing an HSMS.  The H&S management approach was both universal and 
optimal, as it was found in all types of organisations and covered all elements of an 
effective HSMS.   
 
The basic approaches to H&S management were developed as explanatory concepts that 
described the relationship between organisational contexts and managers’ ways of 
implementing an HSMS.  Four approaches were identified (column three of Table 7.2):  
 
• Focusing, which was universally applied, particularly in change projects 
• Co-determination, which was found at ‘formalistic organisations’ 
• Co-operation, which was found at ‘pragmatic organisations’ 
• Domination, which was found at ‘pragmatic organisations’ mainly in Germany 
 
Managers of ‘formalistic organisations’ chose between a co-determination or focusing 
approach, with the latter being more common in change projects.  Managers of 
‘pragmatic organisations’ adopted a co-operation or domination approach, in addition to 
a focusing approach in change projects.  This was demonstrated based on the examples 
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of identified ways of implementing an HSMS at the case organisations.  The four basic 
approaches to H&S management were elaborated and explained with reference to those 
examples (see sections 7.2.1 to 7.2.4).  Figure 7.1 below illustrates at which case 
organisations the respective ways of implementing an HSMS were identified.  The 
focusing approach was observed at nine of the 12 fire departments, mainly in the context 
of change projects.  The approaches of co-determination and domination were found at 
five organisations, while there were four cases of co-operation.  
 
Figure 7.1 
Cross-case analysis to develop basic approaches to H&S management 




7.2.1 Focusing approach to H&S management 
 
Most examples of the focusing approach to H&S management were identified in the 
context of change projects, as shown in Figure 7.1.  The ways of implementing an 
HSMS were characterised by typically covering all four elements of an effective HSMS.  
In any case, top managers acted as H&S leaders and employees developed H&S 
innovations that were subsequently implemented through taking care.  Decision-making 
 108 
by top management may be replaced by team decisions in the case of minor changes, 
which was revealed at D-4 and S-3 (section 6.3.2).  Figure 7.2 summarises the findings. 
 
Figure 7.2 
Focusing approach to H&S management (developed by the author) 
 
 
In terms of holistic HSMSs according to Figure 7.2, the three Dutch organisations NL-
2, NL-4 and NL-5 provided comparable examples of implementing H&S measures for 
clean working (‘Arbeidshygiëne’).  The background was an initiative of the national 
association ‘Brandweer Nederland’, which had taken a non-binding decision in 2015 to 
improve H&S conditions at Dutch fire departments in this regard.  The described 
activities comprised the use of symbols standing for the envisaged change.  Managers 
promoted improvements by leading and providing opportunities for employee 
discussions.  At the Swedish fire department S-2, similar characteristics were identified 
in relation to the implementation of new procedures for motorway accidents, which 
included using a special fire truck as a physical symbol for the envisaged change.  When 
such focusing approaches to H&S management were adopted, managers were personally 
involved and remained focused on their projects.  In this way, they showed leadership in 
motivating employees to innovate H&S procedures and to take care of H&S issues. 
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Regarding ongoing operations and behaviour, continuous top-management focus was 
only identified at NL-2.  The interviews at D-5 and S-5 revealed, in contrast, a more 
project-like management style that implied a temporary focus on specific H&S 
measures.  At NL-2, the presented near-miss reporting was considered a central part of 
the overall work culture.  The commander of NL-2 emphasised that bottom-up 
communication was very important because the firefighters knew best how to act 
(interview, #00:22:15): 
 
“The people in the fire stations, they are the professionals.  
They have the best ideas about how they can do their 
work.  They are serious in their work.  They know where 
the easiest improvements can be made.  So, let’s use that 
knowledge.” 
 
The mentioned knowledge was supposed to be collected by the fire department’s H&S 
experts, who were responsible for running the reporting system for near-misses.  Six 
employees were active in this field, which could be considered a lot in an organisation 
of about 200 full-time firefighters.  They had a rather formal and technical focus, but 
they did indeed describe that they discussed reporting procedures and H&S measures 
with staff.  Basically, the H&S experts provided the system’s governance orientation, 
while top management demonstrated behaviour-oriented leadership.  This combination 
created a complete HSMS for the field of near-miss reporting.  However, ‘innovating’ 
referred only to the process but not the contents of reporting.  The implementation of 
H&S measures corresponded with the co-determination approach to H&S management 
(section 7.2.2). 
 
At the ‘pragmatic organisations’ D-4 and S-3, a focusing approach without ‘deciding’ 
was identified. Although not all four elements of an HSMS were covered, the described 
ways of implementing an HSMS were considered optimal, too.  Management allowed 
staff to decide on specific personal equipment (at D-4) or operational procedures (at S-
3) on their own.  ‘Innovating’ was promoted as team discussions, and working groups 
were encouraged.  At D-4, supervisors discussed with their teams and reported what 
kind of equipment they considered most appropriate.  At S-3, risk assessments and 
procedures for new equipment were discussed at work-floor level.  In both cases, top 
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management would follow employees’ recommendation as long as they fitted with the 
overall operational performance and budget targets.  The vice-commander of D-4 
described that top management asked employees to actively report about new 
equipment they saw at other fire departments or at trade fairs because he could not 
know or notice everything.  At the same time, the H&S expert at D-4 thought that 
firefighters were typically interested in technical equipment.  Thus, ‘leading’ by top 
management was based on the general interests of employees, that is, ‘taking care’.  In 
such cases, the focus resulted from employees’ involvement. 
 
 
7.2.2 Co-determination approach to H&S management 
 
As depicted in Figure 7.3, the main characteristic of the co-determination approach to 
H&S management was the lack of ‘leading’ by top management.  There was a clear 
governance orientation, which was sometimes supplemented with ‘taking care’ of 
employees for somewhat operational H&S issues. 
 
Figure 7.3 
Co-determination approach to H&S management (developed by the author) 
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Co-determination seemed to produce comprehensive H&S documentation but limited 
improvements of actual H&S conditions, because employees’ rule compliance was 
expected to be low due to the lack of behaviour orientation (Chapter 2).  Nevertheless, 
the documentation could be expected to ensure that legal requirements of H&S 
authorities were met.  This approach might be considered the formal way of exchanging 
views between managers and employees.  The identified ways of implementing an 
HSMS indicated that the approach was based on top-management decisions that were 
prepared in discussions with employees and/or their representatives.  These HSMS 
implementations combined ‘deciding’ and ‘innovating’ as well as sometimes ‘taking 
care’.  In all observed cases, the co-determination approach showed a lack of 
management leadership.  As described in Chapter 6 for the operational examples at S-2 
and S-4, a formalistic H&S process was difficult to translate into actual H&S measures.  
With respect to formal decisions, the vice-commander of S-4 said (interview, 
#00:59:25): 
 
“It [the risk assessment] is made at one time, and then 
when the decision is made, it kind of disappears.” 
 
At S-2, this problem was addressed by splitting responsibilities between the human 
resources department and the technical H&S experts (section 7.1).  The former was 
expected to deal with the legal requirements for H&S management, and the latter was to 
ensure that actual H&S measures were implemented.  In this way, inspectors of H&S 
authorities would most likely confirm the legal compliance of such an organisation.  
However, in contrast to the focusing approach at NL-2 (section 7.2.1), there was no 
holistic HSMS for ongoing operations because top management did not provide general 
H&S leadership.  At S-2, such an effective HSMS was only observed for the symbolic 
change project on new ways of working at motorway accidents.  Similar to the 
conclusion for the major change projects in Chapter 6 (in connection with fire 
departments D-2, D-3, NL-3, S-4, S-5), leadership might be lacking because managers 
did not want to encourage employee discussions on decisions they had already made 
(for example at D-3 and S-5).  However, with respect to the examples at NL-3, S-2 and 
S-4, the lack of ‘leading’ might also be explained by excessive complexity of the 
managerial contexts.  That is, if there were numerous documented risk assessments, it 
might be hard to know what to focus on.  
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As could be expected, ‘taking care’ of employees was not relevant in the more abstract 
contexts of high-level decisions.  The identified ways of implementing an HSMS at D-
3, NL-3, S-4 and S-5 indicated that managers and employee representatives discussed 
H&S issues according to formal procedures that had little operational relevance on the 
work floor.  The procedures were mainly based on national laws that defined 
employees’ co-determination rights and procedures for organisational H&S 
management.  The H&S discussions seemed to be an element of organisational politics 
rather than a tool for improving H&S conditions.  For example, the commander of D-3 
was not convinced that more chainsaw training would improve H&S conditions, but he 
still agreed to it because the city’s H&S expert required it.  The commander of NL-3 
even reported having experienced that H&S items on meeting agendas were misused for 
political purposes.  Thus, in the context of high-level decisions, the co-determination 




7.2.3 Co-operation approach to H&S management 
 
Co-operation might be considered the pragmatic version of co-determination.  In this 
study, four examples of this approach were identified: two for ongoing operations and 
two for high-level decisions (Figure 7.1).  Top managers acted as leaders and 
demonstrated their willingness to exchange views with staff.  They ensured that good 
H&S conditions were implemented by ‘deciding’ on necessary measures and persuading 
employees of ‘taking care’.  Their H&S decisions took employees’ views into account, 
but the developed H&S measures were applied directly, without documenting risk 




Co-operation approach to H&S management (developed by the author) 
 
 
‘Innovating’ was hardly possible due to the lack of H&S rules or documents that could 
be used for future training, safety prioritisations or risk assessments.  Instead, existing 
H&S practices had developed historically.  The commander of D-2 reported that this 
was the only suitable approach to H&S management in Germany because their 
firefighters were not used to abstract thinking (interview, #00:47:50): 
 
“They are craftsmen…  They have a firefighting 
qualification… but remain craftsmen throughout their 
lives.  And craftsmen are not the ones who think through a 
process in theory… they fumble through it, through life, 
until they encounter a problem somewhere.” 
[“Das sind Handwerker... Die haben eine Feuerwehr-
qualifikation… bleiben ihr Leben lang aber Handwerker. 
Und der Handwerker ist nicht der, der einen Prozess 
durchdenkt, in der Theorie… sondern der fummelt sich 
durch, durch sein Leben, bis er irgendwo auf ein Problem 
stößt.”] 
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The co-operation approach to H&S management also implied that the formal H&S 
responsibility lay with top management alone.  In contrast to co-determination, 
managers did not refer to any group discussions or demands from employee 
representatives.  They clearly accepted their responsibility for the H&S conditions in 
their organisation, apparently even more so than managers applying co-determination.  
For example, the commander of the formalistic S-2 emphasised that employees had to 
act as professionals with H&S awareness, while the H&S expert at NL-4 said 
(interview, #00:16:30): “we have to educate people and get them aware of the risks of 
smoke.” 
 
In the context of high-level decisions, the co-operation approach to H&S management 
was similar in form, but different in content.  As already mentioned in Chapter 6, 
employees’ ideas were less relevant for top managers’ decisions, but the exchange of 
views was aimed at ensuring employee support for decisions.  At S-3, decisions on 
major investments were made by top management based on both economic 
considerations and manufacturers’ H&S knowledge.  Team discussions were not 
considered suitable in this context.  Similarly, the top management of NL-5 decided 
independently on the new overall structure of the H&S management organisation but 
ensured employee support through regular information and advertising.  As described 
above, there was no documentation of employee involvement and (potentially) 
associated adjustments to management decisions. 
 
 
7.2.4 Domination approach to H&S management 
 
When domination was applied, the three characteristic HSMS elements of co-operation 
were only partly covered.  Top management was either ‘deciding’ or ‘leading’, 
expecting employees to take care if H&S issues were relevant on the work floor.  High-
level decisions were made without considering employees’ views.  The domination 
approach to H&S management mainly relied on the organisational authority of top 
management, based on either formal position (‘governance oriented’) or personal 
integrity (‘behaviour oriented’).  The resulting ways of implementing an HSMS are 





Domination approach to H&S management (developed by the author) 
 
 
The fire department D-4 provided two examples of the domination approach to H&S 
management, one in the context of ongoing operations and one in the context of high-
level decisions. At the same time, there was a complete HSMS for the change project at 
D-4.  The interviewees described D-4 as pragmatic and economically constrained.  
Limited resources, in terms of both employees’ work time and financial budgets, 
seemed to result in reduced co-operation between managers and employees.  In ongoing 
operations, such as smoke diving, top management did not decide on specific rules, but 
led by example and expected employees to take care.  Informal H&S discussions took 
place, but outcomes were not documented as lessons learnt.  Regarding high-level 
issues, independent management decisions were predominant.  The H&S expert at fire 
department D-5 described time constraints (caused by too many back-office duties such 
as equipment maintenance and training for volunteer fire departments in the region) that 




“We are actually here more for back-office duties than for 
firefighting, I would say… You also realise it when the 
staff says: Oh, there is an emergency call, I have no time 
at all!” 
[“Wir sind eigentlich mehr hier für den Innendienst als für 
den Brandschutz, sage ich jetzt einmal… Man merkt das 
auch, wenn die Leute sagen: Ah, jetzt kommt ein Einsatz, 
ich habe gar keine Zeit!”] 
 
In the corresponding examples of HSMS implementation, top managers dominated 
organisational H&S measures.  During ongoing operations, their ‘leading’ aimed at 
pushing individual behaviour in a certain direction.  For example, the vice-commander 
of D-4 emphasised that there were no formal rules on when to enter a building for 
indoor firefighting, but that he expected staff to always go inside.  In the case of high-
level decisions, such as major investments, top managers decided on their own.  There 
were no reports of any discussions with employees about the decisions at D-2, D-4 and 
NL-4 on organisational change, workshop rebuilding or risk assessments.  These 
organisations saw budget responsibility as resting with top managers alone.  The H&S 
expert at NL-4 stated (interview, #00:23:00): 
 
“And if they [the relevant managers] need extra money for 
technical, electro-technical installations or something, 
they have to come back with a proposal how to do it.” 
 
The identified examples of HSMS implementation showed that the domination 
approach is a simplified version of the co-operation approach to H&S management.  
Both styles of management are applied at ‘pragmatic organisations’, but domination 
seemed to result from economic constraints.  Thus, if there was a lack of resources, 
managers would use fewer elements of an effective HSMS in order to save time and 
money.  As a result, less effective ways of implementing an HSMS were observed.  As 
with co-operation, there was no ‘innovating’.  The other three elements varied by 




7.3 Country cases on H&S management and regulation 
 
The regulatory contexts of H&S management were assumed to be mainly determined by 
national laws and national H&S authorities.  The laws provide the framework for 
organisational H&S activities, not only in terms of specific H&S rules, but also with 
respect to employee co-determination and firefighter duties.  Therefore, local variations 
in authorities’ H&S enforcement practices, as described for example by Fairman and 
Yapp (2005b), were considered relatively minor.  Thus, country cases were developed 
as themes of authorities’ regulation and managers’ approaches to H&S management.  
The regulatory contexts were reviewed with reference to the interviews at the fire 
departments and the literature on authorities’ activities. 
 
Managers’ perceptions of their regulatory contexts were investigated with the help of 
two specific questions in the interview guidance for this study (Appendix B).  They 
were asked to describe their experiences with H&S authorities and their impressions of 
the regulatory focus.  Accordingly, the descriptive codes of interview statements were 
sorted into three groups: 
 
• emphasised approaches of H&S authorities 
• positive experiences of fire departments 
• negative experiences of fire departments 
 
Within these groups, categories were developed that described similar regulatory 
contexts from the fire departments’ perspectives.  In Table 7.3, those categories that 
were supported by statements from at least two organisations in a country were marked 
with grey boxes.  This facilitated the comparison of countries at the level of regulatory 
context.  Additionally, the source organisations were depicted in the boxes in order to 
allow a comparison with the previously analysed organisational contexts (section 7.1) 
and approaches to H&S management (section 7.2).  Overall, the descriptions of 
interview participants indicated that the characteristics of regulatory environments were 
of mainly national origin, although one fire department in each country (that is, D-5, 
NL-5 and S-3) seemed to have outlying views on the national regulatory context.  
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Table 7.3 
Analysis of interviewees’ statements on regulatory contexts 
 
  Boxes in grey reflect views of at least two organisations. 
National differences in regulatory contexts could be identified in the interviewees’ 
descriptions.  The emphasised approaches of H&S authorities and the positive 
experiences of fire departments clearly varied by country.  In terms of negative 
experiences, Dutch and Swedish managers had similar views, while the Germans 
mentioned only a few experiences.  The latter might be explained with the fact that there 
were no regular inspections in Germany.  There was general agreement among 
participants from all three countries that the H&S authorities focused on their own H&S 
rules, and that these rules were not helpful.  This reflected inspectors’ general habit of 
relying on formal procedures (Hawkins, 2002; Hale, 2015).  However, the other coding 
categories revealed national differences that were only partly reflected in the literature, 
mainly in national sources.  These were reviewed when developing the country cases. 
 
In terms of regulatory contexts, the outliers D-5, NL-5 and S-3 made it clear that there 
were different regulatory experiences and views even within countries.  D-5 and NL-5 
Categories of codes Germany Netherlands Sweden
Emphasised approaches of H&S authorities
Rule focused D-2, D-4, D-5 NL-2, NL-3, NL-4, NL-5 S-2, S-3, S-4, S-5
Enforcement and accident analysis D-4 NL-2, NL-3, NL-4 S-2, S-3, S-5
Inspections every few years NL-3, NL-5 S-2, S-4, S-5
No regular inspections D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5 S-3
Focus on buildings and equipment D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5
Focus on system outcomes D-5 NL-5 S-2, S-3, S-4, S-5
Information provision D-2, D-3, D-5
Positive experiences of fire departments
Supportive and advising D-2, D-3, D-5 S-3
Motivating and reminding NL-2, NL-5 S-2, S-3
Open to discussions NL-3, NL-4, NL-5
Good relationship and mutual understanding D-5 NL-5 S-2, S-3, S-4
Deciding S-3, S-4, S-5
Negative experiences of fire departments
Rules not helpful D-2, D-4 NL-2, NL-3, NL-4 S-2, S-4, S-5
Lack of knowledge in firefighting NL-2, NL-5 S-2, S-4
Authoritarian style NL-2, NL-5 S-2, S-3
No definitive advice NL-2, NL-5
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had a good relationship with H&S authorities and were convinced that these had a 
holistic system focus.  Thus, their statements were similar to those of most Swedish fire 
officers, who had a high opinion of authorities despite claiming that their rules were not 
helpful.  The Swedish outlier S-3 was special because this fire department had not 
experienced regular inspections.  Like their German counterparts, they were not used to 
enforcement measures by authorities but experienced them as supportive and advising, 
even appreciating their H&S rules and guidelines.  However, the vice-commander of 
S-3 was aware of the authoritarian position of the regulator (interview, #00:51:05): 
“They have a very strong, big big power.”  Overall, the three individual cases of D-5, 
NL-5 and S-3 exemplify that the categories of Table 7.3 were interrelated.  
 
Based on the organisational context analysis depicted in Figure 7.1, national differences 
in H&S management practices could only be described for ongoing operations.  In the 
area of change projects, the identified ways of implementing an HSMS were 
concentrated in the focusing approach.  Regarding high-level decisions, examples of co-
determination and co-operation/domination were found in all three countries.  Due to 
this context limitation, only eight of the 12 case organisations were considered in 
developing the country cases.  Besides the fire departments NL-5 and S-3 mentioned 
above, D-3 and S-5 were also excluded from the country cases.  The regulatory context 
description of the latter corresponded well with their national counterparts, but the 
interviewees from these fire departments did not present any ways implementing an 
HSMS for ongoing operations.  
 
NL-3 stood out from the sample of HSMS implementations because it was the only one 
of the ‘formalistic organisations’ that adopted a domination approach to H&S 
management.  As a closer look revealed, it was a special kind of domination that was 
based on well-defined rules that served as a non-binding basis for internal discussions.  
The H&S rules at NL-3 did not result in uniform behaviour, as observed at the 
formalistic Swedish organisations, but left room for informal agreements between 
management and staff, as observed at the pragmatic German organisations.  This 
approach to H&S rules, which was similarly expressed at NL-4, served as a first 
indication of an apparent intermediate position of Dutch organisations in terms of H&S 
management.  Thus, Sweden was taken as the starting point for the country case 
analysis.  Germany was then developed based on the opposing examples of the fire 
departments there.  Finally, the intermediate position of the Netherlands was elaborated.  
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7.3.1 H&S management and regulation in Sweden 
 
Both H&S management and H&S regulation seemed to be rather formalistic in Sweden.  
In section 7.1, it was shown that three of the four Swedish fire departments were 
characterised by a formalistic context.  Accordingly, for ongoing operations, the 
Swedish ways of implementing an HSMS represented co-determination approaches.  
Both the accident analysis at S-2 and the review of emergency response practices at S-4 
were done in written form with well-defined responsibilities.  Active leadership on the 
part of managers was typically lacking, as was also confirmed by Sanne (2018), who 
asked managers and staff of Swedish fire departments about H&S learning practices. 
 
Looking at the legal environment, the strong position of employees could be considered 
an explanation of the formal management approach.  Unlike in the other two countries, 
there are employee representatives who focus on H&S issues exclusively, the so-called 
‘skyddsombud’.  Besides being involved in H&S-related management decisions, they 
may even stop work at their organisations immediately and ask H&S authorities to do 
inspections.  The framework is based on the 1991 Work Environment Act, which 
stipulates a systematic H&S management approach comprising regular risk assessments 
within a process of continuous improvement.  Steinberg (2013, p. 302) summarised: 
 
“Every Swedish employer is obliged to follow an action 
plan of Systematic Work Environment Management.  This 
includes maintaining a work environment policy, making 
risk assessments, allocating tasks with regard to health 
and safety, and drawing up and following a work 
environment action plan including follow-up routines.” 
 
This process is to be completed in co-operation with the ‘skyddsombud’ (in the case of 
five or more employees) and should additionally be documented in writing for 10 or 
more employees.  Frick and Johanson (2013) stated that the role of the ‘skyddsombud’ 
is still an important element in today’s H&S management in Sweden.  Several decades 
of co-determination in the field of H&S has established a convention according to 
which managers typically continue the dialogue with those union representatives despite 
a general trend of reduced union power.  According to Frick and Johanson (2013), most 
employers did comply with the formal rules on H&S co-determination. 
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Managers perceived the national H&S authority ‘Arbetsmiljöverket’ as an enforcer that 
conducted regular inspections and focused on the outcomes of the overall H&S system.  
It was also considered a motivating and reminding influence.  The authority made clear 
decisions, which were described as positive at S-3, S-4 and S-5.  The H&S authority 
decided on interpretations of H&S rules and related exemptions.  Regarding the latter, 
the H&S expert at S-3 stated storm ‘Egon’ of 10 January 2015 (interview, #00:25:30): 
 
“They had a storm in the south of Sweden, a big storm and 
many trees fell down so they did an exception [regarding 
demanded trainings for chainsaws] just for that accident 
so they could put away all the trees that fell down.” 
 
The enforcing and deciding role of the ‘Arbetsmiljöverket’ could be considered the 
result of historical developments, as described by Frick (2011).  The Swedish 
government had decided in 1991 that the authority should focus on policing, after 
having been criticised for applying limited public resources to consulting private 
companies.  Since then, inspectors have instructed managers and have taken binding 
decisions on specific applications of H&S rules.  The commander of S-2 added that 
there was a considerable link between the ‘Arbetsmiljöverket’ and the trade unions, that 
is, the local ‘skyddsombud’ (interview, #00:46:20): 
 
“If you go against them, you will also get the union 
because, as an employer, I could say that 
‘Arbetsmiljioverket’ is very closely related to the union.” 
 
Overall, the review of both the interview statements and the literature indicated that the 
Swedish H&S authority had a very strong position.  The authority and its inspectors 
focused on enforcement and seemed to be closely linked to employee representatives.  
Thus, there was the obvious theme that Swedish managers pursued a formal co-
determination approach to H&S management because of the substantial power of the 
national H&S authority ‘Arbetsmiljöverket’.  At the same time, the examples at S-2 and 
S-4 suggested that the resulting ways of implementing an HSMS were not effective 
because there was too strong a focus on governance.  As the top managers at S-2 and S-
4 were aware of the problems, they considered national H&S rules not helpful and saw a 
lack of firefighting knowledge at the H&S authority.  
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7.3.2 H&S management and regulation in Germany 
 
There is no national H&S authority in Germany, but employers’ liability insurance 
associations (‘Berufsgenossenschaften’ and ‘Unfallkassen’) and regional government 
agencies (‘Gewerbeaufsicht’) both act as H&S regulators (Deinert, 2013).  Despite this 
heterogeneous structure, German interview participants had very similar views on their 
regulatory contexts.  All of them reported that there were no regular inspections and that 
the infrequent visits of H&S authorities focused on buildings and equipment.  An 
official accident analysis was only reported at D-4, but it had happened many years ago 
and was related to a deadly accident.  With the exception of D-4, all interviewees 
mentioned that comprehensive information on H&S topics was provided.  Overall, 
managers had positive experiences with H&S authorities, perceiving them as supportive 
and consultative.  In Germany, inspectors seemed to act as informing and guiding 
advisors.  This regulatory approach was confirmed by the study of Tilindyte (2011, p. 
26), who found “extremely low levels of formal enforcement”.  Similarly, a 
representative of the United Services Trade Union ver.di criticised that employees’ 
working conditions were “outside the law” in Germany (Frank, 2014, p. 252). 
 
Especially for emergency responses, there were no well-defined rules because working 
environments are unpredictable.  Instead, behaviour-oriented H&S management was 
applied, with leadership being considered to be the main duty of managers.  At D-2, this 
approach was supplemented with hands-on management decisions on H&S practices.  
Formal rule-based ‘innovating’ did not take place.  Instead, firefighters were expected to 
decide on their own, as the vice-commander of D-5 described (interview, #00:57:40): 
 
“That independent judgement on how far you deviate from 
the standard...  The [one] does not see such a great 
danger, the other is more the fearful type.  And that’s 
where there are then very big differences… at some 
emergency sites.” 
[“Das selbst Einschätzen, wie weit weiche ich jetzt von 
der Norm ab… Der [eine] sieht keine so große 
Gefährdung, der andere ist mehr der ängstlichere Typ. 
Und da gibt es dann ganz große Unterschiede…bei 
manchen Einsatzstellen.”]  
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The vice-commander of D-5 also reported that he intervened if he thought certain 
actions were not appropriate from, for instance, an H&S perspective.  Just like the top 
management of D-4, he considered such interventions to be the leadership duty of 
commanding fire officers.  They provided a framework for firefighters without setting 
strict rules.  This approach was also found in the German literature on firefighting.  
Südmersen and Cimolino (2014) described in their guidelines for indoor firefighting 
that firefighters often took higher risks than objectively acceptable.  However, the 
authors emphasised that this behaviour should not be condemned, as it were part of the 
firefighting culture.  In their view, firefighters should decide for themselves. 
  
Obviously, in terms of the approaches to H&S management covered in this study, rule-
based co-determination cannot work within the described culture of risk-taking.  Thus, 
interview participants reported few, if any, risk assessments that had been conducted at 
their organisation.  This was generally confirmed for German organisations by Schmitt-
Howe (2018a, p. 171):   
 
“But also the thin majority of German companies (54%) 
that do have a written risk assessment (RA) in most cases 
do not entirely comply with all legally prescribed steps of 
risk assessment process…” 
 
However, Schmitt-Howe (2018a) emphasised that there seemed to be a fundamental 
focus on H&S issues in the industry, as about 90% of organisations regularly instructed 
their employees in H&S procedures.  Such instruction was also mentioned at all German 
fire departments in this study, either as formal training for regular work at the fire 
station or as immediate orders during emergency responses.  
 
As depicted in Figure 7.1 the top managers of German fire departments took either a co-
operation or a domination approach to H&S management.  They acknowledged their 
responsibility, but rarely followed the formal rules of H&S authorities.  It was generally 
observed that managers felt themselves responsible and acted independently.  Especially 
in the case of economic constraints, they expected support from H&S authorities, as 
reported at D-4 and D-5.  There were no well-defined organisational H&S rules, but a 
culture of hands-on decision-making predominated, as described at fire department D-2 
in section 7.2.3, resulting in behaviour-oriented management approaches.   
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7.3.3 H&S management and regulation in the Netherlands 
 
Jaspers and Pennings (2013) stated that the Dutch H&S authority (‘Inspectie SZW’, an 
agency of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment) was comparatively 
understaffed, which resulted in too few inspections.  Therefore, they considered the 
initiative of employees and their representatives to be crucial.  According to Jaspers and 
Pennings (2013), H&S rules were typically negotiated between employers and 
employees, either within organisations or at industry level.  They stated that operational 
risk assessments should be conducted jointly by management and staff, then (in 
organisations with more than 25 employees) be formally approved by a certified health 
and safety officer.  In certain industries, unions and employer associations had agreed 
on working conditions catalogues (‘arbocatalogi’), which were then approved by the 
‘Inspectie SZW’.  According to Jaspers and Pennings (2013), such negotiated rules were 
considered more effective than provisions of the national H&S authority.  ‘Brandweer 
Nederland’ and relevant unions negotiated an ‘arbocatalogus’ for fire departments.  
 
Dutch managers perceived their national H&S authority as an enforcement agency that 
focuses on rules and carries out inspections every few years.  Negative experiences 
mentioned were a lack of knowledge and an authoritarian style.  In these respects, the 
context was similar to Sweden, while it clearly differed from the supportive and 
consultative regulation in Germany.  However, Dutch inspectors were open to 
discussions, while their Swedish counterparts provided clear decisions.  The willingness 
to discuss H&S issues was also reflected in the descriptions of negative experiences at 
NL-2 and NL-5, where interviewees criticised inspectors for not giving clear answers on 
H&S issues but simply assigning final responsibility to top management.  While the 
H&S expert at NL-5 was concerned that such practices might inhibit information 
exchange with H&S authorities, the commander of NL-2 even lost his respect for 
inspectors (interview, #00:37:10): 
 
“When you get an inspector from the Minister [sic] here, 
they’re just clowns.  Puppets on a string.” 
 
Such limited respect might also be reflected in non-compliance with formal H&S rules.  
Blok (2017) mentioned the point of concern that Dutch fire departments did not conduct 
legally prescribed risk assessments despite being very active in developing and 
 125 
implementing H&S measures for clean working at emergency responses.  Indeed, in the 
past, Dutch inspectors had not explicitly asked for formal risk assessments if the overall 
H&S conditions at an organisation looked good (Graas, 2014).  In January 2013, this 
regulatory approach was changed to stricter checks of documentation, which also 
implied more frequent fines.  According to Graas (2014), the Dutch government wanted 
to encourage organisations to pursue more formalistic self-regulation for H&S issues. 
 
The Dutch tradition of discussing H&S rules was confirmed by Rothstein et al. (2015, 
p. 13), who stated that authorities focused on dialogue about suitable H&S measures:  
 
“While there is little formal scope for discretion on the 
application of specific duties, inspection cultures tend to 
favour pragmatic and non-legal negotiated solutions.” 
 
The identified ways of implementing an HSMS at NL-3 and NL-4 seemed to reflect this 
regulatory approach.  As described at the beginning of section 7.3, both fire departments 
used non-binding H&S rules to improve operational H&S conditions.  Firefighters were 
to be convinced to act in safer ways.  The commander of NL-4 emphasised that 
firefighters learned from experience (interview, #00:45:35): 
 
“Fire departments are really experienced-based for how 
they learn: they must experience.  Because you can say it 
on paper, and they think, ‘Yeah, hm, nice’, but they really 
have to try it…  So, we’re really looking for exercises 
where you try this.” 
 
Thus, Dutch fire departments seemed to develop well-defined rules as a basis for 
discussion.  The rules might be developed at the organisation itself (decided by top 
management as at NL-4) or they might be transferred from other organisations with no 
detailed decisions having been made, as was the case at NL-3.  As information was 
continuously shared between managers and employees, the step towards a focusing 
approach to H&S management could be considered smaller than in the case of Swedish 
co-determination or German domination.  As a result of continual negotiation with 
employees and inspectors, Dutch managers seemed to be used to elements of both 
governance- and behaviour-oriented ways of implementing an HSMS.  
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7.4 Conclusions on the first cross-case analysis 
 
Basic approaches to H&S management were developed by grouping the individual ways 
of implementing an HSMS identified in Chapter 6.  Additionally, managers’ regulatory 
perceptions were investigated by analysing their answers to the interview questions on 
their experiences with H&S authorities.  The context-driven cross-case analysis 
revealed that there were two general behavioural characteristics according to which the 
fire departments could be grouped. 
 
First, the ‘formalistic organisations’ were governance oriented and typically adopted the 
co-determination approach.  They tended to have comprehensive H&S rules that top 
management and employees elaborated together, but that were limited in their 
effectiveness due to the absence of H&S motivations in day-to-day work.  Second, 
‘pragmatic organisations’ were behaviour oriented and typically adopted the co-
operation and domination approaches.  Their H&S management was mainly based on 
informal information exchange between top management and employees, resulting in 
day-to-day H&S engagement without the specific rules needed for effective H&S 
innovations.  The country cases demonstrated national preferences, that is, co-
determination was most common in Sweden, domination was typical in Germany and 
co-operation fitted Dutch managers. 
 
The most effective approach to H&S management, namely focusing, was adopted in all 
kinds of organisations in all three countries.  Being both governance and behaviour 
oriented, it corresponded to change projects that managers pursued to improve specific 
H&S conditions.  Based on the analyses of Chapter 7, the diverse ways of implementing 
an HSMS in different organisational and regulatory contexts can be described as four 






Typology of Managers’ H&S Motivations 
(Second Cross-Case Analysis) 
 
In the second cross-case analysis, managers’ H&S motivations were investigated as the 
independent variable of the research question.  Based on the literature review, it was 
assumed that their motivations determined their engagement in H&S practices (section 
2.6).  Motivation statements of interviewees were therefore coded in relation to the 
identified ways of implementing an HSMS.  The relationship between categories of 
H&S motivations and approaches to H&S management (Chapter 7) was investigated 
with reference to organisational contexts.  Additionally, motivation differences between 
countries were reviewed with respect to the national approaches to H&S management 
and regulation identified in section 7.3.  The cross-case analyses were then combined to 
address the final research objective, that of developing a typology of managers’ H&S 
motivations in their managerial and regulatory context. 
 
 
8.1 Coding of managers’ H&S motivations 
 
Motivations were coded by quoting notable statements by interviewees on their reasons 
for implementing an HSMS in a certain way.  The identified text passages (see 
Appendix E) were sorted into categories by first focusing on the quote itself and then 
considering the context.  The motivation statements were categorised through cross-case 
comparison.  The outcome reflects the characteristics of the interview data and deviates 
considerably from the findings of the literature review (section 4.3).  Contrary to what 
the latter suggested, interviewees did not mention a motivation for using the H&S 
information of authorities.  At the same time, statements that could have been assigned 
to the originally anticipated category ‘manager performance/reputation’ were instead 
assigned to either ‘power of formal rules’ (such as performance evaluations based on 
H&S rules) or ‘power of informal rules’ (such as peer pressure affecting H&S 
reputation), because the resulting categorisation was considered more consistent.  The 
social-context category of ‘moral and personal’ motivations was additionally developed 
from the interviews.  The five identified categories of managers’ H&S motivations are 
described below.  
 128 
8.1.1 Motivation category ‘limited resources and savings’ 
 
The motivation category ‘limited resources and savings’ was considered separately 
because the analyses in Chapter 7 revealed that, especially in Germany, fire 
departments’ budgets seemed to be constrained.  The researcher had visited some very 
old fire stations (especially D-4 and D-5) and identified corresponding interview 
statements at D-2 and D-3 (section 7.1).  Therefore, it was investigated whether such 
budget constraints represented motivations for (reduced) H&S activities.  Interviewees 
did indeed state that a lack of money or personnel affected their decisions on H&S 
measures.  This category was also defined because the literature review had indicated 
that economic pressure might promote informal safety cultures rather than formal 
HSMSs (section 2.4). 
 
 
8.1.2 Motivation category ‘overall performance and safety’ 
 
The economic motivation of ‘overall performance and safety’ was mentioned in almost 
all descriptions of HSMS models.  Managers aimed at creating benefits for their 
organisations.  During the coding process, all statements on good business performance 
and positive H&S conditions were assigned to this category.  In this way, different 
views on performance were summarised.  For example, the vice-commander of D-5 
focused on firefighters’ ability to extinguish fires (interview, #00:05:00): 
 
“We are not the ones who are afraid there, who stay 
outside and always only say: no, I always want total 
safety.  Then we would not extinguish fires so well, and we 
also could not rescue people so quickly…” 
[“Wir sind nicht die, die Angst jetzt da haben, um draußen 
stehen zu bleiben und immer nur sagen: nein, ich bin 
immer nur auf totale Sicherheit aus. Dann würden wir das 
Feuer nicht so gut bekämpfen und wir würden auch nicht 
so schnell eine Menschenrettung durchführen können…”] 
 
A contrasting example was the HSMS description of the H&S expert at NL-3.  He 
emphasised that the procedures, called “management of change (MOC)”, were 
 129 
implemented in order to prevent risks that could be incurred without sufficient analysis.  
Such statements created the impression that commanders and H&S experts might have 
different perspectives on H&S issues: the former thought of overall performance while 
taking safety issues into account, the latter focused on H&S in the context of overall 
performance.  Such variations in focus reflected the different organisational roles of the 
two groups of interviewees.  However, their underlying motivations were considered 
similar, and were therefore summarised in one category. 
 
 
8.1.3 Motivation category ‘power of formal rules’ 
 
The ‘power of formal rules’ was mentioned as a motivation at all fire departments.  
National laws and regulations as well as local municipalities’ H&S rules were described 
as a basis for the organisational ways of implementing an HSMS.  This coding category 
comprised all the external pressures related to written H&S rules.  Similarly, statements 
on formal organisational procedures were assigned to this category because they were 
the result of top-down decisions and thus represented pre-defined rules for H&S 
activities.  The typical motivation could be described as the duty to comply with defined 
rules.  The H&S expert at S-5 described this with respect to municipal guidelines for 
H&S management (interview, #00:02:40): 
 
“This list is something that the municipality had for quite 
some years and we have to comply with it, because it 
follows the Arbetsmiljöverket’s rules.  And they have made 
this plan out of all the regulations, the rules from 
Arbetsmiljöverket [the national H&S authority].” 
 
 
8.1.4 Motivation category ‘moral and personal’ 
 
The category ‘moral and personal’ motivations summarised all statements relating to 
care for employees and a sense of individual responsibility.  Care was expressed as 
feelings of duty toward, and personal relationships with, employees.  Interviewees also 
described specific responsibilities of managers and employees.  In the view of most 
interviewees, all employees had a certain responsibility to ensure good H&S conditions.  
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This also implied that employees were granted the right to make decisions on their own.  
Especially in the context of ongoing operations, top managers at German (D-2, D-4, 
D-5) and Dutch (NL-2 and NL-4) fire departments emphasised that firefighters were 
allowed to refuse orders and act in contradiction to H&S rules.  The commander of 
NL-4 stated (interview, #00:04:20): 
 
“So, they can ignore the commanding chief on the truck 
because they have an opinion about their own health and 
safety.  In the way you use your materials and your 
equipment, there is a responsibility for the organisation, 
but there is also a big responsibility for the user 
themselves.” 
 
Such statements on the responsibilities of employees were also identified in Sweden, 
but they were less frequent and less explicit.  The commander of S-2 explained that 
there used to be a strict line of command in Swedish firefighting, and the H&S expert of 
S-4 emphasised that, even today, following the rules is “strongly recommended” 
(interview, #00:41:40).  Swedish managers appeared to focus more on ‘power of formal 
rules’ than on ‘moral and personal’ motivations.  Compared with their German and 
Dutch counterparts, they seemed more likely to ascribe H&S responsibility to the 
organisation as a whole rather than to individual employees.  These kinds of 
fundamental judgements on responsibilities and duties, with no reference to external 
forces or organisational performance, defined the category of ‘moral and personal’. 
 
 
8.1.5 Motivation category ‘power of informal rules’ 
 
Informal rules mainly referred to peer pressure and individual reputation, which were 
mentioned as motivations in section 4.3.  During the interviews, managers said that they 
were expected to act in certain ways because others did so.  There was no moral 
judgement or reference to people’s safety, which would be typical for the ‘moral and 
personal’ category.  Instead, managers responded to the behaviour of employees based 
on feelings of pressure and obligation, as illustrated by comparing the interviews with 
the H&S experts at D-4 and D-5.  The former mentioned that young colleagues were an 
inspiration at the organisation, which was coded as motivation by ‘power of informal 
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rules’.  The latter mentioned that young employees informed the organisation about the 
latest H&S rules, which was coded as ‘power of formal rules’.  Thus, the same young 
colleague could motivate top management in two different ways, either by acting in 
accordance with the H&S practices they had just learned during their initial training, or 
by informing management about those same rules.   
 
 
8.2 Statistical analysis of categorised motivation statements 
 
From the country cases in section 7.3, in which management practices and regulatory 
approaches were compared, three national themes were developed with respect to 
characteristic HSMSs for ongoing operations: 
 
• Germany:  Hands-on decision-making and behaviour-oriented leadership 
prevailed, and managers acted independently, as formal H&S rules were hardly 
enforced by authorities.  Thus, the most common approach to H&S 
management was domination. 
• Sweden:  Managers typically implemented HSMSs based on detailed rules and 
governance orientation because the H&S authority enforced a formal HSMS 
with regular inspections and strong power.  Thus, the main approach to H&S 
management was identified as co-determination. 
• The Netherlands:  Managers implemented HSMSs with both governance- and 
behaviour-oriented elements, and they negotiated with employees and 
inspectors, as the H&S authority was open to discussions.  Thus, the most 
frequent approaches were focusing and co-operation.  
 
The national themes indicated that the varying regulatory approaches affected 
managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS.  Accordingly, three out of four Swedish 
fire departments were considered formalistic, while three out of four German fire 
departments were deemed pragmatic (section 7.1).  Among the Dutch participants, there 
were two formalistic organisations and two pragmatic ones.  In light of these national 
differences, it was investigated whether motivations varied between formalistic and 
pragmatic organisations.  As shown in Table 8.1, there was no significant difference 
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41 35% 36 35% 
Power of 
formal rules 
27 23% 27 26% 
Moral and 
personal 
21 18% 22 22% 
Power of 
informal rules 
16 13% 10 10% 
Total 118 100% 102 100% 
 
For each group of fire departments, more than 100 motivation statements were 
identified in the interviewees’ descriptions of ways of implementing an HSMS.  The 
frequency of the ‘overall performance and safety’ motivation was very similar in both 
groups, comprising 35% of all quotes.  This category represented the most common 
motivation.  ‘Power of formal rules’ and ‘moral and personal’ were second and third in 
their frequencies, and they were also equally distributed between the two kinds of fire 
departments.  The less frequent motivations ‘power of informal rules’ and ‘limited 
resources and savings’ displayed considerable differences.  At pragmatic organisations, 
the former was mentioned 60% more often (16 times versus 10 times) and the latter was 
mentioned 86% more often (13 times versus 7 times), though the numbers of HSMS 
descriptions and case organisations were the same for pragmatic and formalistic 
organisations.  The difference in the ‘power of informal rules’ was small in absolute 
terms, but this might be explained by the general characteristics of pragmatic 
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organisations relying less on formal rules than formalistic organisations.  The data on 
‘limited resources and savings’ corresponded to the literature, which indicated that 
economic constraints should lead to less formal ways of implementing an HSMS 
(section 2.4).  
 
The similar H&S motivations at formalistic and pragmatic organisations were surprising 
because they suggested that pragmatic managers who did not follow the rules on legally 
defined HSMSs (section 7.1) still felt the same ‘power of formal rules’ as their 
formalistic counterparts.  From the inverse distribution of German and Swedish 
nationalities in the two groups of organisations (the former mostly pragmatic, the latter 
mostly formalistic), it could be assumed that similar motivations existed in these two 
countries.  In the Netherlands, in contrast, H&S motivations could be either similar to or 
divergent from the others, as two Dutch fire departments were pragmatic and two were 
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19 23% 25 37% 33 46% 
Power of 
formal rules 
26 32% 12 18% 16 23% 
Moral and 
personal 
13 16% 19 28% 11 16% 
Power of 
informal rules 
11 14% 9 13% 6 8% 
Total 81 100% 68 100% 71 100% 
 134 
Based on Table 8.2, it was concluded that ‘limited resources and savings’ was a 
motivational category that mostly applied to Germany.  Of the 20 associated statements, 
12 were identified there.  This finding corresponded well with the researcher’s 
observation that the German fire stations were older and less well equipped than their 
Dutch and Swedish counterparts (with the exception of certain fire engines).  The 
predominantly pragmatic behavioural contexts in Germany also pointed towards 
economic constraints (section 7.1).  At each German fire department, between two and 
four statements on ‘limited resources and savings’ were identified, yielding 12 in total.  
In the Netherlands and Sweden, the total numbers of such statements were three and 
five, respectively.  These low frequencies suggested that no meaningful statistical 
analysis was possible with respect to this motivation category.  Therefore, ‘limited 
resources and savings’ as a motivation was not considered in subsequent analyses.  
After excluding associated quotes, the numbers of motivation statements were very 
similar in the three countries, that is, between 65 and 69 each.  Thus, a set of four 
motivation categories, comprising 200 statements in total, was used for the further 
investigations.  
 
As shown in Table 8.2, ‘overall performance and safety’ was the most common 
motivation in the Netherlands and Sweden.  The frequency of such statements was 
about a third higher in the Netherlands than in Germany, and another third higher in 
Sweden than in the Netherlands.  Regarding the very high value in Sweden, it might be 
assumed that Swedish interviewees wanted to emphasise that their individual HSMS 
models, which they had chosen to describe in their interviews, were more effective than 
the H&S measures stipulated by the Swedish authority ‘Arbetsmiljöverket’.  Regarding 
the discrepancy between Germany and the Netherlands, it was found that mainly the 
interviews with H&S experts yielded the observed difference.  Only 15% of the 
corresponding motivation statements from all H&S experts originated from Germans.  If 
they had given similar answers as their commanders, the frequencies of statements on 
‘overall performance and safety’ in Germany and the Netherlands would have been 
almost equal.  It might be assumed that German H&S experts did not want to judge the 
H&S measures their commanders had ultimately decided on.  Overall, the national 
variations in the ‘overall performance and safety’ motivation indicated that there were 
different perspectives on H&S management, but they did not suggest implications for 
managers’ practices.  
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Comparing national motivations according to Table 8.2 and regulatory practices 
according to section 7.3 revealed that the ‘power of formal rules’ was mentioned most 
often in two very different regulatory environments: Germany and Sweden.  It was 
originally expected that managers would mention this motivation if regulators acted as 
police.  This was the case in Sweden where commanders generally emphasised the 
importance of authorities’ rules.  However, the data indicated that non-enforcing 
regulators, such as the German H&S authorities, generated such motivations, too.  
Indeed, formal rules were mentioned most often in Germany, particularly by H&S 
experts.  The Dutch inspectors, in contrast, who were open to discussion, seemed to 
promote motivations in the category of ‘moral and personal’.  This was found 
approximately 50% more often in the Netherlands than in Germany and Sweden.  The 
uneven distribution of the statements on ‘power of informal rules’ basically reflected the 
distribution of formalistic and pragmatic organisations among the countries.  This 
motivation category was mentioned more often at the mostly pragmatic fire departments 
in Germany than at the mostly formalistic counterparts in Sweden.  In the Netherlands, 
where pragmatic and formalistic organisations equally occur, mainly the commanders 
mentioned the ‘power of informal rules’.  Apparently, the open discussions with 
inspectors also promoted feelings of peer pressure and individual reputation at the top 
organisational level.  
 
Analysing the data in Table 8.2 revealed the relationships between managers’ H&S 
motivations and their national regulatory environments.  These findings were combined 
with the previously developed national themes on characteristic HSMSs and regulation 
(section 7.3).  As a result, suggestions for relationships between managers’ motivations 
and their approaches to H&S management emerged.  For example, it could be assumed 
that both the mostly German approach of domination and the mostly Swedish approach 
of co-determination were positively correlated with the ‘power of formal rules’ as a 
motivation.  The higher share of ‘moral and personal’ motivation in the Netherlands 
suggested that this category was related to the focusing and co-operation approaches, 
which were adopted more often there. 
 
The above discussion shows how managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS were 
related to the frequencies of their statements on H&S motivations.  The data are 
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24 38% 27 42% 9 30% 17 41% 
Power of 
formal rules 
21 33% 12 18% 7 23% 14 33% 
Moral and 
personal 
11 18% 18 28% 8 27% 6 14% 
Power of 
informal rules 
7 11% 8 12% 6 20% 5 12% 
Total 63 100% 65 100% 30 100% 42 100% 
 
The figures in Table 8.3 confirmed previous suggestions.  The specific numbers of 
statements on the ‘power of formal rules’ were indeed higher for the co-determination 
and domination approaches.  Likewise, ‘moral and personal’ motivations were 
mentioned more often during descriptions of focusing and co-operation approaches.  In 
contrast, mentions of ‘overall performance and safety’ were quite evenly distributed 
among the approaches to H&S management, especially if the two pragmatic approaches 
of co-determination and domination were combined.  The share of statements was 
always about 40%.  Similarly, the shares of the ‘power of informal rules’ were always 
around 12%.  Thus, no significant differences between the management approaches 
were identified with respect to these two motivation categories. 
 
With reference to Table 8.3, it was concluded that the statements reflecting ‘power of 
formal rules’ and ‘moral and personal’ motivations were almost inversely distributed 
between the management approaches of co-determination and domination on the one 
hand and focusing on the other.  For the former two management approaches, the share 
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of statements indicating motivation by the ‘power of formal rules’ was 33% each, while 
the share of those indicating ‘moral and personal’ motivations was 17% and 14%, 
respectively.  For focusing, in contrast, the share of the ‘power of formal rules’ 
statements was only 18%, while the share of ‘moral and personal’ motivations was 
28%.  Regarding co-operation, the two motivations had quite similar shares, at 23% and 
27%, respectively.  Thus, the ‘power of formal rules’ was the most frequently cited 
motivation for two approaches to H&S management, and ‘moral and personal’ was the 
most common motivation for the other two approaches. 
 
The following analysis therefore focused on the motivation categories of ‘power of 
formal rules’ and ‘moral and personal’, which displayed considerable differences.  
These two categories comprised about half of all the remaining motivation statements, 
that is 97 quotes.  Regarding the two motivation categories ‘power of formal rules’ and 
‘moral and personal’, the significance of the differences in frequencies was investigated 
by means of a chi-square test; see Table 8.4.  
 
Table 8.4 
Chi-square test for two categories 








































Total 32 30 15 20 97 
Total chi-square value = 6.43 
Chi-square distribution with three degrees of freedom: 6.40 for p = 0.094 
Chi-square distribution with three degrees of freedom: 6.50 for p = 0.090 
Thus, p = 0.093 
Critical chi-square value with three degrees of freedom: 6.25 for p = 0.100 
Thus, difference in motivations identified at the 90% level of confidence 
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The overview of the chi-square calculations in Table 8.4 shows relatively small figures, 
especially for the less frequently observed approaches of co-operation and domination.  
Nevertheless, the data were still considered sufficient for a meaningful statistical 
analysis.  In accordance with general recommendations, expected values were at least 
five.  Additionally, the two motivation categories had very different characteristics, 
describing either an extrinsic motivation from regulatory forces or an intrinsic 
motivation from personal feelings.  Applying a chi-square test to the distributions of 
statements on ‘power of formal rules’ and ‘moral and personal’ motivations yielded a 
p-value of 0.093.  The total chi-square value of 6.43 was greater than the critical value 
of 6.25 according to the chi-square distribution with three degrees of freedom.  Thus, a 
significance level of 10% was achieved for rejecting the hypothesis that the two 
distributions did not differ.  Accordingly, there was a difference in motivations at the 
90% level of confidence.  Due to the relatively small number of observations, the 
identified difference in the distributions of the two motivation categories were 
considered well substantiated. 
 
Applying the chi-square test by column, that is, to the approaches to H&S management, 
allowed for a significance level of 5%.  It could be rejected that ‘power of formal rules’ 
and ‘moral and personal’ motivations did not differ between co-determination and 
focusing and between domination and focusing (both comparisons yield p-values of 
0.04).  In contrast, the motivations for co-operation were apparently similar to those for 
focusing (reflected in a p-value of 0.67).  The statistical analysis confirmed the 
impression from Table 8.3 that there were two kinds of motivations that were related to 
specific management approaches.  
 
 
8.3 Resulting typology of managers’ H&S motivations 
 
The final objective of this study was to develop a typology of managers’ H&S 
motivations in their managerial and regulatory context.  Groups of managers were to be 
identified based on what they stated as their motivations when describing their specific 
ways of implementing an HSMS.  As the analysis in section 8.2 showed, two kinds of 




For co-determination and domination, it was observed that the ‘power of formal rules’ 
was mentioned about twice as often as ‘moral and personal’ motivations (Table 8.4).  
Thus, the former motivation clearly dominated when these two approaches to H&S 
management were adopted.  As reflected in the country cases (section 7.3), co-
determination was most common in Sweden, while domination was a typically German 
approach to HSMS implementation.  In both cases, management practices were related 
to the typical characteristics of national regulation.  As presented in Table 7.3, Swedish 
inspectors focused on system outcomes, while German authorities looked at buildings 
and equipment.  In order to meet these regulatory demands, a Swedish manager was 
expected to implement a systematic HSMS with decision-making processes that involve 
employees and take their views on operational procedures into account.  Thus, co-
determination would be the right approach.  A German manager, on the other hand, 
should mainly ensure that the buildings and equipment are in good shape, which would 
not require a formal HSMS.  Instead, the commander and H&S expert(s) in an 
organisation could simply complete their own technical inspections as authorities would 
do, disregarding employees’ operational views and experiences.  The corresponding 
approach for this is domination.  The comparison of the typical management approaches 
and regulatory contexts in Sweden and Germany explained why motivation by the 
‘power of formal rules’ resulted in very different approaches to H&S management.  
Those ways of implementing an HSMS that met the perceived demands of H&S 
authorities were applied.  Although managers’ regulatory perceptions were also affected 
by their cultural contexts (section 7.3), the laws and rules that H&S authorities 
promoted directly influenced organisational H&S practices.  This type of managerial 
motivation was therefore called ‘Law Managers’. 
 
Focusing and co-operation were related to more frequent statements implying ‘moral 
and personal’ motivation.  These two approaches to H&S management and this 
motivation category were observed more often in the Netherlands than in Germany and 
Sweden.  As described in the country cases in section 7.3, Dutch managers seemed to be 
used to continual negotiation with employees and inspectors.  The authorities conducted 
regular inspections (unlike in Germany), but did not provide clear decisions (unlike in 
Sweden).  Instead, inspectors conducted open and result-oriented discussions.  
Authorities’ activities could be characterised as a combination of regular visits and 
negotiated rules.  This regulatory approach forced managers to repeatedly discuss and 
communicate their views on H&S management.  Apparently, such conversations 
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promoted ‘moral and personal’ motivations.  For the focusing approaches in the 
Netherlands, statements in this motivation category were mentioned five times as often 
as those in the ‘power of formal rules’ category (that is, 10 statements versus two). 
Additionally, the negotiated H&S rules were expected to support alternative approaches 
to HSMS implementation, such as focusing or co-operation, because inspectors 
consented to corresponding deviations from legal requirements.  Although such consent 
did not reduce top management’s liability, it still encouraged Dutch managers to adopt 
those approaches to H&S management. 
 
Focusing was related to more frequent statements involving ‘moral and personal’ 
motivation in Germany and Sweden, too.  While the ‘power of formal rules’ was the 
predominant motivation for both co-determination and domination, it was supplemented 
by ‘moral and personal’ motivations for focusing.  In Sweden, the ratio of statements 
reflecting ‘moral and personal’ motivation and ‘power of formal rules’ was 0.55 for co-
determination, that is, ‘moral and personal’ topics were described six times while 
formal rules were mentioned 11 times.  However, the ratio was 0.80 for focusing, 
corresponding to four and five statements, respectively.  In Germany, the frequency 
ratios of the two motivation categories were 0.60 (that is, six versus 10 statements) for 
domination and 0.80 (that is, four versus five statements) for focusing.  Thus, the 
number of statements reflecting the two kinds of motivations was fairly equal for 
focusing in Germany and Sweden.  This is also true in terms of the total statements for 
co-operation (Table 8.4), which could not be analysed at national level due to the small 
sample size.  Because of the largely equal frequencies of statements reflecting the two 
motivations for focusing and co-operation, the second type of managerial motivation 
was called ‘Law & People Managers’. 
 
 
8.4 Conclusions on the second cross-case analysis  
 
The developed typology of managers’ H&S motivations in their managerial and 
regulatory context comprised two groups:  Law Managers and Law & People Managers.  
The Law Managers aimed at compliance with H&S rules.  Their approaches to H&S 
management varied according to the regulatory activities of national H&S authorities.  
The driver for organisational H&S activities was motivation by the ‘power of formal 
rules’.  The systematic focus of the Swedish H&S authority ‘Arbetsmiljöverket’ resulted 
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in co-determination, while the technology focus of German inspectors promoted 
domination.  This type of manager was less common in the Netherlands, where 
authorities were perceived to be more open to discussions on deviations from legally 
prescribed H&S rules. 
 
The second type of manager, Law & People Managers, tried to combine compliance 
with their feelings of moral responsibility and care for employees.  Law & People 
Managers seemed to be most common in the Netherlands, though they also existed in 
Germany and Sweden.  Their preferred approaches were focusing and co-operation.  
These approaches were applied in all regulatory environments because managers did not 
limit their attention to authorities’ demands, but also considered their employees’ 
interests when implementing appropriate organisational HSMSs.  Continual negotiation 
with employees and authorities in the Netherlands seemed to promote such management 





Overall Conclusions and Discussion in View of the Literature 
 
In accordance with the qualitative research approach of Eisenhardt (1989), this study’s 
findings on H&S motivations, management practices and regulation are discussed in 
view of the literature.  This discussion is not limited to the literature review that was 
used for justifying the research question, aim and objectives (Chapter 2).  The findings 
are, on the contrary, compared with literature that presents similar, conflicting or 
complementary results.  Thus, following the recommendation of Eisenhardt (1989), an 
additional literature review is presented with reference to the conclusions of the 
previous Chapters.  This is typical for inductive case study research (Yin, 2014).  
Correspondingly, section 9.1 summarises how the typology of managers’ H&S 
motivations was developed.  The two types of H&S motivations are then considered 
with respect to literature that reflects the identified approaches to H&S management 
(section 9.2) and regulations by H&S authorities (section 9.3). 
 
 
9.1 Summary of findings in light of research question, aim and objectives 
 
It is now explained how the study’s research objectives were achieved in order to 
answer the research question and meet the research aim.  Figure 9.1 presents the 
identified typology of managers’ H&S motivations as the ultimate outcome of the 
research process.  Two types of managers are distinguished with reference to their H&S 
motivations.  They are related to different regulatory emphases and managerial H&S 
practices.  With it, it is explained how and why H&S regulators determine top 
managers’ ways implementing HSMSs.  Figure 9.1 may therefore provide guidance to 
authorities on the appropriate approaches to addressing H&S issues in their 
communication with top managers.  If rule enforcement is supplemented by open 
discussions, promoting moral and personal motivations among top managers, the 
demands of good H&S conditions will be in the focus of H&S management.  The 
resulting HSMSs will not be limited to compliance, but they will take the interests and 
ideas of employees into account.  This new managerial perspective on H&S can 
improve communication between managers and authorities, and it can hence facilitate 




Identified typology of managers’ H&S motivations (developed by the author) 
 
 
9.1.1 Answer to the research question and achievement of the aim: how are top 
managers’ ways of HSMS implementation affected by their H&S motivations in 
different regulatory environments? 
 
Figure 9.1 answers the research question by showing how top managers’ ways of 
implementing an HSMS are affected by their H&S motivations in different regulatory 
environments.  It reveals that the two identified types of managers pursue H&S 
management by different means.  Law Managers ensure compliance with regulatory 
demands through either co-determination or domination.  Law & People Managers take 
the views of their employees into account to optimise H&S conditions through either 
co-operation or focusing.  Managers’ underlying H&S motivations and the associated 
regulatory strategies H&S authorities use to promote them are depicted as determinants 
in Figure 9.1.  Overall, the typology provides a comprehensible and useful answer to the 
research question.  The focusing approach to H&S management is marked in bold 
because, based on the literature review, it is assumed to be the most effective in 
satisfying the requirements for good H&S conditions.  It is supported by a regulatory 
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emphasis on advising and sensitising, which implies open and result-oriented 
discussions about H&S rules.  Answering the research question also achieves the 
research aim:  to identify how top managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS are 
affected by their H&S motivations in different regulatory environments.  
 
 
9.1.2 Achievement of the first research objective: to codify top managers’ ways of 
implementing an organisational HSMS 
 
Top managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS were initially described in order to 
achieve the first research objective.  A large variety of managerial practices were 
identified (Chapter 6) and characterised with reference to the HSMS model of this 
study.   The four elements of an effective HSMS were discussed with all interviewees.  
During the within-case analyses, only the description of ‘innovating’ was slightly 
adjusted.  Instead of claiming that employees assess ‘hazards’, as stated in Figure 2.7, it 
was now clarified that their assessment covers ‘risks & incidents’, as shown in Figure 
9.2.  This represents an empirically tested model for analysing organisational HSMSs. 
 
Figure 9.2 
Revised elements of an effective HSMS (developed by the author) 
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Based on a context-focused cross-case analysis, the individual ways of implementing an 
HSMS were categorised into four approaches to H&S management (sections 7.1 and 
7.2).  The four resulting categories are co-determination, domination, co-operation and 
focusing.  Top managers of formalistic organisations typically apply co-determination, 
while domination and co-operation prevail at pragmatic organisations.  Focusing is 
applied in both environments.  The interview data unexpectedly revealed that top 
managers use focusing mostly in operational change projects rather than in the 
organisational contexts of ongoing operations and high-level decisions. 
 
 
9.1.3 Achievement of the second research objective: to codify top managers’ 
perceptions of H&S authorities’ regulatory approaches 
 
The second research objective was achieved through the development of country cases 
that focused on managers’ perceptions of H&S authorities’ regulatory approaches 
(section 7.3).  The interviewees’ statements on regulatory contexts were codified and 
compared with the literature.  In all countries, interviewees reported that the individual 
H&S authorities focus on their H&S rules and that these rules are perceived to be not 
helpful.  In terms of national differences, German and Swedish authorities focus on 
advising and threatening, which reflects a policing approach, while Dutch inspectors 
prefer to advise and sensitise (Figure 9.1).  Also, inspections are very infrequent in 
Germany, while they occur regularly in the Netherlands and Sweden.  Similar 
descriptions of country characteristics can be found in the literature, but there have been 
no specific studies on national differences.  Thus, the outcomes of the analysis for the 
second research objective are essential with respect to the regulatory environment 
mentioned in the research question.   
 
 
9.1.4 Achievement of the third research objective: to codify the H&S motivations 
of top managers 
 
As described in section 8.1, the third research objective was achieved by quoting 
notable interview statements on reasons for applying certain H&S management 
practices.  The initial codes of H&S motivations were directly related to ways of 
implementing an HSMS.  The categorisation of motivation statements was subsequently 
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done through cross-case comparison.  The resulting five categories of H&S motivations 
provide reasons for top managers’ organisational HSMS choices.  They are based on the 
data from the 24 interviews with the (vice-) commanders and H&S experts at the fire 
departments and, therefore, represent substantiated descriptions.  Thus, the achievement 
of the third research objective lays the foundation for developing the typology of 
managers’ H&S motivations.  
 
 
9.1.5 Achievement of the fourth research objective: to identify relationships 
between managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS and their H&S motivations in 
different regulatory environments 
 
The relationships between managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS and their H&S 
motivations were investigated in section 8.2.  Statistical analyses were performed by 
counting and evaluating the number of motivation statements by managerial approach.  
The five categories of H&S motivations were related to the four approaches to H&S 
management, which in turn were considered with reference to the country cases (section 
7.3).  The surprising finding was that no motivational differences were identified 
between formalistic and pragmatic organisations, that is, between those managers who 
try to follow the letter of the law (particularly common in Sweden), and those who 
independently decide on H&S measures (particularly common in Germany).  However, 
the focusing approach – and to a lesser degree co-operation – is related to an increased 
relevance of ‘moral and personal’ motivation as compared with the ‘power of formal 
rules’.  This is most obvious in the Netherlands, where inspectors are open to discussing 
H&S rules rather than focusing on policing.  
 
 
9.1.6 Achievement of the final research objective: to develop a typology of 
managers’ H&S motivations in their managerial and regulatory context 
 
As presented in section 8.3, the final research objective was achieved by distinguishing 
between the two prominent motivational settings.  On the one hand, there is the positive 
engagement of Law Managers, who are predominantly motivated by the ‘power of 
formal rules’.  On the other hand, there are Law & People Managers, who report being 
driven by both ‘power of formal rules’ and ‘moral and personal’ motivations.  These 
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two types of managers adopt different approaches to H&S management in the varying 
regulatory contexts of the three countries.  The ‘power of formal rules’ is most relevant 
for co-determination and domination, which are often found under the policing 
regulators in Germany and Sweden.  The ‘moral and personal’ motivations are 
additionally mentioned for co-operation and focusing, which are more frequent in the 
Netherlands, where inspectors are willing to discuss H&S rules.  Integrating the findings 
from Chapters 6 to 8, the typology of managers’ H&S motivations provides a 




9.2 Managers’ H&S motivations and approaches to H&S management  
 
The literature review showed that managers’ H&S engagement is based on legal, 
economic, and social-context motivations (section 2.6).  The social-context motivations 
were described in a variety of forms, such as moral duty, benchmarking, performance 
evaluation, reputation and supply-chain pressure.  According to this study, the decisive 
difference between managers was their sense of moral duty (section 8.3).  Statements 
reflecting ‘moral and personal’ motivations were mentioned significantly more often 
when managers pursued a focusing or co-operation approach.  In these cases, the ‘power 
of formal rules’, that is, legal motivations, were still relevant, but were less prominent 
than in cases involving co-determination and domination.  For the other motivations, no 
significant variations were observed in terms of approaches to H&S management.  
Therefore, it is concluded that two types of managers’ H&S motivations should be 
distinguished.  First, Law Managers aim at meeting legal requirements with top-down 
decision-making, either with formalistic consultation of employees (that is, co-
determination) or without employee involvement (that is, domination).  Second, Law & 
People Managers discuss matters with employees and other stakeholders in order to 
ensure optimal H&S conditions.  Their approaches of focusing and co-operation may be 
more time-consuming, but they tend to cover more elements of an effective HSMS 
according to the model of this study (Figure 2.7). 
 
The focusing approach to H&S management addresses both the governance-oriented 
practices of formal (sometimes certified) systems and behaviour-oriented practices for 
operational implementation.  The importance of both kinds of HSMS elements in 
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creating good H&S conditions was recently confirmed by Casey et al. (2017), who 
reviewed the available literature on the underlying concept of safety climate.  They 
found that meta-analyses had shown that safety climate was positively associated with 
safety behaviour, which in turn was negatively associated with accident rates.  
Management commitment, in particular, was found to be predictive of future accidents.  
According to their review, for proactive H&S management, a safety climate had to 
feature “safety recognition… and planning practices” and “employee consultation and 
involvement practices” (Casey et al., 2017, p. 348).  These categories were similar to 
those in Figure 2.7, which was developed from the safety climate model of Vinodkumar 
and Bhasi (2010).  Open and comprehensive communication on H&S issues was a pre-
requisite for all those elements.  In line with the assumption of this study, Casey et al. 
(2017) proposed that safety climate could be used as a managerial control mechanism, 
while safety culture was a more general organisational characteristic.  Thus, a complete 
HSMS ought to be implemented in such a way that all elements of an effective safety 
climate are addressed, following the focusing approach. 
 
Hale and Borys (2013a, 2013b) suggested that linking formal H&S rules and practical 
behaviours would create optimal H&S conditions in organisations.  They described two 
main perspectives on rule violations by employees: either the rules were inappropriate 
or the individuals were misguided.  In the first case, employees should be commended 
for deviating from H&S rules.  In the second case, they should be instructed or even 
punished.  The authors suggested that H&S management would be improved if top-
down rule-setting were supplemented with bottom-up rule development, requiring 
comprehensive communication between managers and employees.  In this way, H&S 
measures would fit actual situations on the work floor, and staff would be persuaded to 
comply.  Therefore, training – of both employees and managers – should not only cover 
information on formal H&S rules but also address operational behaviours and cultural 
principles.  According to Hale and Borys (2013a, 2013b), all elements of a good safety 
climate would be considered by modifying the typical H&S management process of 
continuous improvement.  This corresponds to the focusing approach in ongoing 
operations as it was observed at one Dutch fire department (section 7.2). 
 
In the project context, the focusing approach to H&S management was observed at fire 
departments in all three countries.  Interviewees mentioned ‘moral and personal’ 
motivations more often with respect to focusing than with respect to other approaches to 
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H&S management.  They were Law & People Managers when they adopted a focusing 
approach (section 8.3).  Such managers follow the advice of Hale and Borys (2013b, 
p. 223) that “social interaction” and “tacit knowledge” of the people on the work floor 
should be taken into account when H&S laws are translated into an operational HSMS.  
The focusing approach always comprises the HSMS elements of ‘leading’, ‘taking care’ 
and ‘innovating’ that characterise the envisaged innovation processes of modern 
proactive H&S management (section 2.4).  The focusing approach is mostly applied in 
project contexts and may be compared with general innovation management.  In 
accordance with the observations of this study, Kanter (2016, p. 3) described that 
innovations were typically implemented through change projects: 
 
“Innovation begins with someone being aware enough to 
sense a new need.” 
 
Top managers initiate projects because they personally perceive a need for change, or 
because somebody tells them about such a need.  Thus, innovation processes tend to 
begin with significant incidents.  The commander of S-2, for instance, explained that his 
focusing project on new ways of working at motorway sites was not an outcome of the 
fire department’s HSMS but was developed together with other organisations after 
several deadly accidents in the country.  Obviously, the formal risk assessment of an 
HSMS can create the perception that H&S measures are urgently needed.  However, 
understood in this way, such risk assessments are not the fundamental basis for 
continuous improvement, but represent only one of many possible starting points of 
H&S change projects.  To implement these changes, focused management is needed, as 
was described by the commander of S-5 in section 7.1; this is confirmed by Kanter 
(2016, p. 10): 
 
“Leaders must stay closely involved with the 
implementation process and keep the focus on the 
innovation, or things can move so slowly that new 
initiatives atrophy.” 
 
In contrast to such project-based approaches, EU-OSHA (2012) recommended a process 
of continuous H&S improvement as the best organisational HSMS.  The country cases 
in this study (section 7.3) confirmed that national H&S authorities promoted this 
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management principle, which is reflected in the EU Framework Directive 89/391/EEC 
on Safety and Health at Work (Ales, 2013).  In Sweden, inspectors enforced 
corresponding management systems; in the Netherlands, they negotiated such 
approaches; and in Germany, they informed organisations about them.  Nevertheless, 
project-based focusing was observed in all countries and was applied regardless of legal 
stipulations.  This approach was associated with Law & People Managers, who were 
driven not only by the ‘power of formal rules’ but also by ‘moral and personal’ 
motivations.  It can therefore be concluded that, when implementing improved H&S 
conditions, managers with strong ‘moral and personal’ motivations are more likely to 
deviate from H&S laws.  Their approach to H&S management corresponds to the 
principles of change projects rather than to the principles of continuous improvement. 
 
Formalistic ways of implementing an HSMS according to the EU Framework Directive 
were most common at Swedish fire departments.  These organisations aimed at pursuing 
a co-determination approach to continuously improve H&S conditions.  However, the 
identified ways of implementing an HSMS there did not work well, as they were 
lacking the element of ‘leading’.  Swedish researchers such as Frick (2013) and Sanne 
(2018) emphasised that ‘leading’ was important for successful implementation of an 
HSMS.  Sanne (2018) described that employees of fire departments expected top 
management to show interest in H&S issues.  According to him, employees had 
informal talks about critical incidents, but these were often not reported to top 
management, either informally or formally.  Frick (2013a) emphasised the importance 
of leadership when he presented his case study on an HSMS implementation in a 
Swedish municipality.  Thus, research from Sweden confirms this study’s assumption 
that ‘leading’ is necessary for successful implementation of an HSMS.  As concluded in 
Chapter 7, focusing covers ‘leading’ and also ensures the development of organisational 
H&S rules.  However, Swedish authors still emphasised the importance of systematic 
and formal systems based on co-determination (Frick and Johanson, 2013; Sanne, 
2018), disregarding project-based alternatives with simplified H&S rules.  Nevertheless, 
focusing is even applied at Swedish fire departments to solve the leadership problem. 
 
According to the data of this study, the German and Dutch approaches to H&S 
management were more pragmatic than those of Swedish organisations.  Dutch fire 
departments had fewer H&S rules than Swedish ones, and German fire departments had 
practically no locally developed H&S procedures.  The lack of H&S rules made 
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‘innovating’ less possible because such rules were needed as a reference for behaviour 
and a starting point of discussion.  Therefore, German researcher Beck (2011) thought 
that only organisations that accepted the formalistic documentation tools of H&S 
authorities were pursuing an acceptable HSMS.  Hale (2015), a long-time professor at 
the Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands, emphasised that written rules were 
the pre-requisite for continuous H&S improvement.  Thus, German and Dutch 
researchers seem to be concerned about a lack of H&S rules in their national 
organisations.  This corresponds well with the observed importance of domination in 
Germany and co-operation in the Netherlands.  The former implements (technical) 
guidelines without considering employees’ views.  The latter is based on informal 
employee discussions without written rules.  Only in focusing is management leadership 
supplemented with the bottom-up development of formal H&S rules.  While the 
element of ‘leading’ is absent in Sweden, the element of ‘innovating’ is lacking in 
Germany and the Netherlands.  However, there typically is a formal systematic HSMS 
at Swedish fire departments, while German and Dutch top managers tend to neglect 
such legal provisions.  
 
Schmitt-Howe (2018a) asked why managers deviated from the legally prescribed 
processes of continuous operational H&S improvement.  In her study, she conducted 
qualitative interviews with top managers and H&S experts at 50 German companies 
from several industries.  Similar to this study, she was interested in managerial 
approaches to H&S.  However, in contrast to this study, her interview questions 
investigated general “types of action” and “mind-sets” (Schmitt-Howe, 2018a, p. 173) 
rather than specific practices and associated motivations.  With respect to Casey et al. 
(2017), her investigation might be considered an analysis of safety culture, while this 
study focused on the elements of safety climate.  The outcomes of her study reflected 
three of the four approaches to H&S management that were developed in section 7.2: 
 
• Co-determination:  Such formalistic approaches to H&S management were 
observed at large enterprises in Germany, either as a manifestation of an 
independent H&S culture, corresponding to strong social norms, or as a strict 
controlling approach, reflecting a strong focus on organisational rules.  Schmitt-
Howe (2018a) found that big companies tended to use a formal HSMS more 
often than small ones, which was consistent with previous studies (for example 
Nordlöf, 2015). 
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• Co-operation:  Companies of all sizes displayed the attitude of “humans are 
central” (Schmitt-Howe, 2018a, p. 175), which was reflected in the creation of 
“relevant behavioural standards by an ongoing process of discussion with 
employees”.  Formal H&S rules tended to be applied less often. Organisational 
safety cultures were characterised by a reliance on either employee initiative or 
managers’ duty to care.  
 
• Domination:  This approach was adopted by the largest number of companies in 
her sample.  Organisations of all sizes and in all sectors acted accordingly.  
Managers concentrated on engineering solutions for H&S problems, reflecting a 
strong belief in safety equipment and in the technical guidelines of H&S 
authorities.  They focused on budget and purchasing decisions, as they mainly 
aimed at ensuring that appropriate equipment was available.  
 
Schmitt-Howe (2018a, p. 176) additionally described “self-reference” organisations, 
which did not deal with H&S management but relied on the aptitude of their employees.  
Overall, it is concluded that the findings of Schmitt-Howe (2018a) correspond well with 
the findings of this study.  However, due to its more operational view, this study 
identified the focusing approach to H&S management as an additional managerial 
option. 
 
In summary, the outcomes of this study indicate that managers’ ways of implementing 
an HSMS can be described and categorised with the help of the four safety climate 
elements depicted in Figure 9.2.  Managers adopt four different approaches to H&S 
management: co-determination, co-operation, domination and focusing.  The first three 
categories correspond to Schmitt-Howe (2018a), while the latter comprises change 
management projects that managers use to improve specific H&S conditions.  Only Law 
& People Managers use focusing projects, because this approach typically violates the 
rules of H&S authorities, compromising the legal motivations of Law Managers.  In 
Germany and Sweden, it seems to be most common to act as a Law Manager and to try 
to follow formal H&S rules by either implementing systematic processes 
(corresponding to co-determination, found particularly in Sweden) or providing 
appropriate technical equipment (corresponding to domination, found particularly in 
Germany).  In the Netherlands it is accepted that H&S rules are negotiated between 
authorities, managers and employee representatives.  Accordingly, there is a larger 
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variety of management approaches there.  Law & People Managers, who apply 
focusing, seem to be most frequently found in the Netherlands.  Nevertheless, managers 
in Germany and Sweden also use focusing to solve the problems of the more common 
ways of implementing an HSMS, which are characterised by a lack of the elements 
‘innovating’ or ‘leading’. 
 
 
9.3 Managers’ H&S motivations and regulation by H&S authorities  
 
With respect to H&S laws, it emerged from the literature review that most managers 
engage in H&S consultation processes with employees and H&S authorities if they 
become aware of non-compliance (Fairman and Yapp, 2005a) and if they perceive 
authorities to be willing to advise (Beck, 2011).  Such consultations with employees and 
authorities take different forms depending on the motivational settings of top 
management as identified in Chapter 8.  Law Managers focus on the information and 
directives of H&S authorities, adjusting organisational procedures and practices 
according to regulatory feedback.  Law & People Managers, on the other hand, 
additionally consider the views of their employees when adapting H&S measures to 
local conditions.  This perspective from the work floor does not necessarily result in 
legal compliance, but it aims at creating optimal H&S conditions based on the idea of 
enforced self-regulation (EU-OSHA, 2012).  Thus, Law & People Managers may have 
to choose between legal requirements and optimal H&S conditions.  This choice may 
require individual judgements regarding the legality and legitimacy of H&S measures, 
and it may lead to conflict with H&S authorities.  Law Managers, in contrast, will only 
have conflicts with H&S inspectors if their measures do not fully reflect H&S directives 
or recommendations.  
 
The developed typology of managers’ H&S motivations suggests that H&S regulators 
may adopt two distinct approaches to promoting good H&S conditions in organisations.  
The principles of the enforcement pyramid (Figure 2.8) seem to be most appropriate for 
Law Managers.  Their motivations are mainly related to the activities of inspectors.  
When deciding about compliance, they probably consider both economic and 
reputational consequences of non-compliance, as was suggested by Braithwaite (2011).  
Law & People Manager additionally feel a moral responsibility to their employees 
because they are aware that their decisions affect the safety conditions at workplaces 
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and determine the likelihood of harm to employees (section 2.6).  This kind of H&S 
motivation, which was labelled ‘moral and personal’ in Chapter 8, is not covered by the 
principles of the enforcement pyramid.  Therefore, it ought to be addressed by 
additional regulatory activities, and it requires an appropriate regulatory attitude.  Hale 
and Borys (2013b, p. 230) emphasised that “the more rule sets come under the 
scrutiny… the less likely is it that organisations can preserve the flexibility of their own 
sets of rules”.  Thus, effective H&S management implies that at least some legally 
defined H&S rules are ignored.  The dialogue with employees and the consideration of 
their operational practices on the work floor are more relevant than the demands of 
inspectors.  Such reasoning reflects the individual moral judgement of Law & People 
Managers. 
 
Ernste and Wildner (2015) described moral judgements as a key element of business 
ethics.  Their analysis referred to German-American philosopher Hannah Arendt, who 
was one of the leading analysts of the relationships between “intention, motivation, 
moral agency, and responsibility” in the 20th century (Jeffery, 2008, p. 101).  They 
stated that managers had to take the time to reflect on decisions, because resulting 
actions should be both legal and legitimate.  They assumed that this managerial 
responsibility was necessary because laws and regulations could not cover all 
circumstances.  Those moral judgements were based on managers’ socialisation, which 
in turn was affected by critical discussions with others (Bradshaw, 2013; Nielsen, 
1984).  With respect to environmental management systems, which are structurally 
similar to H&S management systems, Bradshaw (2013, p. 220) concluded that the 
dedicated organisational procedures for involving both management and employees 
created moral awareness by “providing room for the expression of environmental 
concerns within company decision making”.  Therefore, the author recommended that 
formal management systems should be mandatory in order to promote discussions on 
ethical issues within organisations.  
 
An empirical study on tax compliance in the United Kingdom (Hallsworth, 2017) found 
that, next to legal deterrence, social norms, that is, the perceived behaviour of others, 
had the strongest positive effect on compliance.  Ethical concerns, which reflect 
individual moral standards, seemed to be less relevant for individuals’ decisions in this 
area.  In contrast to this finding, the analysis of Chapter 8 indicates that individual 
‘moral and personal’ motivations are always more important than the ‘power of 
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informal rules’ that stems from peer pressure and social reputation.  Social norms are 
probably less relevant for managers than for the general population because they 
typically decide rather independently.  Additionally, ‘moral and personal’ motivations 
can be assumed to be more common in H&S management (or environmental 
management) than in tax compliance because the ethical relevance of managerial 
decisions is higher due to the potential for human or environmental harm.  Thus, in 
contrast to Hallsworth (2017) but in line with Bradshaw (2013), it is concluded that 
ethical concerns are relevant in H&S management and regulation. 
 
The circumstances under which managers make good moral judgements on H&S issues 
were previously investigated by Nielsen (1984).  Like Bradshaw (2013) and Ernste and 
Wildner (2015), he cited Hannah Arendt.  In his view, managers’ thinking about their 
responsibilities “should be an individual and independent, habitual activity” (Nielsen, 
1984, p. 158).  He argued that this activity should be based on critical discussions with 
peers.  He mentioned the operation of low-cost factories with bad H&S conditions as an 
example of managers’ moral responsibility.  Especially under severe pressure, for 
example from superiors or economic constraints, managers should be expected to take 
the moral legitimacy of their actions into account and should adapt their decisions 
accordingly.  Nielsen (1984, pp. 155-157) described three types of managers that did not 
meet this ethical requirement:  the “Richard III” type decided to give way to the 
pressure.  He knew that his actions were bad and immoral, but he did it anyway for 
personal benefit.  The second type, “Faust”, acted with full moral consciousness and 
did bad things for the greater good rather than for personal benefit.  Finally, the 
“Eichmann” type made no moral judgement because he was “thoughtless” (according 
to Hannah Arendt).  He did not see the moral and ethical problems of his actions.  Both 
Bradshaw (2013) and Nielsen (1984) suggested that critical discussions and related 
reflections could create moral awareness.  Thus, it can be expected that managers will 
not act like “Eichmann” (or perhaps “Faust”) if their moral judgement is promoted.  
 
Heyler et al. (2016) presented a practical model of ethical decision-making and moral 
judgement.  Their qualitative data comprised 205 statements on decision-making 
processes from 25 interviews with senior managers of the United States Air Force and 
Department of Defence who were colonels and lieutenant colonels or equivalent high 
ranking civilian employees.  Similar to this study, they developed an explanatory model 
by combining literature with empirical data.  They found that moral awareness, which 
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reflected the manager’s personality and experience, and perceived ethical relevance, 
which reflected human proximity and the manager’s knowledge of potential 
consequences, formed the basis of thoughtful moral judgement.  The outcome of the 
individual decision-making process was then determined by the manager’s “moral 
potency” (Heyler et al., 2016, p. 797), which comprised feelings of moral ownership, 
courage and confidence.  If the manager felt the ownership and courage to decide and 
act, there could be a positive ethical outcome that would increase confidence and, with 
it, improve the manager’s future ethical decision-making.  The interviews with senior 
managers provided the basis for a circular model according to which experience of 
ethical issues promotes better managerial practices.  Heyler et al. (2016) emphasised 
that moral awareness was not enough: it had to be complemented with ownership.  This 
sense of moral responsibility would, in their view, motivate managers to take corrective 
action.  They suggested that “moral potency” could be stimulated by means of case 
studies, group discussions and mentoring sessions.  Thus, their empirical analysis 
confirmed Bradshaw (2013) and Nielsen (1984), who theoretically derived that personal 
discussions are necessary in order to sensitise managers to the moral aspects of H&S 
management.  This idea corresponds well with the data of this study, as the open and 
result-oriented discussions between fire departments and inspectors in the Netherlands 
resulted in more statements reflecting ‘moral and personal’ motivations, that is, more 
Law & People Managers.  
 
Based on the typology of managers’ H&S motivations and the related approaches to 
H&S management (section 9.1), it is concluded that inspectors should address both legal 
and moral motivations when engaging with top managers.  Legal considerations form 
the basis of the general approach of responsive regulation in today’s legal environment 
of enforced self-regulation (sections 2.5).  Inspectors should help managers to comply 
and emphasise their legal responsibility by signalling potential sanctions (Braithwaite, 
2011).  However, the results of this study indicate that managers whose statements show 
that they are mainly motivated by the ‘power of formal rules’ apply HSMSs with 
limited effectiveness, that is, co-determination and domination.  In contrast to these Law 
Managers, additional ‘moral and personal’ motivations typify Law & People Managers.  
They pursue the approaches of focusing and co-operation, joining forces with their 
employees to develop better H&S conditions.  As demonstrated in the Netherlands, 
open and result-oriented discussions between inspectors and managers promoted ‘moral 
and personal’ motivations and ethical decision-making.  Such conversations sensitise 
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top managers to the moral aspects of H&S.  In contrast to the Dutch H&S authority, 
German H&S inspectors were rarely available for conversations, and Swedish 
inspectors were strict on rules due to their policing approach (section 7.3).  Thus, it can 
also be concluded that the frequency and duration of H&S inspections, which have been 
reduced in the EU in recent decades (Frick and Johansson, 2013; Tombs and Whyte, 
2010; Satzer, 2011), should be increased so that inspectors more opportunities to take 
the time for open and result-oriented discussions with top managers, promoting Law & 
People Managers. 
 
Regarding the frequency of inspections, the data of this study indicated that the ‘power 
of formal rules’ was an important motivation both with and without regular inspections.  
Despite the low frequency of inspections in Germany, managers there still seemed to 
perceive the deterrent effect of potential sanctions in the same way as managers in 
Sweden, where fire departments were regularly visited.  This finding contradicts 
Braithwaite (2011), who emphasised that the enforcement pyramid would not work with 
a weak regulator that could not put pressure on regulated organisations.  Hallsworth 
(2017, p. 174) additionally found in his behavioural investigations that managers may 
strategically omit legal duties if there is insufficient regulation. 
 
“In sum, there is evidence that individuals engaged in 
dishonesty use omission options strategically. Omission 
options create greater ambiguity about the intentions of 
the individual, and they offer more scope for the behaviour 
to be rationalised and re-categorised. These qualities are 
likely to reduce the blame that is allocated, the punishment 
administered, and the psychic costs incurred.” 
 
 
According to the analysis of Hallsworth (2017), social pressure (“blame that is 
allocated”), legal forces (“punishment administered”) and moral feelings (“psychic 
costs”) can initiate such omission behaviour.  In terms of social norms and legal 
frameworks, negligence is less blameworthy than deliberate actions.  At the same time, 
breaches of individual moral standards may be retrospectively justified by reframing 
one’s own decisions.  Hallsworth (2017, p. 176) found that tax compliance was better 
when tax authorities amended their written request with the statement “this will be an 
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active choice”, just as if they were discussing the issue with the individuals.  Based on 
Braithwaite (2011) and Hallsworth (2017), it is therefore concluded that regular 
inspections are necessary for the purpose of both putting pressure on managers and 
ensuring that omission behaviour is prevented.  A sufficiently high frequency of 
inspections is necessary to promote positive engagement in H&S management, in terms 
of both Law Managers and Law & People Managers. 
 
Looking at the country cases in section 7.3, it is concluded that the German H&S 
authorities are unlikely to encourage managers to create good H&S conditions.  They 
neither visit organisations regularly nor do they discuss H&S issues openly.  Instead, 
they focus on publishing general technical guidelines.  The Swedish H&S authority, in 
contrast, applies the enforcement pyramid by providing specific guidelines and ensuring 
that local rules are implemented.  Finally, the Dutch regulatory agency additionally 
promotes moral judgement by regularly discussing inspection results with managers.  
This approach might have been limited to fire departments in the Netherlands because 
inspectors have been focusing on these organisations due to the many regional mergers 
in recent years.  However, the resulting activities of the Dutch H&S authority have 
created a good example of what can be achieved.  Law & People Managers were most 
commonly found in the Netherlands, yielding many focusing projects.  
 
In summary, this study indicates that there are two ways of promoting managerial self-
regulation.  The objective is to motivate top management to ensure good H&S 
conditions in workplaces:  
 
1. A functioning enforcement pyramid (Figure 2.8) can be achieved through 
consistent support and deterrence, which enable compliance and discourage 
managers from using strategies of omission.  This practice of advising and 
threatening promotes Law Managers. 
 
2. Good moral judgement can be promoted through open and result-oriented 
discussions, which ensure that managers understand rules and recognise their 
individual moral responsibility.  Advising and sensitising in this way promotes 
Law & People Managers. 
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Both ways require frequent inspections, though with different regulatory attitudes.  The 
first approach corresponds to the known concept of responsive regulation as described 
by Braithwaite (2011).  Inspectors support organisations in implementing H&S 
measures that typically are (largely) defined by the H&S authority.  If managers do not 
comply or try to omit decisions on H&S rules, potential sanctions are signalled.  The 
second approach supplements the enforcement pyramid of Braithwaite (2011) by 
promoting good moral judgement.  Openly discussing H&S issues with managers 
promotes ‘moral and personal’ motivations.  Assuming that managers generally aim to 
prevent harm to their employees, inspectors allow deviations from H&S rules in order to 
facilitate individual organisational H&S measures (Hale and Borys, 2013b).  With it, the 
effective management approach of focusing will be promoted, which this study 
exemplified at fire departments in three countries.  Inspectors can create optimal H&S 
conditions in organisations by taking the time to discuss matters with top managers and 
allowing them the freedom to conduct their individual change projects.  
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Chapter 10 
Contributions to Knowledge 
 
10.1 New method for analysing ways of implementing an HSMS 
 
This study proposes a new method for identifying and categorising managers’ ways of 
implementing an HSMS.  The new HSMS model derived from the safety climate 
literature was successfully applied during data collection and analysis.  Four critical 
elements of effective H&S management are identified: ‘deciding’, ‘innovating’, 
‘leading’, ‘taking care’.  The interviews with the commanders and H&S experts of fire 
departments showed that these elements are suitable for describing ways of 
implementing an HSMS in working environments with relevant operational H&S risks.  
The sub-categories depicted in Figure 9.2 give concrete form to the four critical 
elements that can be used to guide semi-structured interviews with organisational 
members.  Applying safety climate as a framework for evaluating managerial practices 
has recently also been proposed by others (for example Casey et al., 2017).  Contrary to 
the safety climate literature, where quantitative surveys are typical, this study presents a 
qualitative methodology.  This is considered more suitable for describing organisational 
realities, offering a promising approach for practical applications in H&S management. 
 
The tested HSMS model (Figure 9.2) represents a significant contribution to the 
scientific discourse because it provides a new view on HSMS implementation in 
organisations.  These are typically examined qualitatively in studies on safety culture 
and reviews of operational practices, or they are analysed quantitatively with surveys on 
safety climate (section 2.1).  Presenting an HSMS model that is derived from the 
quantitative literature on safety climate but that is still qualitative in nature, this study 
provides a new tool for describing the H&S reality in organisations.  In contrast to 
earlier research, safety climate, which reflects the H&S perceptions of employees, is 
analysed with semi-structured interviews instead of being investigated with forced-
choice questionnaire surveys.  This puts the focus on the interaction between managers 
and employees, adding a management perspective to the prevailing inspectors’ view on 
formal compliance.  
 
The new method for evaluating ways of implementing an HSMS represents an 
integrative approach in a diverse scientific and practical discourse.  The different 
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literature streams on safety culture, safety climate and practical guidelines have been 
integrated in order to improve the understanding of managerial H&S decisions 
(Chapter 2).  As depicted in Figure 2.1, top management shapes an organisation’s 
HSMS in the context of its safety culture and its physical H&S environment.  The safety 
culture has been developed over time by the activities of management and the 
organisational history.  The physical H&S environment depends on the operational 
work and equipment, which are affected by practical guidelines, including rules laid 
down by H&S authorities.  The resulting HSMS is then perceived by employees, who 
adjust their behaviour accordingly, as suggested in the safety climate literature.  By 
integrating the main scientific and practical perspectives, this study’s new HSMS model 
contributes a significant point of reference in the diverse field of H&S management.  
 
 
10.2 Change projects as an alternative approach to H&S management 
 
The data from this study provide empirical evidence that change projects are used to 
directly improve H&S conditions on the work floor.  This approach to H&S 
management, which is termed ‘focusing’ in Chapter 7, is related to the literature on 
innovation management.  It is adopted in all three countries despite their different 
regulatory environments.  Focusing is considered effective in terms of safety climate 
and thus actual H&S conditions (Figure 2.1).  According to the author’s knowledge, 
change projects have not been regarded as autonomous approaches in previous studies 
on H&S management.  Instead, such interventions were only considered as a means for 
improving organisational H&S procedures and cultures (Beck, 2011; Frick, 2013a; 
Hale et al., 2010).  Schmitt-Howe (2018a) did not identify change projects when 
developing her typology of H&S management approaches.  Therefore, the identification 
of focusing as an additional, mostly project-based approach to H&S management marks 
a significant contribution to the scientific knowledge base. 
 
The identified ways of implementing an HSMS are good examples for day-to-day H&S 
management in medium-sized organisations.  As described in section 6.3.2, there are 
two kinds of employee involvement that reflect effective focusing projects.  Minor 
changes to H&S conditions are discussed and decided on by employees in dedicated 
workshops set up by management.  Examples are small-scale equipment innovations 
and operational risk assessments.  Major H&S measures are developed by top managers 
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together with their employees, including not only formal representatives but all relevant 
stakeholders.  Examples of measures for promoting such broad communication include 
a goodie box or team shirt for project participants, a symbolic safety tool or an H&S 
theatre play.  In all incidents, managers act as leaders that encourage employees to take 
care and innovate. 
 
The literature on safety culture suggests that focused change projects improve H&S 
conditions not only directly, but also indirectly via positive effects on the safety culture 
(section 2.2).  The H&S projects become part of the organisational history, and 
employees will remember that top management supported such H&S initiatives.  
According to Reason (2016), the visible involvement of management in safety processes 
is a particularly important benefit of a formal HSMS.  By providing similar 
management involvement, focused change projects may take the place of such systems.  
As stated in section 2.6, only relatively large enterprises tend to have formal procedure 
for continual H&S improvements.  Thus, especially for small to medium-sized 
organisations, the identified alternative approach to H&S management represents a 
significant contribution that may improve both managerial and regulatory practices.  
The findings should even be considered by large enterprises because focusing may also 
be applied in medium-sized divisions or subsidiaries (section 10.3). 
 
 
10.3 Typology of managers’ H&S motivations as a new regulatory perspective 
 
The findings of this study indicate that a regulatory approach that considers the moral 
issues of H&S management improves the effectiveness of authorities’ measures in terms 
of actual H&S conditions on the work floor.  The empirical data led to a typology of 
managers’ H&S motivations that reveals two characteristic types of positive H&S 
engagement (Figure 9.1).  Decision makers become either Law Managers or Law & 
People Managers, depending on the circumstances.  In the former case, the enforcement 
pyramid of Braithwaite (2011) may be applied in order to motivate by the ‘power of 
formal rules’.  In the latter case, however, this known regulatory model falls short 
because it does not address ‘moral and personal’ issues.  The typology developed in this 
study emphasises the importance of such moral motivations and suggests that H&S 
regulations and corporate training should promote ethical decisions by means of open 
and result-oriented discussions with top managers.  This is expected to result in 
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improved organisational approaches to H&S management, especially focused change 
projects (section 10.2).  Thus, the typology makes a significant contribution to 
regulatory theory because it indicates how the established enforcement pyramid should 
be amended in fields where moral aspects are relevant.  
 
The practical value of the typology of managers’ H&S motivations stems from its 
potential to improve regulators’ understanding of managers’ behaviour.  Instead of 
exclusively referring to the enforcement pyramid of Braithwaite (2011), inspectors 
ought to consider ‘moral or personal’ motivations, too.  If their focus remains on 
ensuring compliance with H&S laws and rules, they will keep applying the principles of 
the enforcement pyramid.  If they allow discretion for managers to adjust H&S rules to 
local needs, they will conduct open und result-oriented discussions on optimal H&S 
measures.  In the latter case, they will become aware that managers often prefer 
focusing projects to systematic improvement processes.  Under the plausible assumption 
that sensitising managers to ethical issues is more complex and time consuming than 
threatening legal sanctions, this study’s regulatory conclusion implies that more H&S 
inspectors are needed if Law & People Managers are to be promoted.  This finding may 
provide H&S authorities with good arguments for increasing staffing levels. 
 
The developed typology also has practical implications for the definition of H&S laws 
and rules.  By providing evidence that the current H&S regulations in the European 
Union do not necessarily yield optimal outcomes in the field of H&S management, this 
study may prompt discussions regarding the underlying legal framework.  Both the 
H&S laws and the latest H&S standard ISO 45001 refer to management systems for 
continual H&S improvement.  Such procedures conflict with the approaches of Law & 
People Managers, who prefer project-based H&S measures (Figure 9.1).  The interview 
data suggest that H&S change projects are popular in all countries, though managers are 
aware that their approaches do not necessarily satisfy legal requirements.  It is 
recommended that H&S authorities and policy makers allow managers sufficient 
freedom to deviate from the rigid processes described in todays’ H&S laws and 
standards.  If top managers are also sensitised to the moral dimensions of their H&S 
decisions, they are more likely to implement effective HSMSs that ensure good H&S 
conditions for employees.  By revealing such managerial motivations and practices in 
medium-sized organisations, this study makes a significant contribution to practical 
discussions on potential innovations in H&S laws, regulations and industry standards.   
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Large enterprises may apply this study’s new regulatory perspective to their divisions or 
subsidiaries.  Such organisations are subject to not only authorities’ H&S regulations 
but also corporate H&S rules.  They tend to implement more formal HSMSs than 
independent medium-sized organisations because large enterprises often use formalistic 
management approaches to implement a distinct H&S culture or a strict controlling 
approach across the whole group (Nordlöf, 2015; Schmitt-Howe, 2018a).  However, 
according to the findings of this study, top managers of subsidiaries should also be 
allowed to apply focusing in order to create optimal H&S conditions.  The typology 
according to Figure 9.1 applies if these subordinate top managers are senior decision 
makers who are used to deciding independently (Heyler et al., 2016).  Just like H&S 
authorities, the top organisational level of large enterprises should amend the 
enforcement of formal H&S rules with sensitising top managers of divisions and 
subsidiaries.  Such an approach might have improved the problematic H&S conditions 
at British Railways described in section 1.1.  This study’s findings suggest that the often 
complex H&S rules of large enterprises should be simplified and that senior managers’ 
training should consider the ethical and moral dimensions of H&S issues. 
 
Overall, the typology of managers’ H&S motivations (Figure 9.1) provides a significant 
contribution to the scientific and practical discourse because it reveals the role of ‘moral 
and personal’ motivations in the field of H&S.  Effective change projects for improved 
H&S conditions (reflecting the focusing approach) are conducted by managers who feel 
a moral responsibility toward their employees.  The ‘power of formal rules’, in contrast, 
promotes formalistic approaches that are less functional, particularly in medium-sized 
organisations.  Therefore, it is recommended that H&S regulations and corporate 
training use open and result-oriented discussions – regarding specific practices or 




10.4 Summary of this study’s findings 
 
This study has resulted in three main knowledge contributions.  First, the new HSMS 
model integrates the different strands of the diverse H&S literature and provides a 
promising tool for practice, putting the focus on the interaction between top managers 
and employees.  Second, change projects were identified as an alternative management 
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approach that is applied in all three countries despite not fulfilling legal requirements.  
Third, the typology of managers’ H&S motivations suggests that H&S decisions are 
significantly affected by managers’ feelings of moral responsibility.  Having identified 
this motivation and its direct relationship with effective change projects in the field of 
H&S, it is concluded that regulatory rules and practices should be adjusted.  Scientist 
and practitioners alike should take into account that ethical decision making by top 
managers is an important aspect in promoting good H&S conditions for employees.  
This new understanding of managerial decision making will improve working 
conditions particularly in small and medium-sized organisations where today’s complex 
H&S rules and ISO standards typically are poorly implemented.  
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Chapter 11 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
11.1 Limitations and generalisability of the findings 
 
As stated in section 2.1, the methodological focus of this study was to develop an 
explanation that would not be limited to the context of the investigated cases but would 
be generalisable to other industries.  Following Eisenhardt (1989), the degree of 
generalisability was evaluated by comparing the researcher’s findings with the 
literature.  For example, it was concluded in section 9.2 that the high frequency of 
statements relating to the ‘power of formal rules’ in Germany was not plausible because 
it contradicted Braithwaite (2011) and Hallsworth (2017).  Instead, it was assumed to be 
a result of the sampling process, which was biased towards fire department managers 
with positive views on H&S (section 4.5).  Based on such theoretical considerations, it 
is concluded that the typology of managers’ H&S motivations (Figure 9.1) applies to all 
medium-sized organisations that encounter substantial operational H&S risks, raising 
moral questions for top management.  The HSMS model (Figure 9.2) and the 
management approach of focused change projects could then be used in organisations 
where there are relevant differences between the written H&S rules and the reality of 
their work (section 9.1).  However, it cannot be derived from the known literature which 
specific businesses, with the exception of high-risk industries such as aviation, 
chemicals and firefighting, are substantially affected by such operational characteristics.  
Also, the data from this study do not permit any predictions as to the organisations to 
which managers could apply focusing to cover all the elements of an effective HSMS 
according to the study model. 
 
The reliability and validity of the data differed between the fixed- and open-coding 
procedures of this study.  Managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS were identified 
using the fixed-coding scheme of the deductively derived HSMS model (Figure 2.7).  
Following the conclusions from the pilot studies, the elements of the model were 
discussed with all interview participants in order to ensure reliability and validity 
through “member checking” (Saldaña, 2009, p. 28).  The open-coding procedures, in 
contrast, were less exact, especially in terms of managers’ H&S motivations.  This 
coding and categorisation of the interview data were not checked by anyone other than 
the author.  Regarding the statistical analysis of the counted motivation statements in 
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Chapter 8, there is the additional issue of correctly separating codes, that is, 
distinguishing between repeated and distinct statements.  However, an effort was made 
to increase reliability and validity by repeatedly reviewing the interview transcripts in 
different contexts during the relatively long data analysis period, which lasted about ten 
months.  Following Eisenhardt (1989), there was no pre-defined initial concept. The 
coding categories and the typology were developed over time, as the author frequently 
tested his findings on participants’ answers.  Overall, it should be acknowledged that the 
typology of managers’ H&S motivations (Figure 9.1) may not reflect all relevant 
motivations. 
 
As is typical for research based on cross-sectional case-studies, the sample size was 
rather small in comparison to questionnaire surveys (Yin, 2014).  The four fire 
departments in each country were not representative but were biased towards managers 
with a special interest in H&S issues.  It was expected that participants had a positive 
view on H&S and that they were willing to describe their ways of implementing an 
HSMS because they considered their H&S activities to be at least appropriate 
(section 4.5).  Accordingly, there were no interviewees who could have provided 
information on motivations for not engaging in H&S management.  However, the 
sampling was suitable for describing the relationships between regulatory perceptions, 
motivations and H&S management practices.  By limiting case selection to the business 
of firefighting, the effect of differences in industry cultures was smaller than in cross-
industry studies.  National characteristics were elaborated in the country cases by 
comparing the data with the literature.  Nevertheless, it is unknown whether national 
cultures have unidentified effects with respect to both positive and negative views on 
H&S. 
 
The literature on safety climate formed the theoretical basis of the HSMS model 
(Figure 2.7) that was used for data collection and analysis.  Although safety climate 
investigations would typically be done with employee surveys on the organisational 
H&S conditions, this study collected data by interviewing representatives of top 
management.  The ways of implementing an HSMS were investigated with reference to 
managers’ descriptions of their activities and their perceptions of employees’ responses.  
In doing so, the plausible assumption was made that managers acted in a way that was 
well understood by employees.  Still, it might have been beneficial to quantitatively 
measure the actual safety climate in the participating organisations.  This was not 
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possible in the cross-sectional setup because employee surveys would have required 
agreements with the works councils in all organisations.  Additionally, it was assumed 
during research design that H&S issues might be used by employees and their 
representatives as tools in organisational politics.  Staff could put pressure on top 
management by claiming that certain measures were necessary because of H&S reasons.  
The interviews at NL-3 and S-5 confirmed this initial assumption (see sections 6.3.2 and 
6.3.3).  Thus, if employees had been asked about H&S management practices at their 
organisations, the interviewees of this study might have encountered corresponding 
conflicts with their staff.  This would have probably affected the answers of both 
management representatives and employees.  Therefore, the study’s findings on ways of 
implementing an HSMS were not triangulated by asking employees but are exclusively 
based on the views of top managers.  
 
 
11.2 Areas for future research 
 
To address the limitations of this study, the new HSMS model (Figure 9.2) and the 
typology of managers’ H&S motivations (Figure 9.1) could be tested in further 
qualitative and quantitative studies.  Following the exploratory approach of this study, 
both concepts aimed at providing new perspectives on H&S management and H&S 
regulation.  Future research could challenge the underlying views. 
 
If future studies were to apply the new HSMS model (Figure 9.2) in other industries and 
countries, its generalisability could be checked, and necessary amendments could be 
identified.  Additional qualitative cases would increase the data base of this study.  
According to this study, it is possible to discuss the elements of safety climate with 
representatives of top management.  Such additional data would help to better 
understand in what kinds of organisations focused change projects help top management 
to create better H&S conditions.  Such knowledge would then also inform the regulatory 
activities of H&S authorities.   
 
Testing the typology of managers’ H&S motivations in other industries and countries 
could investigate whether Figure 9.1 covers all relevant motivations.  Further qualitative 
studies could scrutinise the effects of nationalities and industry cultures and potentially 
identify necessary amendments.  Discussing the typology with inspectors of H&S 
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authorities could additionally improve its reliability and applicability.  As outlined by 
Hawkins (2002), the regulatory strategies of H&S authorities are based on inspectors’ 
perceptions of managers’ motivations.  Those strategies, in turn, affect managers’ 
motivations and ways of implementing an HSMS.  The most appropriate typology of 
managers’ H&S motivations might well be approved by both managers and inspectors. 
 
If this study’s new perspectives on H&S management and H&S regulation were to be 
used for quantitative research across industries and countries, the data base on the 
identified relationships with managers’ motivations could be improved.  Even 
negatively engaged managers might respond to anonymous H&S questionnaires 
(Nordlöf, 2015).  Unlike in previous surveys (for example EU-OSHA, 2010; EU-
OSHA, 2015), questions on managerial practices should distinguish between legally 
prescribed processes and change projects.  By relating the different ways of 
implementing an HSMS to managers’ H&S motivations and regulators’ approaches, the 
typology of managers’ H&S motivations (Figure 9.1) could be challenged with a larger 
data base.  
 
Longitudinal case studies may improve the understanding of the relationships described 
within the typology of managers’ H&S motivations.  By investigating the managerial 
and regulatory situations in specific organisations and asking top managers about their 
motivations, examples could be developed that either support or contradict the 
conclusions of this study.  Due to the more intensive communication and information 
exchange in longitudinal case studies, the reliability and validity of constructs would 
presumably be better than in the cross-sectional research of this study.  Additionally, if 
employees’ perceptions were to be considered and actual H&S conditions evaluated, the 
effectiveness of the focused change projects could be scrutinised.  Such research could 
also demonstrate the interplay between legally prescribed ways of implementing an 
HSMS and additionally applied focused change projects.  
 
 
11.3 Summary of limitations and future research 
 
The limitations of this study and the recommended areas of future research mainly 
result from the cross-sectional methodology and the finite resources of the research 
project.  The reliability and validity of data collection and analysis was less exact than it 
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might have been in a longitudinal case study.  The sample was limited to 12 
organisations in one industry in three European Union countries.  Also, it was not 
possible to ask the fire department employees about their perceptions of organisational 
H&S conditions because this would have required agreements with the individual works 
councils and it could have resulted in political conflicts within the organisations.  
Accordingly, it is recommended that additional qualitative case studies – both cross-
sectional and longitudinal – and quantitative surveys be used to enlarge the data base.  If 
future research were to be conducted based on this study’s ideas of focused change 
projects and moral decision-making, it could challenge the associated relationships 





Having considered H&S issues from the perspectives of both managerial practice and 
scientific research, I am astonished how little fact-based evidence exists in this field.  I 
would still repeat the following question that Andrew Hale, a long-time professor of 
safety science at Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands, raised in his 
valedictory lecture in September 2006 (Hale, 2006):   
 
“Why is it that we are so prepared in the practice of safety 
to accept and implement sometimes very costly preventive 
measures, including whole safety management systems, 
without any good scientific basis as to whether they work 
or not?” 
 
Hale (2006) explained that the positive effects of organisational H&S measures might 
be considered obvious, or that companies had conducted but not published validation 
studies.  In my view, it should be added that generations of safety experts have been 
educated according to the ideas of formal management systems for continuous 
improvement, which have been spreading since the 1970s (Reason, 2016) and have been 
required by H&S authorities across Europe (EU-OSHA, 2012a).  Therefore, many 
actors in the field of H&S management seem to take it for granted that systematic rule-
based approaches are effective.  As a manager of a small organisation, without an 
education in the field of H&S management, I did not know how to implement such 
HSMSs.  I probably had a rather superficial view when I started my research project in 
2014.  Indeed, the vice-commander of D-1, whom I interviewed for the second pilot 
study, had a master’s degree in safety engineering and explained to me how risk 
assessments are supposed to be done in Germany.  He focused much more on technical 
solutions than on behavioural changes, in contrast to the Dutch H&S experts whom I 
interviewed for the first pilot study at NL-1.  Thus, there seemed to be national 
traditions of H&S teaching, which I investigated as an experienced manager. 
 
The literature review in the fields of H&S management and H&S regulation proved to 
be difficult.  There were many concepts that were similar in character but were 
described and applied in very different ways.  Guldenmund (2010) emphasised the 
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fuzziness of the safety culture concept, including safety climate.  Similarly, the 
regulatory terms “risk-management process regulation”, “enforced self-regulation” 
and “management-level regulation” all referred to the same idea of corporate H&S 
improvements under responsive regulation (Hale et al., 2015, p. 118).  Although these 
two fields of literature were not the focus of the research, they formed an important 
basis for addressing the identified literature gap.  In order to answer the question of how 
top managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS were affected by their H&S 
motivations, it was necessary to understand the literature on the envisaged outcomes of 
H&S management and the motivational approaches of H&S regulation.  Thus, a broad 
literature review was carried out according to the methodology of Eisenhardt (1989).  
The diversity of the literature increased the complexity of the research project.  Only 
after having developed the elements of an effective HSMS (Figure 2.7) did it become 
clear what the interview guidance should look like.  
 
The comparison of literature from Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden did not yield 
additional insights even when considering publications in the respective national 
languages.  The described managerial and regulatory approaches were similar in all 
three countries, corresponding to the EU Framework Directive 89/391/EEC on Safety 
and Health at Work.  Only the focus of the literature differed, as Swedish authors 
preferred formal HSMSs over the informal managerial strategies that were common in 
Germany and the Netherlands.  At the same time, Germans focused on H&S 
technology, while Dutch and Swedish research considered organisational issues.  Such 
differences reflected traditions in those countries, being the national starting points for 
improving H&S management and regulation within the European legal framework. 
 
It was surprising to me that there were no meaningful statistics on occupational H&S 
conditions in European countries.  The available data on accident rates were not suitable 
because definitions and recording methods varied, plus people had different perceptions 
depending on cultural traditions and employment conditions.  Swuste (2014) presented 
two examples of significant statistical differences that were not caused by actual H&S 
conditions but rather resulted from other effects.  First, in the Scottish construction 
industry, the rate of fatal accidents in the years 1997 to 2002 was 50% higher than in 
England.  This was explained by differences in organisational structures, as fewer 
managers and experts were involved in Scottish construction projects than in similar 
English undertakings.  Thus, the denominator of the accident rate was significantly 
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smaller in Scotland.  Second, during the construction of the Öresund link between 
Denmark and Sweden in the years 1996 to 2000, the lost-time injury (LTI) rates among 
construction workers differed greatly.  The LTI rate of Danish workers was about 
fourfold the rate of Swedish workers despite similar tasks and equal working conditions.  
Besides the better education of Swedish employees, which might indeed have affected 
actual H&S conditions, two social reasons were identified as explanations.  Swedish 
workers continued working despite minor injuries because there were higher 
unemployment rates and less generous sickness benefits in their country.  Employees’ 
occupational attitudes affected the numerator.  Thus, to my knowledge, there are no 
meaningful international statistics on accidents and LTI rates at fire departments. 
 
Frick (2013b) was my starting point for developing the research question of this study.  
In his literature review for the Swedish H&S authority ‘Arbetsmiljöverket’, he stated 
that dedicated managers (particularly of small businesses) often did a lot to create good 
H&S conditions despite failing to comply with laws and regulations on HSMSs.  Thus, 
management commitment might compensate for the lack of compliance with formal 
rules, and regulators might focus on campaigning for management commitment instead 
of enforcing rules on management systems.  Thus, compliance would not be the final 
goal (Guldenmund, 2010).  The literature review confirmed that top management 
determined organisational H&S conditions, but it provided few answers as to how H&S 
regulation affected managers’ H&S activities.  The initial research question focused on 
the relationship between regulation and managers’ ways of implementing an HSMS.  In 
order to consider different regulatory approaches, fire departments were sampled in 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.  It subsequently became clear that managers’ 
underlying motivations were a more promising variable, resulting in the research aim to 
develop a typology of managers’ H&S motivations.  Nevertheless, the multinational 
approach proved to be beneficial for data analysis, as the different national contexts 
highlighted differences in H&S motivations and ways of implementing an HSMS.  The 
qualitative interviews with the commanders and H&S experts in three countries 
reflected diverse experiences and allowed me to develop a broader picture than would 
have been possible within a single country. 
 
The sampling of participants and the conducting of qualitative interviews were positive 
experiences.  Despite a slow beginning, I found five participating fire departments in 
each country.  As expected, the organisational ways of implementing an HSMS were 
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always determined by the commander or vice-commander and the H&S experts 
advising them.  Thus, the interview guide was well received by participants because it 
reflected their managerial practices.  The semi-structured interviews and the developed 
elements of an effective HSMS (Figure 2.7) resulted in open conversations about 
instances of HSMS implementation.  The focus on concrete examples was important in 
identifying the actual management approaches.  The benefits of the collected HSMS 
descriptions became evident during data analysis, especially in comparison to Schmitt-
Howe (2018a).  The interviews resulted in a cross-case comparison of management 
practices, which were qualitatively evaluated with respect to the elements of an 
effective HSMS.  As described above in terms of countries, a quantitative comparison 
of organisational H&S conditions was not feasible despite similarities in operations and 
structures.  Similarly, Reason (2016, pp. 27-28) summarised that operational figures 
were typically “continuous, compelling and relatively accurate” but that figures on 
H&S conditions were, unfortunately, “sparse, intermittent, difficult and often untrue”. 
 
Having realised that it was impossible to quantitatively compare organisational H&S 
conditions with acceptable accuracy, I became aware of the challenges that H&S 
inspectors face.  During the interviews, I asked managers about their views on the 
activities of H&S authorities.  As Hale et al. (2015) had stated before, there were 
negative experiences with H&S authorities’ operational rules in all countries.  However, 
the national authorities’ conclusions seemed to differ.  Dutch and Swedish authorities 
were described as very active, while German authorities were almost invisible.  Indeed, 
Schmitt-Howe (2018b) stated, as representative of the Federal Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (BauA, an agency of the German Federal Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs), that the initiative for H&S improvements should come from the 
companies, not the H&S authorities.  In her view, top managers should implement a 
prevention culture because their examples had a strong impact on employees.  However, 
my investigation of managers’ H&S motivations revealed that top managers are not the 
starting point for developing good H&S conditions.  Their decision-making is affected 
by the regulatory approaches of H&S authorities.  During my research, I learnt that 
managers’ most effective H&S initiatives do not result from the ‘power of formal rules’ 
but are developed as a result of ‘moral and personal’ motivations.  H&S inspectors 
should promote these moral motivations by informing and convincing managers of their 
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This research project on health and safety management at fire departments is being 
conducted as part of a doctoral programme (DBA) at Heriot-Watt University, 
Edinburgh, United Kingdom.  Participants come from Germany, the Netherlands and 
Sweden.  The objective is to better understand different national approaches to 
implementing common EU legislation and to facilitate international information 
exchange.  
 
Two interviews of about one hour in duration are conducted at each fire department: 
one with the commander or vice-commander, the other with an H&S expert.  
Interviewees are asked if they are willing to participate and if they agree with recording 
the conversation.  Confidentiality is guaranteed.  An individual case study will be 
developed by analysing the interviews and the general characteristics of the fire 
department. 
 







1. What is the strategic focus of your H&S management system? 
2. What are your reasons for choosing such an approach? 
3. a) What are your experiences with the authorities? 
b) What H&S approaches and motivations have you discussed with them? 
 
 
End of the interview 
 
Interviewees are asked if they would like to add anything.  They are informed that the 
individual case study will be used for further analysis.  The management practices and 
experiences of German, Dutch and Swedish fire departments will be compared in order 
to identify similarities and differences.  Each participating fire department will be 








This research project on health and safety management at fire departments is being 
conducted as part of a doctoral programme (DBA) at Heriot-Watt University, 
Edinburgh, United Kingdom.  Fire departments in Germany, the Netherlands and 
Sweden are participating.  The objective is to better understand different organisational 
approaches to implementing common EU legislation.  The practical result will be 
information exchange among fire departments as a basis for  
• optimising health and safety management systems at fire brigades and 
• improving communication between managers and authorities. 
 
Two interviews of about one hour in duration are conducted at each fire department: one 
with the commander or vice-commander, the other with an H&S expert.  Interviewees 
are asked if they are willing to participate and if they agree with recording the 
conversation.  Confidentiality is guaranteed.  An individual case study report will be 
drafted by analysing the interviews and the general characteristics of the fire 
department, which will be provided to both interviewees for discussion. 
 
The final case study will then be used for further analysis.  The management practices 
and experiences of the German, Dutch and Swedish fire departments will be compared 
in order to identify similarities and differences.  Each participating fire department will 




Basic model of health and safety management systems 





1. How is your organisational H&S management system shaped? 
(discussion based on existing risk assessments and/or H&S measures) 
2. What are your reasons for choosing such an approach to H&S management? 
3. What are your experiences with H&S authorities (insurances, unions, etc.) and their 
publications? 




End of the interview 
 
Interviewees are asked if they would like to add anything.  It is repeated that there will 
be another opportunity for conversation (either in person or by telephone) about the 
draft case study report.  The researcher assures that he is available in the meantime for 
any additional comments or questions.  
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Appendix C – Case Study Report NL-1 
(Analytical Memo from Pilot Study)  
Health and Safety (H&S) Management at the Fire Department 




NL-1 is a Dutch fire department that is part of one of the 25 ‘veiligheidsregio’s’ [‘safety 
regions’] in the Netherlands.  It is a relatively large fire department with about 200 
professional firefighters at five stations.  The organisation has one commander and one 
vice-commander.  The H&S expert holds a staff position but is also active as a fire 
officer with special functions such as hazardous materials (HAZMAT) manager and 
incident safety officer.  NL-1 has about 20 documented risk assessments.  Several of 
them are very similar because they cover the same topics for the administrative sub-
regions of the fire department.  More than five fire stations are staffed with professional 
firefighters.  Additionally, there are more than 50 volunteer fire stations.  
 
 
Approach to H&S management for considered examples 
 
Two examples of H&S management were discussed with NL-1: 
a) Draft of guidelines for ‘Schoon werken bij brand’ [‘clean working at fire’] 
b) Draft of ‘RI&E proces’ [‘process for risk assessments’] 
 
a) Draft of guidelines for ‘Schoon werken bij brand’ [‘clean working at fire’] 
With regard to the model of health and safety management systems (see next page), it 
was determined that a ‘holistic system’ had formed the basis for the development of the 
‘Schoon werken bij brand’ [‘Clean working at fire’] guidelines. 
 
This example was considered special because discussion on the topic was not limited to 
the NL-1 fire department or the national professional organisation ‘Brandweer 
Nederland’.  There have been comprehensive media reports in recent years about 
firefighters’ risk of developing cancer.  One of the most prominent reports was aired on 
the programme ‘De Monitor’ on 14 September 2015, entitled ‘Kanker als beroepsziekte 
bij de Brandweer’ [‘cancer as an occupational desease at fire services’]. The report can 
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be found here: https://demonitor.ncrv.nl/uitzendingen/kanker-als-beroepsziekte-bij-de-
brandweer. 
 
Model of the health and safety management system for ‘Schoon werken bij brand’ 
 
 






 from media 
 (e.g. internet) 
 
 
In this case, a ‘holistic system’ was identified, although in a special version.  In contrast 
to typical cases in H&S management, there was extensive media attention, which 
affected the organisation from the outside.  The information from the media created 
strong awareness among firefighters in the Netherlands (not only at NL-1), and 
motivated employees to engage in ‘taking care’.  The ‘information from media (e.g. 
internet)’ is marked in bold in the figure in order to indicate this significant external 
effect.  In more typical cases, the information flow into the organisation is expected to 
occur via the top management, that is, the commander(s) and/or the H&S expert. 
 
Taking care was the starting point in this case.  Before the media reports came out, 
employees of the Amsterdam fire department were at a conference in Norway and 
learned about studies on cancer risks in firefighting.  This prompted them to begin 
developing their own simple measures on the work floor.  Top management neither 
opposed nor supported the measures, but permitted them as long as the resulting costs 
were reasonable and within the given budget.  Then the media, especially the TV 
programme ‘De Monitor’, reported on the issue.  This resulted in the information 
spreading among firefighters nationwide.  Employees at several fire departments across 
the country developed related measures. 
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Innovation took place among employees due to the widespread awareness.  There was 
no formal training, but firefighters searched for best practices on the internet.  These 
were implemented and tested, resulting in a practical innovation cycle in the 
organisations with little expert support.  Thus, ‘innovation’ and ‘taking care’ were 
directly connected with no major involvement of top management.  At a later stage, the 
classical innovation cycle of formal rule development in co-operation with management 
began.  This resulted in the ‘Schoon werken bij brand’ [‘clean working at fire’] 
guidelines that were discussed during the interviews at NL-1.  
 
Deciding may be characterised as a reaction to the initiative of the employees in this 
case.  At an early stage, small, low-cost measures (“quick wins”) proposed by 
employees were implemented.  The commanders of NL-1 also implemented a task force 
(led by the vice-commander) in order to show that top management considered the 
issues to be important, too.  At a later stage, the national industry association 
‘Brandweer Nederland’ even commissioned a scientific study at the ‘Instituut Fysieke 
Veiligheid’ (IFV) [a research institute of the safety regions in the Netherlands].  In 
contrast to typical situations, awareness of the need to decide on new measures (and 
corresponding budgets) was created by the employees and the media attention.  As a 
consequence, there was a certain degree of external pressure on top management. 
 
Leading in terms of creating awareness took place on a public-media level.  In this 
context, the commander interviewed on the TV programme ‘De Monitor’ showed 
publicly that he felt strong responsibility.  This helped to create awareness and a sense 
of urgency among other commanders and firefighters across the Netherlands.  Today, it 
is not really necessary to create awareness among firefighters because the issue is well 
known and generally accepted. 
Leading in terms of rewarding communication was important in getting to the point of 
widespread awareness.  Top management did not stop employees’ initial initiatives, 
allowing them to develop own measures.  Additionally, commanders were willing to 
talk about the issue: at NL-1, a dedicated meeting of employees and managers was 
organised.  Top management tried to give direction to the discussions, aiming at both 
ensuring management credibility and preventing employee overreactions. 
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b) Draft ‘RI&E proces’ [‘process for risk assessments’] 
The discussed document ‘RI&E proces’ [‘process for risk assessments’] is a draft 
version that was written to improve the way risk assessments are done at NL-1.  The 
background is that many new risk assessments are needed.  Several of the existing risk 
assessments are four to six years old.  The ‘Inspectie SZW’ [‘Inspectorate SZW’, an 
agency of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment] published a report about its 
inspections at Dutch fire departments in June 2015 [‘Inspecties bij de brandweer 2015’].  
They concluded that all 19 of the inspected regional fire departments did not have up-to-
date risk assessments and action plans.  Moreover, the authorities recommended that a 
more uniform nationwide approach to risk assessment and mitigation should be 
implemented.  
 












H&S presentations → 





Taking care of employees is part of the process for developing risk assessments at 
NL-1.  As a starting point, firefighters are asked about their actual working conditions.  
For example, there are meetings to discuss scenarios such as call-outs and related 
actions in day-to-day operations.  Additionally, H&S questionnaires are sent out to 
employees.  Discussions between top management and team leaders (as representatives 
of employees) were considered to be the most valuable source of H&S information in 
the past.  However, the size of the organisation limits the number of personal 
discussions that are possible; there are more than 100 team leaders.  In general, 
however, employees take part in identifying risks. 
 
 194 
Deciding on the part of top management addresses the risks that were identified in co-
operation with employees.  The associated measures are developed by top management 
with no significant employee involvement, taking the recommendations of the H&S 
expert into account and possibly also scientific findings from research institutions such 
as IFV [the research institute of the safety regions in the Netherlands].  The defined 
measures are then communicated to employees through presentations by commanding 
officers and/or the H&S expert. 
 
Leading is less relevant in this case.  There are training courses and presentations about 
the H&S risks and measures for firefighters.  Major topics and the H&S strategy are 
presented to the team leaders in an annual top management presentation.  However, 
these presentations are typically not about topics that are mentioned in the risk 
assessments (RI&E) because these documents are very comprehensive and detailed.  
Thus, the contents of the risk assessments are weakly related to practices on the work 
floor; they may be considered rather theoretical.   
 
Innovating is less relevant here, as well.  The measures resulting from the risk 
assessment are defined by top management, taking the advice of the H&S expert into 
account.  Only a few of them are communicated in the training courses and 
presentations, as their relevance to the day-to-day work of firefighters is limited.  As a 
result, innovation processes are hardly possible due to the missing link between 
documented rules and practical experiences.  Nevertheless, NL-1 has introduced 
organisational innovations in the past, such as designated H&S fire officers in the field 
at major incidents.  
 
 
Main motivations for choosing the approaches 
 
a) Developing guidelines for ‘Schoon werken bij brand’ [‘clean working at fire’] 
This was a special process that was initiated by employees with the help of the media.  
From a scientific perspective, it was not even certain whether cancer was the most 
relevant H&S issue (high temperatures might be more relevant).  Top managers were, to 
some extent, forced to respond to public and staff opinion.  The ‘holistic system’ 
resulted from staff awareness and management support for open communication.  
Commanders then decided on further H&S initiatives for cancer prevention with respect 
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to the emerged information and small-scale H&S measures of employees.  They wanted 
to start doing something even without having any proof of the cancer risks.  At the same 
time, they tried to give direction to the discussion, aiming at both ensuring management 
credibility and preventing employee overreactions. 
 
b) Draft ‘RI&E proces’ [‘process for risk assessments’] 
This process reflected the formal process that was legally required in the Netherlands.  
However, it was acknowledged that few new practical insights would result from such 
regular risk assessments: it is estimated that about 80% of the findings from 2011 are 
still valid today.  Therefore, NL-1 is attempting to make the process for risk assessments 
more dynamic.  They want to make it less formal, and to make it easier to change the 
content.  At the same time, they want to retain control of the process and its contents.  
This would ensure that the new ‘RI&E proces’ [‘process for risk assessments’] meets 
legal requirements and also supports the development of H&S measures.  
 
 
Experiences with H&S authorities and views on their priorities 
 
Inspectors of the ‘Inspectie SZW’ tend to visit the fire department about once every 
three years.  There may be smaller inspections in between these main inspections.  
Inspectors want to see documents (especially valid risk assessments and action plans), 
but they also talk to people on the work floor.  In a comprehensive inspection, the 
authority will investigate both the H&S conditions on the work floor (for example, 
equipment at the stations and current behaviours) and the strategic H&S management 
system (for example, H&S policy and reporting system for near misses).  NL-1 has also 
discussed H&S innovation processes and experiences with authorities.  Thus, the 
authorities’ approach represents a ‘holistic system’ in terms of the model shown above.  
In general, they are open to discussion. 
 
The ‘Inspectie SZW’ takes a rather national view on fire departments and their H&S 
management.  Thus, they recommend a more uniform nationwide approach to risk 
assessments and H&S measures; see the SZW report on its inspections at Dutch fire 




Ideas of the researcher on the approaches to H&S management 
 
In the ‘holistic system’ described above, top managers led the way by allowing and 
supporting the corresponding communication.  However, they partly lost control over 
the contents of the discussion, which were defined by employees based on media 
reports.  This is a general risk when open communication is encouraged, because it 
produces H&S information that management must consider and appreciate.  If 
management ignores the resulting H&S information, the ‘taking care’ of employees will 
decline. 
 
The ‘RI&E process’ [‘process for risk assessments’] might be improved by making the 
contents more relevant for daily practice.  In addition to simplified processes, the 
following ideas may increase the effectiveness: 
 
• Split the risk assessment documents (‘RI&E’) into smaller pieces.  Many small 
risk assessments should be more likely to remain valid because they are easier to 
amend.  Such simplified documents are easier to use in innovation processes 
with employees.  
• The action fields of ‘leading’ and ‘innovating’ might be initiated with 
workshops on specific H&S issues that are relevant for daily work – perhaps 
including near misses.  Management would no longer decide alone on H&S 
measures.  This would result in a ‘holistic system’ also for the ‘RI&E process’ 
[‘process for risk assessments’]. 
 
 
Idea from NL-1 regarding the model 
 
In the field ‘innovating’, it might be more appropriate to state “assessment of 
measures” instead of “assessment of hazards”.  For example, in the case of the risk for 
cancer, the severity of hazards within a fire department cannot be assessed by 





Data sources for this case study 
 
This case study is based on two interviews and a site visit, which were conducted in 
April 2017.  The first interview participant was the H&S expert; the interview duration 
was 71 minutes.  The second interview participant was the vice-commander; the 
interview duration was 48 minutes.  Also considered were the two written documents 
‘Schoon werken bij brand’ [‘clean working at fire’] and ‘RI&E proces’ [‘process for 
risk assessments’], which were developed by the organisation.  Additionally, the 






Appendix D – Transcript Excerpts from Pilot Study Interviews 
 
Codified text passages 
• Blue: statements on managers’ H&S motivations 
• Yellow: descriptions of organisational context (project contexts in these cases)  
 
 
First pilot study: transcript excerpt from interview with vice-commander NL-1 
 
I:  That’s basically the model.  The literature says all four fields should take place 
somehow and the reality says, also my experience but also what I heard at other fire 
departments, is it’s not easy to really do that. #00:06:26.0# 
 
R: No, it’s not easy. #00:06:28.3# 
 
I: Typically, you’re focused on some parts of it and the idea was to discuss today about 
these two examples your fire department presented, what you think, how it worked.  
First, perhaps ‘schoon werken bij brand’ [‘clean working at fire’] and the second is the 
new risk assessment procedure, the ‘RI&E’ procedure [‘process for risk assessments’].  
Should we start with the first then, ‘schoon werken bij brand’.  What was your 
experience in that project or this development?  I think it’s been in development since 
2015, isn’t it? #00:07:08.9# 
 
R: Yes, correct.  Because of the same reasons why firemen, the basis of our 
organisation, start worrying about their health according to cancer, according to smoke, 
according to all the stuff that comes out of a fire, it was the same time when we got the 
awareness as well that maybe we have to do something.  That’s the time when we 
decided to start up a task force.  We, as the top management of the organisation, find it 
very important.  We said, well, the deputy commander is leading the task force just to 
make an example that we also find it very important. #00:08:11.9# 
 
I: Okay, so you were head of the task force, and there was… basically you also found it 
important as a response to the importance of the employees? #00:08:21.6# 
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R: Yes.  The awareness came on both sides as well as the employees, as well as the top 
management.  We then decided to create the task force and within the task force, we 
talked about measures; what can we do in the short term, what can we do in the mid-
term, and what do we have to do in the long term.  We said, okay, because people [at 
the work floor] were worrying about it, we have to do some… we call it low hanging 
fruits, the quick wins.  We have to do something to show that we really care, that we 
really want to invest.  You probably discussed the measures we do with [name of H&S 
expert], for instance, the cleaning, extra suits, cleaning rooms in all the fire stations.  We 
went to the board, the boss of our organisation… #00:09:55.2# 
 
I: In a company, it would be supervisory board? #00:09:58.5# 
 
R: No, the commissioners, the board of commissioners [municipal representatives].  We 
said, “Well, this is what we think is important.  These are the risks that we have in our 
organisation and because of our work, this is what we want to do and this is what it’s 
going to cost.  Do you agree?  Do you want to spend more money on that?  Do you want 
to pay more for it?” and they said, “Yes, this is important and that is our role”.  So, one 
way is into the organisation and the other way is through our board of commissioners to 
say, “This is what we want, this is what we need but this is what it’s going to cost you”. 
#00:10:44.0# 
 
I: Do you agree, yes.  It helped probably the commissioners that there was also a TV 
program?  I mean, I saw it on the internet, on ‘De Monitor’ [news magazine in Dutch 
TV], … I assume everybody knows it here. #00:11:02.0# 
 
R: Yes, everybody knows but there’s also not a… Sometimes people overreact and 
that’s the other part of it; how do we avoid panic. #00:11:19.6# 
 
I: Yes… Panic is perhaps too much but, yes. #00:11:23.2# 
 
R: Over-concern. #00:11:23.9# 
 
I: Over-concern, yes, that the people are scared to do their work. #00:11:27.4# 
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R: Fear to do their work.  So, we have to bring back reason in what we have to do and 
that’s what the measures are, especially the short, the quick wins, what do we do.  Will 
this work?  We don’t know.  It was not a decision we made.  We don’t know if 
everything works but we start and then we listen to… and this is what you said about 
innovating.  We have an idea that’s going to work.  We start and when it’s not working 
or when it has to be done another way, we will accept that and we change the way we 
do it.  We change the way we clean things, etc. #00:12:26.2# 
 
I: I mean you said it’s a reaction, or you show your initiative.  Now, I have talked to one 
colleague in Germany and they are very much coming from this analytical part and 
saying, “Well, we have no scientific proof yet that there’s a danger.  Of course, we are 
aware and we think of it”, but they have less measures. #00:12:52.9#  
 
R: I know but, on the other hand, that was what we really believe, the colleague in 
Germany is right.  There is no scientific proof but I don’t want to be involved in 10 
years when I could have done something now which I haven’t done because there was 
no scientific proof. #00:13:23.2# 
 
I: Understood, yes. #00:13:24.6# 
 
R: I’m not sure it’s working, what we do but it sure doesn’t harm. #00:13:34.2# 
 
I: Yes, true. #00:13:34.8# 
 
R: It’s not a bad thing to take off your dirty clothes and put on some new ones. 
#00:13:44.6# 
 
I: It cannot harm. #00:13:46.3# 
 
R: There’s no harm.  I don’t know if it really helps.  That’s the other thing we’re going 
to do, I can only tell that over maybe two decades but should I take the risk now to do 
nothing.  That’s when we said no. #00:14:07.8# 
 
I: Okay. #00:14:09.3# 
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R: But we do it reasonably within proportions.  We don’t overreact but we’re going to 
do something.  One of the other things we’re doing is, okay, this is the short term, this is 
what we’re going to do.  [name of H&S expert] has told you probably all about it.  We 
are innovating. #00:14:29.8# 
 
I: You went into more details, yes, and therefore it’s a study at IFV [‘Instituut Fysieke 
Veiligheid‘, a research institute of the safety regions in the Netherlands]… right… 
about the cleaning. #00:14:40.4# 
 
R: For instance, the suits stay where they are, the clothes, the specific fire clothes.  We 
have to change them this year or next year.  We said we’ll wait because we know 
there’s a study going on in Finland.  When the results of the study come in then we 
decide what route we’re going to go.  That’s one of the decisions we made. 
#00:15:15.1# 
 
I: Also, that’s not a costly decision.  It doesn’t cost very much extra.  It’s cost nothing, 
basically, and you simply wait. #00:15:23.2# 
 
R: On the other hand, when things cost, for instance, every professional fireman here 
has a second suit. #00:15:33.2# 
 
I: Yes, and that costs. #00:15:34.3# 
 
R: That costs, but that’s necessary because we want to achieve things.  We want to 
achieve that everyone doesn’t have to use a dirty suit on the next incident.  If you say 
that, you have to accept the costs. #00:15:57.6# 
 
I: Yes, but that’s then really a discussion of cost because that’s a lot of cost.  I mean a 
second suit, that’s a substantial cost. #00:16:02.7# 
 
R: That’s a substantial cost but, on the other hand, when you set out a line, “That’s what 
we want to be, that’s what we want to do”, you have to accept the consequences.  Of 
course, there are limits, sure, but on the other hand when you say we are an organisation 
that goes for safety and for health – that’s what we do outside – then we also have to do 
that for our own employees. #00:16:37.8# 
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I: Yes, you need it otherwise you’ll lose your credibility.  Okay, and then of course the 
leaders, I’m just thinking about leading, it’s not creating awareness because the 
awareness was there anyway, right?  It’s more like rewarding communication then? 
#00:16:57.3# 
 
R: Yes, it’s rewarding communication and it’s canalizing.  How do you call that, to lead 
the awareness? #00:17:11.0# 
 
I: Yes, “Kanalisieren” in German.  I have to write it down.  I don’t know how to say it 
in English, to give direction. #00:17:24.2# 
 
R: To give direction to the emotions, to the awareness, that’s what we do by leading. 
#00:17:30.3# 
 
I: Yes.  I think we mean the same. 
 
R: “Kanalisieren” is what we would say in Dutch, too. 
 
I: I have to look up what that really means in English. #00:17:50.0# 
 
 
Second pilot study: transcript excerpt from interview with vice-commander D-1 
 
R: I'll give one more example.  With regards to accidents, I don't know whether you've 
heard, now we're at smoke diving [accidents]: in Marne and in Cologne.  
 
I: I know Cologne, yes. #00:41:50.9# 
 
R: There were smoke diving accidents there.  And we also looked at the accident reports 
during this working group and honestly asked ourselves, can that happen with us, 
something like that?  And what was the/ there were actually really complex causal 
chains, that each led to the accidents.  In Marne unfortunately fatal, in Cologne thank 
God yes only seriously injured.  Can components of this causal chain also occur with 
us?  And we realized, yes, they can happen.  How do we actually do our pressure 
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monitoring, if we do the pressure monitoring?  And then they said, yes, the lowest 
pressure, that and that.  And then we said, yes, guys, that's dangerous, because if the 
pressure, if one person is being deployed with 330 bar and the other one with 270 bar.  
Then I automatically assume that the lowest pressure is coming from the one who has 
the 270 bar.  But what if the other one has a device defect and suddenly after the second 
pressure monitoring it's the low/then I don't see that.  So we need to perform a pressure 
monitoring.  So…  That was the first realization.  And then it can happen to us that one 
time someone whose breathing protection is not monitored is deployed in smoke diving.  
Rather rare but it can happen.  #00:43:08.5# 
 
I: Who isn't capable of smoke diving? #00:43:10.5# 
 
R: No, he is capable of smoke diving, but he hasn't registered.  And then we thought, 
how do we come to the point where we can see from a distance, if he was at smoke-
diving registration or not? And yes, then we thought, okay where is there a system 
where you have to remove something, so that something can start.  And then there is 
this remove before flight trailer at Lufthansa or for some airlines, before the aircraft can 
fly again.  And then we said that we could, actually…, we make a remove-before-
smoke-diving badge, which is fitted with velcro to the jacket.  We have bright jackets 
and then I can see from far away, because someone has a smoke diving device and may 
already be connected but still has this badge.  This can't happen.  And at the same time, 
each person individually gets his name written on it, so that when I am at the smoke 
diving registration, I don't have to write on it, or what was the name of that guy that just 
went past because the machinist [driver of the fire engine] at the beginning, if he has to 
do the smoke diving registration/has several tasks and can't do all of that.  And this is 
now an example where, in our existing structures without a technical… well, yes, that is 
also technically a change, but where, in existing structures, we've learned lessons, yes 
from others, said to ourselves when reading accident reports of others, we need to 
improve that.  #00:44:40.2# 
 
I: And that's a velcro strap on each person's jacket.  #00:44:45.1# 
 
R: Exactly, we have jackets that are sand bag colours and so you can see the red very 
easily.  And so, also a bit with a smiley, there’s this remove-before-smoke-diving, 
everyone knows the remove-before-flight and yes.  #00:45:00.4# 
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I: This is a great idea, yes.  #00:45:03.5# 
 
R: Then we wrote a product introduction for it.  Exactly so.  It explains, what's the 
background? Why do we want it like that? We have procured other smoke diving 
registration badges, but this is pure coincidence.  And then [at that point in time] we 
also asked the team what other problems does smoke diving registration create for us.  
If, for example, it rains, then, sorry, the pen doesn't write.  How do we get the pen to 
write? Then we looked for paper that is not destructible, on which you can write under 
water, and got a pen, the famous NASA pen.  I don't know if you know the one which 
has a gas pressure system and always writes.  No matter whether I write over my head, 
underwater, whatever.  It's called NASA pen, because NASA/ #00:45:51.5# 
 
I: … it’s for microgravity...  #00:45:54.5# 
 
R: Exactly.  The Russians just took a pencil, but we couldn't do that now because it 
doesn't write so well if it's wet.  But that's how things came about from it...  Just to make 
it easier because people may die from that.  We have seen that in a practical example.  
Unfortunately, it was a dramatic way but said it made us decide, that's how we'll do it.  
#00:46:18.0# 
 
I: And, once again, that was also from a working group [in the federal state of D-1], 
wasn’t it? #00:46:20.9# 
 
R: No, it is a D-1 idea.  #00:46:22.5# 
 
I: This is a D-1 idea?  #00:46:23.8# 
 
R: D-1 idea.  #00:46:27.4# 
 
I: Yes, the other… we will later… exactly.  #00:46:28.9# 
 
R: But we found the idea, now it shouldn't sound like we're blowing our own trumpets, 
we found the idea to be a good one and used an event in the district of [name of the 
administrative region] where we informed people about it.  That was our idea.  We said, 
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listen people, there were two serious smoke diving accidents.  We've examined them.  
We'll describe the accidents to you.  And at the same time, we'll describe the lessons we 
learned from them to you.  And then we offered a training session, it was really well 
attended, there were 112 colleagues, comrades, managers from the entire district area 
and at the same time we also wrote an article for an association newsletter [in the 
federal state of D-1], where that was then publicised, the idea behind it.  #00:47:07.1# 
 
I: Ok, nice.  This means that you have developed the measure in a work group.  Who 
was included in this working group, then? #00:47:13.9# 
 
R: The idea was from this AusTakTek.  [Commission for] technology and tactics… and 
me also.  Yes.  #00:47:20.1# 
 
I: So, from this working group, yes, from you as the leader and the others, those are? 
#00:47:27.7# 
 
R: Colleagues.  Section heads.  Managers.  #00:47:30.4# 
 
(Short interruption because of incoming telephone call) 
 
I: You talked about the decision-making circle according to the fire department rule 
FwDV 100. Well, that [rule] is rather abstract.  For example, what I have seen in 
Sweden is that in addition to these abstract instructions, they also try to make detailed 
instructions, for instance, the smoke is dense, then you do that.  The smoke is less 
dense, then do you do this.  So just for the smoke diving activity.  What they, yes, 
what's defined as policy there, is there also something like that here, or is that/ 
#00:48:23.8# 
 
R: So, we have the so-called standard operating rules for emergency responses.  They 
aren't that detailed, but instead we have trainings, we train our colleagues for 18 months 
in firefighting and give them regular ongoing training.  We send them once into the fire 
container, where they're supposed to learn how to read fire and I have no possibility to 
work according to a checklist – so to say, inside [a building] – like a pilot, who can 
simply take his checklist into the cockpit and say, that's happened, I can't do that in 
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smoke diving.  Because either I must hold the checklist as close to my face as possible 
or I can/ #00:49:02.8# 
 
I: You can't see it, exactly.  #00:49:04.5# 
 
R: I can't see it at all, exactly.  This is why we are trying to get measures through right 
now, that keep everything as simple as possible.  And with good training and regular 
repetition of the training, giving people the right tools in their hand, but also 
encouraging the people very clearly in their responsibility.  Taking responsibility.  
Making decisions themselves.  To say, okay, we’ll do this like that now and we’ll do 
this like that now.  And me personally, however this is my totally personal opinion, I 
don't think it's effective if I say to someone, the smoke is thick or the smoke is this, and 
now you must do that and that by default, because each indoor intervention, each work 
is very individual there and we want them to deal with their environment and we train 
them so that they can develop a sense of the situation exactly for this reason.  And the 
answer but not always by default, but also in relation to the concrete situation for 
yourself and your team partner, is to develop a strategy for action that allows you to 
proceed.  That's why it's our task to give them tools in their hand but also to train them 
to take a certain degree of responsibility.  #00:50:20.3# 
 
I: Self-responsibility also means, of course/ #00:50:22.8# 
 
R: making decisions.  In a small area, but then we enable them to make decisions.  
#00:50:29.1# 
 
I: That means that they then also have, you also allow them to make the decision.  
#00:50:33.9# 
 
R: Yes, of course.  #00:50:34.6# 
 
I: So, you require it of them.  #00:50:36.1# 
 
R: This is what we do in ambulance service as well… (deviating from the topic of 
indoor firefighting)… I must be aware of the good training and say, yes, they have the 
right tool to make the decision.  #00:53:16.3# 
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I: This is also… exactly… If we come back once again to this smoke diving team 
member.  He must also, if he feels uncertain inside there, now from my perspective, 
then he obviously doesn't need to read any operating instruction, he just has to, then he 
has to practically be able to give the message and withdraw.  #00:53:32.8# 
 
R: Exactly.  In principle, he [the fireman] must evaluate, can I take responsibility for 
taking a measure now, which maybe isn't the standard measure but can remedy things 
here.  If I can't, I must pull back and provide feedback.  The decisive factor is that they 
communicate, that this feedback comes and the decision, right now I'm at my wits end 
here and then also give the feedback.  To do this, technically the options must exist, the 
best possible ones.  And the employees must be sensitized to realise: So, now I'm at my 
wits end and I need support in making a decision.  #00:54:13.9# 
 
I: Yes, and he must and perhaps he must also have the feeling that he is allowed to say 
it.  #00:54:19.3# 
 
R: Precisely, yes.  #00:54:21.3# 
 
I: So you can also create a lot of pressure.  #00:54:26.9# 
 
R: No, so we try to live it like that, that the employees have no inhibitions, even for 
something like this to get down to the details, say, hey, what did you think when this 
happened? What was going on? What is the background? This is what works in 
practice.  And then we must consider the matter.  Because they don't want to tell us 
anything personal, but we should, it’s in our interest for them to be able to work as best 
as possible, because they can put out the fire that way as best as possible or help 
someone in the rescue services.  It's our task to create the best possible framework, the 
best possible way to do that.  And if you come up against the limits at any time and 
actually want more then you must be able to report that back and constructively that's 
always the most decisive thing, that's exactly why we have this requirement, this 
requirement that there is constructive feedback, can you do that or consider it once 
again, improve.  #00:55:18.5# 
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I: A question then: Employees, now if I'm one of your employees, you said several 
times, good, then on the one hand I can come into your office, and say, this and that is 
bothering me.  Are there any other ways I can give feedback? #00:55:32.3# 
 
R: Yes.  We have a regular meeting, which is called a jour fixe.  Jour fixe rescue 
service, now this is my area.  All the employees can attend this.  The focus, of course, is 
from the field of rescue services.  But everyone else who wants to come is invited or 
gladly invited to come and they can say anything there.  And there we've already 
discussed garbage bags in garbage bins.  There are minutes.  The minutes state what the 
content was.  Who has a task and who is responsible and by when.  And that's been 
going on since I've been here, for two and a half years.  And since then, there are 





Appendix E – Interviewees’ Motivation Statements 
 
Interviewee Motivation statement 
D-2 Interview commander 
draw information from the circle of professional 
fire departments 
D-2 Interview commander employees came and said 
D-2 Interview commander 
I did not choose the H&S approach, but it has been 
historically developed 
D-2 Interview commander it was always done like that 
D-2 Interview commander 
derived from legal demands there is a focus on 
machines and technical installations 
D-2 Interview commander 
governance of top-management, this I want to 
improve 
D-2 Interview commander lack the H&S committee. It is at the city 
D-2 Interview commander 
I am interested that the employees do not suffer any 
harm 
D-2 Interview commander improvement of the system 
D-2 Interview commander specifications of district government 
D-2 Interview commander 
this fire department is lacking a good middle 
management 
D-2 Interview commander 
more time for their duties, one or the other could be 
trained even better 
D-2 Interview commander 
strengthening H&S as it will be on team leader 
level and in the tactical department 
D-2 Interview commander tactics determines purchasing, not vice versa 
D-2 Interview H&S expert 
because we have no time for another version than 
the top-down approach 
D-2 Interview H&S expert 
completing regular inspections, in principle 
according to the H&S law 
D-2 Interview H&S expert controlling of day-to-day business 
D-2 Interview H&S expert first checking the available data on a topic 
D-2 Interview H&S expert 
it must be ensured that the quality of our work is 
not reduced by improved H&S 
D-2 Interview H&S expert 
not very much time, thus we pursue with a short 
analysis 
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D-2 Interview H&S expert transport this mentality in such (dangerous) fields 
D-2 Interview H&S expert 
you see the result, but the way we came there is not 
shown 
D-3 Interview commander 
(H&S Expert of the city) came here and asked for 
risk assessments 
D-3 Interview commander the head of the diving team came to me 
D-3 Interview commander 
when he (the H&S Expert of the city) offered his 
support 
D-3 Interview commander 
I do not have the time (to complete all risk 
assessments) 
D-3 Interview commander everyone has always said that it is enough to 
D-3 Interview commander 
if I am not able to change the H&S related building 
situation 
D-3 Interview commander I have very clear requirements from my mayor 
D-3 Interview commander 
It is fun to discuss with (the H&S Expert of the 
city) 
D-3 Interview commander 
two (free) master students searched for a 
dissertation topic 
D-3 Interview commander we think through the (H&S) work procedures 
D-3 Interview H&S experts 
according to the rule ‘DGUV A1’ the delegation of 
responsibilities shall now 
D-3 Interview H&S experts 
(peers) have asked, do you have a risk assessment 
diving 
D-3 Interview H&S experts create patience at the emergency site 
D-3 Interview H&S experts making the responsibility clearer for all 
D-3 Interview H&S experts 
if we have a higher education, the (work) quality 
will be better 
D-3 Interview H&S experts one of the most dangerous activities 
D-3 Interview H&S experts 
procedures being practical so that they can serve 
superiors 
D-3 Interview H&S experts we must act according to the rules 
D-4 Interview H&S expert and then the top-management feels to be obliged 
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D-4 Interview H&S expert 
it is less about the rules and laws, but more often 
the inspiration from younger colleagues 
D-4 Interview H&S expert 
there are fields, and that concerns of course H&S, 
where inspirations can be important 
D-4 Interview H&S expert 
when a (vacant) position is filled, something 
changes too 
D-4 Interview H&S expert every fireman is a little bit of a hero 
D-4 Interview H&S expert I used the opportunity 
D-4 Interview H&S expert one has no other choice than to comply 
D-4 Interview H&S expert there are of course laws 
D-4 Interview H&S expert we do not only want to comply with the law 
D-4 Interview H&S expert 
you are even responsible for their actions if you are 
not with them 
D-4 Interview vice-commander 
(allowing wishes) we get relatively many ideas also 
from employees 
D-4 Interview vice-commander 
could not imagine how we could make it better 
with the given resources 
D-4 Interview vice-commander my duty to set priorities (in the budget) 
D-4 Interview vice-commander it is difficult to describe (a risk assessment) 
D-4 Interview vice-commander that are all things which develop from experience 
D-4 Interview vice-commander train things so that it works at the emergency 
D-4 Interview vice-commander we have now a relatively good solution 
D-5 Interview H&S expert 
because of less emergencies, one must complete 
more trainings 
D-5 Interview H&S expert 
analyse how it looks like in the cabin (of the fire 
engines) 
D-5 Interview H&S expert every fire department must be financeable 
D-5 Interview H&S expert I have no time 
D-5 Interview H&S expert during emergencies... would not be possible 
D-5 Interview H&S expert health and safety works well for reaching decisions 
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D-5 Interview H&S expert health and safety is allowed to also use 
D-5 Interview H&S expert 
in the building now everything ok, thus my main 
duty 
D-5 Interview H&S expert one lives as a team 
D-5 Interview H&S expert 
regarding safety, we rather rely on the 
manufacturer (of the vehicle) 
D-5 Interview H&S expert the latest knowledge 
D-5 Interview H&S expert 
we have a reporting system, which however was 
not made for H&S 
D-5 Interview vice-commander 
a little bit of individual responsibility (of the 
fireman) 
D-5 Interview vice-commander 
do not aim for total safety, then we would not well 
extinguish the fire 
D-5 Interview vice-commander everyone (fireman) can decide himself 
D-5 Interview vice-commander I (must) provide the tools that one needs 
D-5 Interview vice-commander 
our safety rule also says that we can deviate from 
certain things 
D-5 Interview vice-commander it must be solved technically 
D-5 Interview vice-commander manufacturers… develop things 
D-5 Interview vice-commander there are also safety rules 
D-5 Interview vice-commander 
there is a danger (in the risk assessment), so I must 
react 
D-5 Interview vice-commander there are things that cannot be prescribed in detail 
D-5 Interview vice-commander 
there currently is a mindshift, everybody has 
realised 
D-5 Interview vice-commander 
within the large fire department community of 
AGBF one then said 
NL-2 Interview commander big responsibility for the user themselves 
NL-2 Interview commander let people have a big influence 
NL-2 Interview commander let's try to make our own instruction movie 
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NL-2 Interview commander that is a cultural thing 
NL-2 Interview commander work in the NL-2 way 
NL-2 Interview H&S experts creating awareness 
NL-2 Interview H&S experts give a good example 
NL-2 Interview H&S experts policy in our region is, everyone is responsible 
NL-2 Interview H&S experts learn from near misses 
NL-2 Interview H&S experts 
the fewer layers of managers, the better it is 
(according to or policy) 
NL-2 Interview H&S experts we are all responsible for our health 
NL-3 Interview commander everything is made a safety issue 
NL-3 Interview commander dealing with it together (with the union) 
NL-3 Interview commander did not feel free to do so 
NL-3 Interview commander investigation in the first place 
NL-3 Interview commander needed an accident to mind shift 
NL-3 Interview commander not the right way (according to experience) 
NL-3 Interview commander think more about how we do it 
NL-3 Interview commander the whole system 
NL-3 Interview H&S expert people decide 
NL-3 Interview H&S expert know what risks you take 
NL-3 Interview H&S expert prevention 
NL-3 Interview H&S expert team support (‘draagvlak’) 
NL-3 Interview H&S expert people are not always convinced 
NL-3 Interview H&S expert prevent that risks are brought in 
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NL-3 Interview H&S expert that communication works well 
NL-3 Interview H&S expert there might be an H&S problem 
NL-4 Interview commander 
before we were very busy making the list right so 
the inspection could not say nothing 
NL-4 Interview commander believe very in the behaviour-oriented thing 
NL-4 Interview commander 
improve the health and safety situation and 
documentation 
NL-4 Interview commander explain why it is a problem 
NL-4 Interview commander it is to the manager to get it better 
NL-4 Interview commander how to manage behaviour 
NL-4 Interview commander making people think 
NL-4 Interview commander 
fire departments are experienced-based for how 
they learn 
NL-4 Interview commander it is important, but the second step is 
NL-4 Interview commander 
so that also people are knowing why we do the 
things 
NL-4 Interview commander only the technical option is not enough 
NL-4 Interview commander really make it happen 
NL-4 Interview H&S expert people said ... there is a problem 
NL-4 Interview H&S expert need extra money 
NL-4 Interview H&S expert learn the people first think, first look, be aware 
NL-4 Interview H&S expert newer insights 
NL-4 Interview H&S expert we have to educate our personnel 
NL-4 Interview H&S expert there was not enough awareness 
NL-5 Interview H&S experts competition atmosphere 
NL-5 Interview H&S experts being responsible 
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NL-5 Interview H&S experts convince people in order to organise it 
NL-5 Interview H&S experts create understanding 
NL-5 Interview H&S experts it is not top-down 
NL-5 Interview H&S experts management has decided on H&S policy 
NL-5 Interview H&S experts new organisation 
NL-5 Interview H&S experts putting a name to it 
NL-5 Interview H&S experts make people think about it 
NL-5 Interview H&S experts the higher our target the more money it will cost 
NL-5 Interview H&S experts something new 
NL-5 Interview H&S experts we meet the law 
NL-5 Interview H&S experts to convince people 
NL-5 Interview H&S experts want to accomplish something 
NL-5 Interview vice-commander (explain) what we do and why we do it 
NL-5 Interview vice-commander 
communication with the members of the 
organisation 
NL-5 Interview vice-commander 
people must experience that something changes for 
them 
NL-5 Interview vice-commander 
health and safety team independent of primary 
processes 
NL-5 Interview vice-commander in the media there was much coverage 
NL-5 Interview vice-commander mayors come by themselves with these questions 
NL-5 Interview vice-commander taking health and safety problems of staff serious 
NL-5 Interview vice-commander one can do much good with it 
NL-5 Interview vice-commander with it there is an (H&S) face in the organisation 
S-2 Interview commander 
agreements between the employer and the 
employee 
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S-2 Interview commander it was sponsored by the insurance 
S-2 Interview commander 
I (as fireman) have the responsibility to wear the 
things 
S-2 Interview commander in S2... we work like this 
S-2 Interview commander putting people to work with it 
S-2 Interview commander we are turning into more personal responsibility 
S-2 Interview commander you need to fulfil them (the legal rules) 
S-2 Interview H&S expert 
better to have good material for education, and then 
maybe instructions 
S-2 Interview H&S expert (using time) between emergencies 
S-2 Interview H&S expert 
it does not cost us much (the time between 
emergencies) 
S-2 Interview H&S expert it is enough safe for us 
S-2 Interview H&S expert learn them how to express the risks 
S-2 Interview H&S expert exchanging ideas with other fire departments 
S-2 Interview H&S expert saw ways of doing better 
S-2 Interview H&S expert 
we know that they (the H&S authority) are going to 
ask 
S-2 Interview H&S expert that was wrong in the system 
S-2 Interview H&S expert you should feel well when you are on the job 
S-2 Interview H&S expert 
we are interested and we learn things that we can 
really use and change 
S-3 Interview H&S expert because it is in the law 
S-3 Interview H&S expert convince the employees and the employer 
S-3 Interview H&S expert educate the employees 
S-3 Interview H&S expert get lot of answers by doing this 
S-3 Interview H&S expert have a bigger knowledge 
 217 
Interviewee Motivation statement 
S-3 Interview H&S expert 
have a harder safety instruction than the 
manufacturer 
S-3 Interview H&S expert they (the people) did not complain 
S-3 Interview H&S expert 
you minimize the costs or you minimize the risk to 
employees 
S-3 Interview vice-commander 
is quite new for us also, so that is why it was 
important 
S-3 Interview vice-commander just take really care of the H&S question 
S-3 Interview vice-commander 
make sure that the questions about safety (are 
considered) 
S-3 Interview vice-commander sometimes it is a money question also 
S-3 Interview vice-commander that idea came up together with the people 
S-3 Interview vice-commander 
we are more on practical things and maybe not 
make a special paper 
S-4 Interview H&S expert (decide) how it should be done 
S-4 Interview H&S expert in law it is, sort of, written down 
S-4 Interview H&S expert 
it is his (the vice-commanders) decision but i think 
it gives the possibility for the people 
S-4 Interview H&S expert supposed to check them every year 
S-4 Interview H&S expert processing things 
S-4 Interview H&S expert take care of all the things 
S-4 Interview vice-commander do it systematically 
S-4 Interview vice-commander first have to see in the legislation 
S-4 Interview vice-commander evaluate incidents 
S-4 Interview vice-commander learn from our 
S-4 Interview vice-commander make new education material 
S-4 Interview vice-commander then we have it done (according to the law) 
S-4 Interview vice-commander pick up how to continue 
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S-4 Interview vice-commander problem is the learning phase 
S-4 Interview vice-commander wanted to change the roles and how we work 
S-4 Interview vice-commander tried to find a solution 
S-4 Interview vice-commander 
wanted to see, okay, can we learn something from 
that 
S-5 Interview H&S expert brainstorm it together 
S-5 Interview H&S expert clarify for the team leaders 
S-5 Interview H&S expert if we don't report near misses, the third time it will 
S-5 Interview H&S expert if you take a risk it should be really calculated 
S-5 Interview H&S expert information that we will give to all the people 
S-5 Interview H&S expert try to protect 
S-5 Interview H&S expert we have to comply with it 
S-5 Interview H&S expert try to get everyone's opinion 
S-5 Interview commander a tool when we do something (organisational) 
S-5 Interview commander being responsive, listening to employees 
S-5 Interview commander create feeling of confidence and safety (‘trygghet’) 
S-5 Interview commander focus on certain things 
S-5 Interview commander find solutions 
S-5 Interview commander go through what can occur 
S-5 Interview commander municipality's way of controlling 
S-5 Interview commander 
it must be easy for those who take responsibility at 
the site 
S-5 Interview commander learn from accidents 
S-5 Interview commander progress with rules 
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S-5 Interview commander risk assessment is a good tool 
S-5 Interview commander they want that we do an update every year 
S-5 Interview commander systematic way of preventing 
S-5 Interview commander a fireman can always say no 
 
 
